INTRODUCTION

The 20th century may go down in history as the century of war and peace—the first in which world wars were fought, the first in which men established world peace, and so, perhaps, the last in which peace among nations was merely an armed truce, a breathing spell between wars. Even if world peace is not actually begun in our time, we may prove to be the first generation of men on earth who, under the impact of world wars, have made a firm attempt to draw a decisive conclusion from all the accumulated wisdom concerning war and peace.

It may be thought that antiquity anticipates, and that at all times the tradition contains, the fundamental notions which have recently gained so wide a currency. Socrates and Epictetus, for example, speak of world citizenship. Marcus Aurelius and Zeno of Citium even more explicitly envision a world community. Alexander tries to conquer the world to make it one; Virgil proclaims a peace which will be as universal as the Roman Empire; and Dante, recasting Virgil's vision, advocates the reenactment of that empire and with it monarchy—by which he means one government—to give all Christendom political as well as spiritual unity.

To neglect these anticipations would be to overlook wisdom's perennial aspirations for unity. But if, because of their significance for peace, they should not be neglected here, neither should their importance be exaggerated. For one thing, man has always acted at variance with his wisdom, nullifying the hope of peace by preparing always for the next war. For another thing, it is doubtful that peace by conquest or by empire—the only ways in which the past could conceive the world's coming to the unity of peace—would be a peace perpetual as well as universal. The latter without the former is but a fraction of the ideal.

Even when in modern times the ideal is at last stated in terms of peaceful methods for achieving peace—by law, not by force; by consent, not by imposition—something less than the whole world in its global reality is the object of consideration. William Penn and Rousseau, for example, state the indispensable legal conditions for turning Europe from a continent perpetually wracked by wars into a society able to perpetuate peace, but their historical location causes them to limit their proposals to Europe.

Kant alone first makes the generalization which lies dormant in their reasoning, and which almost begs to be inductively drawn from the conceptions of war and peace so plainly stated by Hobbes and Locke. He conceives the possibility of a peace not only perpetual but truly worldwide. Yet for all the rightness he perceives in what he calls "the cosmopolitical ideal," it seems to remain for him an ideal—not attainable except by approximation. Yet because it is right, he holds that it must be pursued even though it is impossible. We are the first generation to argue for world peace as a conclusion on the level of reality and to conclude that it is possible because it is necessary.

The argument is not yet won, nor the conclusion enacted, but henceforth the problem of war and peace can hardly be discussed without stating the issue as a choice of world government and peace, or of world anarchy and war. If it does no more than seriously face that choice for the first time, the 20th
century makes a signal advance in understanding one of the great ideas—an advance which can change the course of history and the life of man more than the discovery of atomic fission, which is only an instrument of war or a tool of peace. But just as the release of heat and energy from nuclear combustion has its prototype in ordinary fire, which the ancients associate with the beginning of civilization, so the insight which may exert a new civilizing force has its origin in the fundamental thinking man does about war and peace as soon as he begins to think about society.

In the tradition of the great books, war and peace are usually discussed in political terms, or at least in terms of the relation of men to one another, individually or in groups. But the psychologist, the moralist, and the theologian sometimes use the word “peace” in another sense to signify the absence of conflict within the individual or to signify an inner harmony—peace of mind on earth or the heavenly rest of the blessed in the presence of God.

In their spiritual meanings, war and peace are considered in other chapters; e.g., interior conflict is a topic in the chapter on Opposition and interior peace is discussed in the chapter on Happiness. We shall not treat these matters here except in their bearing on the social and political discussion; nor shall we consider civil war except for the light it throws on war and peace in general. The special problem of discord and strife within a single community belongs to the chapter on Revolution.

Certain attitudes toward war between states seem to recur in every century. In the face of the ever-present fact of war, men deplore its folly or find some benefit to compensate for its devastation. But throughout most of the tradition, those who see only suffering, no less than those who celebrate the martial spirit, seem to accept the necessity of war. Good or bad, or a mixture of the glorious and the horrible, war seems, to most of those who write about it, an inevitable thing—as ineradicable as disease and death for the living body, as inescapable as tragedy. Only in recent times has the inevitability of war been questioned, and the possibility of lasting peace proposed.

The two books which look most steadily and searchingly on the face of war—Homer’s The Iliad and Tolstoy’s War and Peace—seem to behold it as a mixed thing. Battle with sword and javelin on the plains of Troy or with musket and howitzer on the Russian steppes lets loose a fury which sweeps human nature to extremes of nobility and baseness, to actions of heroic strength and cringing weakness. To both Homer and Tolstoy, war is the realm of force and chance, and though both see in it occasions for courage and magnanimity and even for a kind of charity or at least compassion, the whole spectacle is one of agony, pervaded by darkness and dismay, torn bodies and ruined minds. “Grievous war” is Homer’s repeated epithet. “Pale fear” and “black death” are the colors of battle. They are everywhere that Ares reigns, “Ares, manslaughtering, blood-stained,” “insatiate of fighting.”

To the poet of any century, Homer or Tolstoy, Virgil or Shakespeare, war’s human features appear to be unchanged even if its mechanical dress and physical lineaments are altered—its weapons and armor, its organization of men and materials, its scope of operations in space and time. The historian who measures the contestants and keeps the score of victories and defeats takes a different view. He dwells on all the differences which mark progress in the art of war, or which enable wealthier and more advanced societies to wage wars of greater magnitude. To Herodotus, no military undertaking ever assumed the proportions of Xerxes’ army on the march, raising a cloud of dust from horizon to horizon. Yet Thucydides says that before the Peloponnesian War “there was nothing on a great scale either in war or in other matters.”

The historian is attentive not only to weights and numbers, to the changing accouterment of war and its mechanical elaboration, but also to inventions in the sphere of strategy and tactics. The Alexandrian phalanx, the patience of Fabius, the forced marches of Caesar, Hannibal’s outflanking and enveloping movements at the battle of Cannae, the deployment in depth of the Roman legions on the Rhine—these are but a few of the inventions of mil-
itary genius which, as Plutarch, Tacitus, and Gibbon recognize, have an effect far beyond the advantage that novelty initially gives them. They become the classical models of war's art and the principles of its science.

Tolstoy may scoff at the historians who stand in awe of military genius. He may be right that Kutuzov's lack of plans rather than Napoleon's air of outwitting all contingencies is the essence of great generalship. Nevertheless Tolstoy magnifies the campaign of 1812 as beyond comparison the greatest mass movement of humanity, from west to east and then from east to west, just as Herodotus apotheosizes the movement of the Persian horde from east to west and Thucydides the rise of Athenian naval power.

Writing from the center of a whole continent in arms a century later, Freud in 1915 gives his impression of what was yet to become the first world war. A war of such proportions and ferocity was almost incredible before it happened. "Then the war in which we had refused to believe broke out," and, Freud writes, "not only is it more sanguinary and more destructive than any war of other days, because of the enormously increased perfection of weapons of attack and defense; but it is at least as cruel, as embittered, as implacable as any that preceded it ... It tramples in blind fury on all that comes in its way, as though there were to be no future and no goodwill among men after it has passed. It rends all bonds of fellowship between the contending peoples, and threatens to leave such a legacy of embitterment as will make any renewal of such bonds impossible for a long time to come."

The enemies of war use a variety of weapons in their attack. The Trojan Women of Euripides cries out with the bitterness of Andromache and Hecuba against the misery of war's innocent victims—the women and children who are left to mourn the vanquished or to become the victors' spoils. Aristophanes turns laughter rather than pity and fear against the waste of war. Such comedies as Peace, The Acharnians, Lysistrata make light of the issues over which men fight and give war the aspect of a wearisome business, preposterous in its motives and hollow in its victories. In the 20th century, Brecht's Mother Courage and Her Children is a biting satire on the folly and cruelty of war.

The genial satire of Rabelais exposes the impostures of war, but beneath the horseplay which deflates by its exaggerations, there is the earnest, serious note of Grangousier's resolution not to "undertake war until I have first tried all the ways and means of peace." Swift's satire is not so amiable. In the eyes of the truly rational Houyhnhnms, war appears to be as senseless and despicable as the Yahoos who wage it. Gulliver tries to tell the Houyhnhnm who is his master about the wars of Europe, their causes and their cost. "I was going on to more particulars," he relates, "when my master commanded me silence. He said whoever understood the nature of the Yahoos might easily believe it possible for so vile an animal to be capable of every action I had named, if their strength and cunning equalled their malice ... When a creature pretending to reason could be capable of such enormities, he dreaded lest the corruption of that faculty might be worse than brutality itself. He seemed therefore confident that, instead of reason, we were only possessed of some quality fitted to increase our natural vices." And Voltaire, in Candide, after referring to the opposing armies as "so handsome, so smart, so brilliant, so well trained," calls their ensuing clash "heroic butchery."

According to Augustine, it is not man's nature but his sinfulness which degrades him below the beasts "devoid of rational will," who "live more securely and peaceably with their own kind than men ... For not even lions or dragons have ever waged with their kind such wars as men have waged with one another." Calling it "the greatest and most pompous of human actions," Montaigne asks whether war is not "testimony of our imbecility and imperfection; as indeed the science of undoing and killing one another, of ruining and destroying our own species, seems to have little to make it alluring to the beasts who do not have it."

But in his essay "Of evil means employed to a good end," Montaigne also quotes Juvenal's remark that "we bear the evils of long peace;
fiercer than war, luxury weighs us down.” He seems to approve the Roman policy of maintaining wars “not only to keep their men in condition, for fear that idleness, mother of corruption, might bring them some worse mischief... but also to serve as a bloodletting for their republic and to cool off a bit the too vehement heat of their young men.” War as a purgative is a familiar theme. Hobbes, like Malthus later, suggests that “when all the world is overcharged with inhabitants, then the last remedy of all is war; which provideth for every man, by victory or death.”

Many writers seem to be ambivalent about war. Plato, for example, seems to see both sides of the question though he does not give them equal weight. In The Republic, Socrates proclaims the discovery that war is “derived from causes which are also the causes of almost all the evils in states, private as well as public.” In the Laws, the Athenian Stranger admits to Cleinias the Cretan that the laws of his city, devised primarily with a view to war, can be justified insofar as they aim at courage; but he reminds him later that insofar as such laws “regarded a part only, and not the whole of virtue, I disapproved of them.”

That he regards permanent peace as the ideal toward which the moral law commands us to strive, does not prevent Kant from saying that “a prolonged peace favours the predominance of a mere commercial spirit, and with it a debasing self-interest, cowardice, and effeminacy, and tends to degrade the character of the nation.” Nor is war to be absolutely condemned. “Provided it is conducted with order and a sacred respect for the rights of civilians,” war itself, says Kant, “has something sublime about it, and gives nations that carry it on in such a manner a stamp of mind only the more sublime the more numerous the dangers to which they are exposed, and which they are able to meet with fortitude.” Yet even while thinking that war can be a “spur for developing to the highest pitch all talents that minister to culture,” Kant reflects that the underlying purpose of war may be “to prepare the way for a rule of law governing the freedom of states, and thus bring about their unity in a system established on a moral basis.”

Hegel alone is not ambivalent. Not only is war not “to be regarded as an absolute evil,” but it is, according to Hegel, a necessary corrective for the corrosive influence of peace. “War is a state of affairs,” he writes, “which deals in earnest with the vanity of temporal goods and concerns—a vanity at other times the common theme of edifying sermonizing... War has the higher significance that by its agency, as I have remarked elsewhere, the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the stabilization of finite institutions; just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from fouling which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so also the corruption in nations would be the product of prolonged, let alone “perpetual,” peace.”

Far from agreeing with those who advocate “perpetual peace... as an ideal towards which humanity should strive,” Hegel points out that “in peace civil life continually expands; all its departments wall themselves in, and in the long run men stagnate... As a result of war, nations are strengthened, and people involved in civil strife also acquire peace at home through making wars abroad.”

To Prince Andrew in War and Peace who says that “the aim of war is murder; the methods of war are spying, treachery, and their encouragement”; or to Freud who says that “the warring state permits itself every such misdeed, every such act of violence, as would disgrace the individual man,” Hegel has an answer. “States are not private persons,” he says, “but completely autonomous totalities in themselves, and so the relation between them differs from a moral relation and a relation involving private rights... The relation between states is a relation between autonomous entities which make mutual stipulations, but which at the same time are superior to these stipulations.”

Self-interest, or “a will for its own welfare pure and simple,” is, according to Hegel, “the highest law governing the relation of one state to another.” Therefore, “when politics is alleged to clash with morals... the doctrine propounded rests on superficial ideas about morality, the nature of the state, and the state's relation to the moral point of view.”
In Hegel’s view, “wars occur when the necessity of the case requires.” He is not alone in thinking war inevitable, but others who think the same do not do so in the same mood, or with the same opinion of the reason for its inevitability. “Drain the blood from men’s veins,” declares Prince Andrew’s father, “and put in water instead, then there will be no more war!” It is an illusion, Freud thinks, to suppose that civilization so transforms human nature as to lift it above the impulses of war. In war, he says, “our fellow-citizens have not sunk so low as we feared, because they have never risen so high as we believed.” The sad fact, he concludes, is that “war is not to be abolished; so long as the conditions of existence among the nations are so varied, and the repulsions between peoples so intense, there will be, there must be, wars.”

William James finds the human race as bellicose as its individual members are instinctively pugnacious; and Hamilton says that if we “judge from the history of mankind, we shall be compelled to conclude that the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the human breast with much more powerful sway than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace; and that to model our political systems upon speculations of lasting tranquility, is to calculate on the weaker springs of human character.”

To the extent that even those who deplore war despair of lasting peace, Machiavelli may not be too cynical a realist when he advises the prince that he “ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline . . . When princes have thought more of ease than of arms, they have lost their states.” The prince “ought never, therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in peace he should addict himself more to its exercise than in war.” The prince who delays in order to save himself from war makes a serious mistake. War, Machiavelli tells him, “is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage.”

Like Machiavelli, Cleinias the Cretan in Plato’s Laws justifies his city’s constant preoccupation with war or preparation for war. The world is foolish, he thinks, “in not understanding that all men are always at war with one another . . . For what men in general term peace [is] only a name; in reality every city is in a natural state of war with every other, not indeed proclaimed by heralds, but everlasting.”

Both Plato and Aristotle seem to agree that war is somehow rooted in the nature of things—in the nature of men and the nature of cities. Yet both also look upon war as transitory, even if recurrent. “No one can be a true statesman,” the Athenian Stranger tells Cleinias, “who looks only, or first of all, to external warfare; nor will he ever be a sound legislator who orders peace for the sake of war, and not war for the sake of peace.”

The whole of life, according to Aristotle, is “divided into two parts, business and leisure, war and peace . . . There must be war for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure, things useful and necessary for the sake of things honorable . . . Men must be able to engage in business and go to war, but leisure and peace are better; they must do what is necessary and indeed what is useful, but what is honorable is better.”

But how does war produce peace? One answer may be Virgil’s. In the opening book of The Aeneid, Jove predicts the coming of a Caesar “whose empire / Shall reach to the ocean’s limits, whose fame shall end in the stars.” When at last Rome has conquered the world, the golden age of peace—or at least the pax Romana—will supplant war’s age of iron.

Then shall the age of violence be mellowing into peace:
Venerable Faith, and the Home, with Romulus and Remus,
Shall make the laws, the grim, steel-welded gates of War
Be locked; and within, on a heap of armaments, a hundred
Bronzen knots tying his hands behind him, shall sit Growling and bloody-mouthed the godless spirit of Discord.

In accordance with this heaven-laid destiny, Anchises bids his son Aeneas to make war for the sake of peace. “Be this your art:—to practise men in the habit of peace, / Generosity to the conquered, and firmness against aggressors.” But some of the proud who are
subjugated by Rome’s legions take a different view of the peace that is imposed by force of arms. Tacitus reports the speech of the British chieftain Galgacus, in which he refers to those “terrible Romans, from whose oppression escape is vainly sought by obedience and submission. . . . To robbery, slaughter, plunder, they give the lying name of empire; they create a wilderness and call it peace.”

Augustine more soberly reflects on the inevitable frustration of the Roman kind of peace. “The imperial city,” he writes, “has endeavored to impose on subject nations not only her yoke, but her language, as a bond of peace . . . How many great wars, how much slaughter and bloodshed, have provided this unity. And though these are past, the end of these miseries has not yet come. For though there have never been wanting, nor are yet wanting, hostile nations beyond the empire, against whom wars have been and are waged, yet supposing there were no such nations, the very extent of the empire itself has produced wars of a more obnoxious description—social and civil wars—and with these the whole race has been agitated, either by the actual conflict or the fear of a renewed outbreak.”

Considering war and peace in relation to democratic societies, Tocqueville comes to “the strange conclusion that of all armies those which long for war most ardently are the democratic ones, but that of all peoples those most deeply attached to peace are the democratic nations.”

Despite his perception of war’s failures, despite his enjoining the wise men, not merely to wage, but “to lament the necessity of just wars,” Augustine holds that it is “with the desire for peace that wars are waged. . . . Every man seeks peace by waging war, but no man seeks war by making peace. For even they who intentionally interrupt the peace in which they are living have no hatred of peace, but only wish it changed into a peace that suits them better. . . . Even those whom they make war against they wish to make their own, and impose on them the laws of their own peace.”

Peace, according to Augustine, consists in harmony and concord. “Peace between man and man is well-ordered concord. Domestic peace is the well-ordered concord between those of the family who rule and those who obey. Civil peace is a similar concord among the citizens . . . The peace of all things is the tranquility of order.” Without disagreeing essentially, Aquinas explains that peace involves more than concord. “Wherever peace is,” he says, “there is concord, but there is not peace wherever there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.” The peace between men may consist in concord, “not indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well-ordered, through one man agreeing with another in respect of something befitting to them both. For if one man agree with another, not of his own accord, but through being forced . . . such concord is not really peace.”

For men to be at peace with one another, Aquinas believes, each must be at peace with himself, but “man’s heart is not at peace, so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains something for him to want.” This, according to Aquinas, explains why Augustine defined peace not simply as concord, but as the tranquility of order, for by “tranquility” is meant all the desires of each individual man “being set at rest together.” It also explains why “those who seek war and dissension, desire nothing but peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For,” Aquinas reminds us, “there is no peace when a man enters into concord with another counter to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war to break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to their will. Hence all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than that which they had heretofore.”

The fundamental insight here seems to be that, though charity or love produces the unity of peace, peace is also “the work of justice”—indirectly, as Aquinas says, “insofar as justice removes the obstacles to peace.” Thucydides gives us a historian’s confirmation of the theologian’s point. He tells us why he considers the long truce or armistice—a period of no actual fighting—to be a part of the war. “Only
a mistaken judgment," he writes, "can object to including the interval of treaty in the war. Looked at by the light of facts it cannot, it will be found, be rationally considered a state of peace, where neither party either gave or got back all that they had agreed upon."

To the same effect is the speech of Hermocrates the Syracusan, which Thucydides reports. "That war is an evil is a proposition so familiar to everyone that it would be tedious to develop it. No one," he declares, "is forced to engage in it by ignorance, or kept out of it by fear, if he fancies there is anything to be gained by it ... I suppose that no one will dispute that we went to war at first, in order to serve our several interests; that we are now, in view of the same interests, debating how we can make peace; and that if we separate without having as we think our rights, we shall go to war again."

Thucydides' observation that periods of armistice or truce are part of war, and the remark of Cleinias in Plato's Laws that "every city is in a natural state of war with every other," may anticipate Hobbes, but full clarity on the point is not reached until Hobbes explicitly distinguishes between war as battle and the state of war which always prevails between men or nations when they do not live together under a common government.

"War consisteth not in battle only," Hobbes explains, "or in the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together; so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace."

Hobbes does not exclude from the condition of peace differences between men or even discord, but only fighting or the need to resort to fighting as a way of settling differences or resolving conflicts. He is cognizant of the distinction which Machiavelli paraphrases from Cicero. "There are two ways of contesting," Machiavelli writes, "the one by law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the second to beasts." Here Machiavelli adds the comment that "because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the second." But Hobbes does not think it is always necessary. At least there is a cure for "the war of every man against every man." That cure is the formation of a commonwealth and the institution of government with sufficient coercive force to maintain law and secure peace. "Anarchy and the condition of war," according to Hobbes, are one and the same, a condition in which each man, being a law unto himself and judge in his own case, must of necessity resort to force if he would impose his will upon, or resist the will of, another.

Since men are everywhere found in societies, living under law and government, it might seem that the universal state of war to which Hobbes refers is now abolished. Not so, according to Hobbes, for "though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another, yet," in his opinion, "in all times kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours, which is a posture of war."

This notion that sovereigns are always in a state of war with one another—because being sovereigns they are autonomous, i.e., not subject to any superior government—seems to be accepted by most of the great political writers who come after Hobbes. The point is sometimes differently formulated, but the basic insight remains essentially the same.

Locke, for example, makes a threefold distinction between the state of nature, which is anarchy or complete independence; the state of war, in which force without authority is resorted to by men to settle their differences; and the state of civil society, which provides law and government for the arbitration of dis-
putes. “Civil society,” he writes, is “a state of peace amongst those who are of it, from whom the state of war is excluded by the umpirage which they have provided in their legislative for the ending all differences that may rise amongst any of them.”

Since Locke holds that “want of a common judge with authority puts all men in a state of nature,” it follows for him that, though the state of nature and the state of war may not be identical, the state of nature, unlike that of civil society, inevitably lapses into the state of war. If in a state of nature men fail to settle their differences by reason, they enter into the state of war which is the realm of force “or a declared design of force . . . where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief.”

With these qualifications, Locke not only agrees with Hobbes that “all princes and rulers of independent governments all through the world are in a state of nature,” but also draws from this the same implication for war and peace. Since “the whole community is one body in the state of nature in respect of all other states or persons out of its community,” Locke argues that the government of each state must have “the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances,” in relation to everything external to itself.

Montesquieu and Rousseau slightly alter Hobbes’s point by attributing the origin of war itself to the existence of separate societies. War, writes Rousseau, “is a relation, not between man and man, but between State and State.” Because they are “in a state of nature among themselves,” bodies politic experience, in his opinion, “the inconveniences which had obliged individuals to forsake it . . . Hence arose national wars, battles, murders and reprisals, which shock nature and outrage reason.”

Hegel’s ultimate reason for thinking that war is ineradicable seems to be not merely that sovereign states are “in a state of nature in relation to each other,” but that they must always remain so. “There is no Praetor to judge between states,” he writes; “at best there may be an arbitrator or a mediator, and even he exercises his functions contingently only, i.e., in dependence on the particular wills of the disputants.”

That is why Hegel dismisses Kant’s idea “for securing ‘perpetual peace’ by a League of Nations to adjust every dispute . . . This idea,” Hegel writes, “presupposes an accord between states; this would rest on moral and religious or other grounds and considerations, but in any case would always depend ultimately on a particular sovereign will and for that reason would remain infected with contingency.” Hence, he concludes, “if states disagree and their particular wills cannot be harmonized, the matter can only be settled by war.”

Kant agrees that, in the absence of what he calls a “cosmo-political constitution” or world state, “war is inevitable.” In their external relations to one another, states, “like lawless savages, are naturally in a non-judicial condition,” and this, according to Kant, “is a state of war, in which the right of the stronger prevails; and although it may not in fact be always found as a state of actual war and incessant hostility . . . yet the condition is wrong in itself in the highest degree, and the nations which form States contiguous to each other are bound mutually to pass out of it.”

How shall this be accomplished? Is Kant’s idea the one Hegel attributes to him? Is the “alliance of nations,” of which he speaks, to be a “league of nations” or does he have something more than that in mind when he says that “this mutual connection by alliance” must “take the form of a Federation”?

On the one hand, he calls for “a universal Union of States analogous to that by which a Nation becomes a State,” and argues that “it is only thus that a real state of Peace could be established.” But on the other, he explains that he means “only a voluntary combination of different States that would be dissoluble at any time, and not such a union as is embodied in the United States of America, founded upon a political constitution and therefore indissoluble.”

The arguments for the federal constitution of the United States help to make this issue clear. The authors of the Constitution regard it as providing “a more perfect union” than
the Articles of Confederation under which the thirteen separate colonies are banded together by little more than treaties or alliances. To the writers of The Federalist, who advocate the adoption of a federal union to replace the loose confederacy or league of states, there is no middle ground between the establishment of peace through federal union and the continuation of the state of war between separate states.

“A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations,” Hamilton declares, “who can seriously doubt that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other... To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.” In another paper, Hamilton admits that “there is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance between independent nations for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty,” but he thinks that Europe has taught “an instructive but afflicting lesson to mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no other sanction than the obligations of good faith.”

He returns therefore to attack the “visionary or designing men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the States, though dismembered and alienated from each other.” What reason have we to expect, he asks, “peace and cordiality between the members of the present confederation, in a state of separation”? It seems to him “an established truth that the several states, in the case of disunion... would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not united under one government.”

The Federalists do not seriously recommend their prescription for peace as a plan for the whole world. Yet they see the generalization that is implicit in all their reasoning. “Happy would it be,” Madison says, “if such a remedy for its infirmities could be enjoyed by all free governments; if a project equally effectual could be established for the universal peace of mankind!”

J. S. Mill, writing somewhat later and in the light of the experience of American federation as a peace plan, seems to be even less ready to propose world federal government as the indispensable condition of world peace. He has no doubt that federal union “puts an end to war and diplomatic quarrels.” But he does not think that abrogating the distinction between fellow countrymen and foreigners by making them all fellow citizens of an encompassing state—an object which is “one of the worthiest to which human endeavor can be directed”—can, “in the present state of civilization, be promoted by keeping different nationalities of anything like equivalent strength under the same government.”

Not only does Kant definitely dismiss the notion of a world union formed along American lines, but even the less perfect union of states which would have the form of a “Permanent Congress of Nations,” seems to him an impracticable idea in the world as it is at the end of the 18th century. “With the too great extension of such a Union of States over vast regions,” he writes, “any government of it, and consequently the protection of its individual members, must at last become impossible; and thus a multitude of such corporations would again bring round a state of war.”

Nevertheless, Kant refuses to yield completely to this conclusion. “The morally practical reason,” he affirms, “utters within us its irrevocable Veto: ‘There shall be no War’... Hence the question no longer is as to whether Perpetual Peace is a real thing or not a real thing, or as to whether we may not be deceiving ourselves when we adopt the former alternative, but we must act on the supposition of its being real. We must work for what may perhaps not be realized... and thus we may put an end to the evil of wars, which have been the chief interest of the internal arrangements of all States without exception.”

And in his The Idea of a Universal History on a Cosmo-Political Plan, Kant does more than urge upon us our moral duty to work for
permanent peace as prerequisite to “the highest political good.” He engages in prophecy. He pictures the nations of the world “after many devastations, overthrows, and even complete internal exhaustion of their powers” as “driven forward to the goal which Reason might well have impressed upon them, even without so much sad experience. This is none other than the advance out of the lawless state of savages and the entering into a Federation of Nations. ... However visionary this idea may appear to be ... it is nevertheless the inevitable issue of the necessity in which men involve one another.”

The argument for world government as the means to world peace is nowhere made in the great books as explicitly as in Dante’s De Monarchia. “Wherever there can be contention,” Dante writes, “there judgment should exist; otherwise things should exist imperfectly, without their own means of adjustment or correction... Between any two governments, neither of which is in any way subordinate to the other, contention can arise either through their own fault or that of their subjects. This is evident. Therefore there should be judicature between them. And since neither can know the affairs of the other, not being subordinate (for among equals there is no authority), there must be a third and wider power which rules both within its own jurisdiction.

“This third power,” Dante continues, “is either the world-government, or it is not. If it is, we have reached our conclusion; if it is not, it must in turn have its equal outside its jurisdiction, and then it will need a third party as a judge, and so ad infinitum, which is impossible. So we must arrive at a first and supreme judge for whom all contentions are judicable either directly or indirectly... Therefore, world-government is necessary for the world.” Aristotle, according to Dante, “saw this argument when he said, Things hate to be in disorder, but a plurality of authorities is disorder; therefore authority is single.” But Aristotle certainly did not draw the conclusion that a single government embracing all mankind should be instituted so that “by common law it might lead all toward peace.” Nor, with the exception of Kant, does any other great author argue to this conclusion. But, as we have seen, Kant, unlike Dante, reaches this conclusion only to qualify his acceptance of it and his advocacy of world government.

Nevertheless, several of the great books do contain the nerve of the argument. It is contained in one fundamental proposition that is variously enunciated by Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau and the Federalists. That proposition is: As anarchy leads to war, government establishes peace, and just laws preserve it. By inductive generalization, it seems to follow that, if local peace depends on local government, world peace depends on world government.

But if, except for Dante and Kant, no one until the present made this inference, the tradition of western thought does include, not only the essential premise for making the inference, but also the controlling vision of a politically united humanity—all men as fellow citizens in a single political society embracing the earth.

Kant speaks of “the right of man as a citizen of the world to attempt to enter into communion with all others.” Epictetus says, “there is but one course open to men, to do as Socrates did: never to reply to one who asks his country, ‘I am an Athenian,’ or ‘I am a Corinthian,’ but ‘I am a citizen of the universe.’”

Reflecting on the fact that man’s “nature is rational and social,” Marcus Aurelius declares: “My city and my country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world.” If we look at “what value everything has with reference to the whole,” we will perceive that man “is a citizen of the highest city, of which all other cities are like families.” The reason which is common to all men dictates a common law of human life. “If this is so,” Aurelius argues, “we are fellow citizens; if this is so, we are members of one political community; if this is so, the world is in a manner a state.”

Aristotle describes how the family is formed by the union of man and wife, parents and children; and from this first of all social units, the tribe or village is formed by a union of families, and the city or state by a union of villages. He does not carry this series on to its
natural terminus, but Augustine does. "After
the state or city," Augustine says, "comes the
world, the third circle of human society—the
first being the family, the second the city."

Yet Augustine, who orders earthly peace
to the peace of heaven, does not prophesy a
single political community of all men living
together under one government. The heavenly
city, he says, "while it sojourns on earth, calls
citizens out of all nations, and gathers to-
gether a society of pilgrims of all languages,
not scrupling about diversities in the manners,
laws, and institutions whereby earthly peace is
secured and maintained, but recognizing that,
however various these are, they all tend to one
and the same end of earthly peace."

One and the same end of earthly peace may
require one city of man as well as one city
of God. That, according to Dostoevsky, seems
to be implied in the fact that "the craving for
universal unity is the third and last anguish of
men. Mankind as a whole," he writes, "has
always striven to organize a universal state.
There have been many great nations with
great histories, but the more highly developed
the more unhappy they were, for they felt
more acutely than other people the craving for
world-wide union."