

## Soul

## INTRODUCTION

IN the language of the poets as well as in the discourse of the philosophers, body and soul are correlative terms. Each affects the meaning of the other. The words are used together in daily speech. Men who are unaware of, or deny, the metaphysical and theological significance of having a soul, nevertheless use the word "soul" with a sense of contrast to body, even if only to refer to vague manifestations of spirit—feelings and sympathies which seem to be alien to the world of matter.

With few exceptions, traditional theories of the soul involve its distinction from and relation to the body. Berkeley represents one of the major exceptions. Denying the reality of matter, he conceives the soul as existing in and by itself; souls or spirits differ from God as finite from infinite spiritual beings. The something "which knows and perceives" and which "exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering," Berkeley says, "is what I call *mind, spirit, soul, or myself.*" Berkeley, therefore, would not speak of himself or other men as having souls, but rather as *being* souls.

The other major exception is exemplified by Lucretius. It is not that Lucretius denies soul as Berkeley denies body. Nor does he deny that soul adds something to body which differentiates living organisms from inorganic things. On the contrary, he declares the mind to be "a part / Of a man's make-up, every bit as much / As are his hands and feet and seeing eyes." Distinct from mind, soul is also part of a living being. "Mind and spirit are held close together, / Compose one unity," but whereas the mind is, as it were, the lord or head of the whole body, "The rest of spirit is dispersed all through / The entire frame, and it obeys the

mind, / Moves, gains momentum, at its nod and beck."

But when Lucretius refers to mind and soul as parts of the body, he means no more than is implied in speaking of the hand and eye as parts of the body. "The nature of both mind and spirit / Must be corporeal," he writes. Just as flesh and bones are composed of atomic particles, so the mind is formed "of particles which are small and smooth and round," and the soul consists of "very tiny seeds, / All sown minutely in sinew, flesh, and veins."

APART FROM THESE exceptions, the traditional discussion of soul considers it as somehow conjoined with body to constitute a whole of which it is the immaterial principle or part. Even those who, like Descartes, define the soul as an immaterial substance, capable of existing by itself, do not actually ascribe to the human soul complete independence of the human body. Nor do the theologians who think of God as a purely spiritual being and of angels as immaterial substances attribute soul to them.

The primitive tribes described by Frazer in *The Golden Bough* believe that "the soul may temporarily absent itself from the body without causing death." This notion of an "external soul" has its advantages and disadvantages. Wizards of certain tribes are believed to hide their souls outside their bodies—sometimes in trees or animals—because they are afraid of someone capturing their magical powers. However, as Frazer tells us, "Such temporary absences of the soul are often believed to involve considerable risk," because the soul, although absent from the body, is still united to the body by a type of sympathetic magic. "So long as this object which he calls his life or

soul remains unharmed, the man is well; if it is injured, he suffers; if it is destroyed, he dies."

Precisely because God and the angels do not have bodies, neither do they have souls. Whether everything which has a body also has a soul is another question. It is variously answered; but certainly those who, like Plato and Plotinus, speak of a world-soul or a soul of the universe, confirm the point that soul is the co-principle or complement of body. The same point appears in theories of the celestial bodies which conceive them as being alive and as therefore having souls.

Unfolding to Socrates the story of the creation, Timaeus says: "Using the language of probability, we may say that the world became a living creature endowed with soul and intelligence by the providence of God." To the world, Timaeus explains, God "gave a body, smooth and even, having a surface in every direction equidistant from the center, a body entire and perfect, and formed out of perfect bodies. And in the center, he put the soul which he diffused throughout the body, making it also to be the exterior environment of it."

Comparing the magnetic force of the loadstone with the animation of a soul, Gilbert says that "this one eminent property is the same which the ancients held to be a soul in the heavens, in the globes, and in the stars, in sun and moon . . . The ancient philosophers . . . all seek in the world a certain universal soul, and declare the whole world to be endowed with a soul. Aristotle held that not the universe is animate, but the heavens only . . . As for us," Gilbert writes, "we deem the whole world animate, and all globes, stars, and this glorious earth, too, we hold to be from the beginning by their own destinate souls governed . . . Pitiably is the state of the stars, abject the lot of earth, if this high dignity of soul is denied them, while it is granted to the worm, the ant, the roach, to plants and morels; for in that case, worms, roaches, moths, were more beautiful objects in nature and more perfect, inasmuch as nothing is excellent, nor precious, nor eminent, that hath not a soul."

On the question whether the earth, each heavenly body, or the whole world is endowed with life, intelligence, and soul, Kepler differs

from Gilbert, Augustine from Plato and Plotinus, Aquinas from Aristotle. Nevertheless, the many-sided controversy indicates the traditional connection of soul with life and mind on the one hand, and with animate or organic bodies on the other—bodies which manifest certain properties and tendencies to motion.

THE MAJOR ISSUES CONCERNING soul seem to follow from these traditional associations. Does the soul which is somehow conjoined with a body exist as an immaterial substance or principle, in such a way that the being composed of body and soul consists of two distinct substances or entities, united as related parts of a whole? Or is the soul the substantial form of an organic body, with the consequence that the form and matter together constitute a single composite substance, which is the living thing? In the latter alternative the unity of soul and body, according to Aristotle, is like that of "the wax and the shape given to it by the die."

On either conception of soul and its relation to body or matter, further questions arise concerning the soul's existence apart from the body. Does it exist before being united to the body? Does it exist after the union is dissolved? How does it exist when it exists separately or apart from matter? For those, like Lucretius, who conceive the soul as itself composed of material particles within the framework of the body, such questions can have little meaning. For those, like Plato and Descartes, who conceive the soul as an immaterial entity having being in its own right, these questions can be immediately answered in favor of the soul's capacity for separate existence. Only when the soul is conceived as a form which, together with matter, constitutes the substance of a living body, does there seem to be both meaning and difficulty to the question whether the soul continues to endure separately when a plant, an animal, or a man dies, *i.e.*, when such composite substances decompose.

If the individual soul ceases to be when the body with which it is somehow united perishes, it is as mortal as the body. The traditional theories of personal immortality—such as the Platonic myths concerning the

transmigration or reincarnation of souls, and the Christian doctrine of man's immortal soul, specially created for union with the body, but destined to survive its separation from the body—are theories which involve conceptions of the soul as capable of self-subsistence. The controversy over these doctrines is dealt with in the chapter on IMMORTALITY. Here are we concerned to see how different implications for immortality necessarily follow from various theories of the soul.

Still other issues concerning soul arise in connection with other chapters. For example, the question whether soul is to be found only in living things, or only in animals but not in plants, or in man alone, is discussed in the chapters on LIFE AND DEATH and on MIND. If soul, on any conception, is the principle or cause of life, then the distinction between animate and inanimate bodies is identical with the distinction between things which have and things which do not have a soul. If, furthermore, the kind of life possessed by a vegetable or plant is radically different from animal life, and that in turn from human life, then souls, too, may have to be differentiated in kind according to the mode of life or the range of vital powers of which each type is the principle.

Some writers, however, tend to equate "soul" with "mind" or "understanding." When, as by Descartes, soul is identified with rational soul or thinking substance, it is usually attributed to man alone. Soul is then not thought necessary to explain the phenomena of life in plants and animals, at least in no sense of soul which implies either an incorporeal or a formal principle; that is, anything beyond the complex interaction of organic parts. Other authors, like Locke, who conceive soul or understanding not merely in terms of rational thought, but also in terms of sensation, imagination, and memory, may exclude plants, but not animals, from the possession of soul or mind.

Descartes takes notice of these ambiguities in the traditional use of the word "soul." Probably because "men in the earliest times," he writes, "did not distinguish in us that principle in virtue of which we are nourished, grow, and perform all those operations which

are common to us with the brutes . . . from that by which we think, they called both by the single name *soul*; then, perceiving the distinction between nutrition and thinking, they called that which thinks *mind*, believing also that this was the chief part of the soul. But I, perceiving that the principle by which we are nourished is wholly distinct from that by means of which we think have declared that the name *soul* when used for both is equivocal; and I say that, when soul is taken to mean the *primary actuality* or *chief essence of man*, it must be understood to apply only to the principle by which we think, and I have called it by the name *mind* as often as possible to avoid ambiguity; for I consider the mind not as part of the soul, but as the whole of that soul which thinks."

In another place, he uses the word "soul" to stand for "that subtle fluid styled the animal spirits" which, pervading the organs of brute animals, accounts for their peculiar type of animation. "We can recognize no principle of motion in them beyond the disposition of their organs and the continual discharge of the animal spirits that are produced by the beat of the heart as it rarefies the blood." Soul in this sense is not to be confused with "the incorporeal and spiritual nature of man's soul." It is "something corporeal, of a fine structure and subtle, spread throughout the external body, and the principle of all sensation, imagination, and thought. Thus there are three grades of being, Body, the Corporeal or soul, and Mind or spirit."

IN THE OPENING PAGES of his treatise *On the Soul*, Aristotle says that "to attain any assured knowledge about the soul is one of the most difficult things in the world." The difficulty seems to apply both to *what the soul is* and to *whether it exists*. The questions are connected. Even Lucretius, who regards the soul as material in nature, does not claim to know its existence by direct observation. It is not, like the body itself or like other parts of the body, a sensible object. It must be inferred to exist. Just as the existence of unobservable atoms is inferred in order to explain the constitution and change of all natural objects, so the ex-

istence of soul is inferred in order to explain the constitution and motion of living things. Those who conceive the soul as immaterial—whether as substance, principle, or form—would seem to face an even greater difficulty in establishing its existence and in describing its nature. Admittedly, the soul as some sort of immaterial being cannot be discovered by observation and experiment. The alternatives, which represent traditional solutions of the problem, seem to include the soul's reflexive knowledge of its own existence, inferential knowledge about the soul based on observed facts, various religious beliefs concerning the nature and destiny of the soul, and the postulation of the soul's existence on practical, not theoretical, grounds.

Not all writers agree with Aristotle that the soul is an object difficult to know, or with Kant that it is absolutely impossible for us to reach any sound theoretical conclusions about the soul's existence. Descartes, for example, says that if there are "any persons who are not sufficiently persuaded of the existence of God and of the soul by the reasons which I have brought forward, I wish them to know that all other things of which they perhaps think themselves more assured (such as possessing a body, and that there are stars and an earth and so on) are less certain."

The argument for the soul's existence which precedes this remark is the famous *Cogito, ergo sum*—"I think; therefore, I am." From the fact that, in the very act of doubting the existence of everything else, he could not doubt that he was doubting, and hence thinking, Descartes assures himself of his own existence, or, more precisely, of the existence of himself as a thinking being. "I knew," he writes, "that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing; so that this 'me,' that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter; and even if the body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is."

Locke appears to agree that "if I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me

perceive my own existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that . . . I have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubting," he goes on, "as of that thought which I call doubt. Experience then convinces us that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are."

But Locke does not turn the proposition that a thinking being exists into the assertion that a spiritual being, the soul as an immaterial substance, exists. "We have the idea of matter and thinking," he writes, "but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter so disposed, a thinking immaterial substance: it being, in respect of our notions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking."

For Locke, however, our idea of soul is as clear as our idea of body. "Our idea of body," he says, "is an extended, solid substance capable of communicating motion by impulse; and our idea of soul, as an immaterial spirit, is of a substance that thinks, and has a power of exciting motion in body, by willing or thought . . . I know that people whose thoughts are immersed in matter, and have so subjected their minds to their senses, that they seldom reflect on anything beyond them, are apt to say, that they cannot comprehend a thinking thing; which, perhaps, is true: but I affirm, when they consider it well, they can no more comprehend an extended thing." And in another place, he adds: "If this notion of immaterial spirit may have, perhaps, some difficulties in it, not easy to be explained, we have, therefore, no more reason to deny or doubt the existence of such spirits, than we have to deny or doubt the existence of body, because the notion of body is cumbered with some difficulties, very hard, and, perhaps,

impossible to be explained or understood by us."

Berkeley differs from Locke not only in maintaining that we have no idea of matter at all, but also in holding that, if we use the word "idea" for sense impressions or the images derived from them, we can have no idea of soul or spiritual substance. But we can, he thinks, form what he calls a "notion" of the soul, which grasps the meaning of the word "spirit" as signifying "that which thinks, wills, or perceives." He differs from Locke further in proportion as he tends to agree with Descartes, asserting that the existence of a spiritual substance, a thinking being, necessarily follows from the undeniable existence of thinking itself.

For both Descartes and Berkeley, the immortality of the soul can be directly concluded from our knowledge of the soul's existence and nature. "The soul," writes Berkeley, "is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer than that the motions, changes, decays and dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural bodies . . . cannot possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance; such a being therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature; that is to say, 'the soul of man is naturally immortal.'"

The arguments in Plato's *Phaedo* for the proper existence of the soul before it joins a particular body, and for its existence after it leaves the body to dwell apart before entering another body—arguments, in short, for the soul's immortality—seem to stem from a slightly different principle. It is not merely that the soul is simple or uncompounded and hence indissoluble, or that the knowledge we have of the absolute ideas requires us to posit a principle of knowledge other than the bodily senses which can apprehend only changing things. In addition, Socrates argues that the knower must be like the known. If it is the soul which knows the unchangeable and eternal essences, it must be as unchangeable and eternal as they are. When the soul uses "the body as instrument of perception," Socrates says, it is "then dragged by the body into the region of the changeable . . . But when return-

ing into herself she reflects, then she passes into the other world, the region of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and unchangeableness, which are her kindred."

AGAINST ANY FORM of argument for the existence and immortality of the human soul which proceeds from the nature of our thought or knowledge, Kant takes the position that the premises do not warrant the conclusion. He claims to expose the fallacies in what he calls the "paralogism of a rational psychology." The "I" of the *Cogito, ergo sum* may be the necessary logical subject of all our judgments, but this does not give us intuitive knowledge of a really existing substance which has the attributes of simplicity, spirituality, and permanence or immortality.

"In all our thinking," Kant writes, "the I is the subject in which our thoughts are inherent; nor can that I ever be used as a determination of any other thing. Thus everybody is constrained to look upon himself as the substance, and on thinking as the accident of his being." But, he goes on, "though the I exists in all thoughts, not the slightest intuition is connected with that representation by which it might be distinguished from other objects of intuition . . . Hence it follows that in the first syllogism of transcendental psychology reason imposes upon us an apparent knowledge only, by representing the constant logical subject as the knowledge of the real subject in which that knowledge inheres. Of that subject, however, we have not and cannot have the slightest knowledge . . . In spite of this, the proposition that the soul is a substance may well be allowed to stand, if only we see that this concept cannot help us on in the least or teach us any of the ordinary conclusions of rational psychology, as, for instance, the everlasting continuance of the soul amid all changes and even in death; and that it therefore signifies a substance in idea only, and not in reality."

Similarly with respect to the simplicity of the soul, Kant contends that the absolute, but merely logical, unity of apperception or thought is illegitimately converted into the absolute unity of a real substance. The propo-

sition, *I am a simple substance*, he declares, "teaches us nothing at all with reference to myself as an object of experience." Its only value is to enable us "to distinguish the soul from all matter, and thus to exempt it from that decay to which matter is at all times subject."

To this extent, rational psychology may "guard our thinking self against the danger of materialism." The concept of the soul as an immaterial and simple substance may thus function regulatively, but we deceive ourselves with the illusion of knowledge when we treat that concept as if it had intuitive content—when, as he says, we change "thoughts into things." Kant does not deny that the "I" is substantial in concept or simple in concept. Though these propositions are "incontestably true," he says, "nevertheless, what we really wish to know of the soul, becomes by no means known to us in that way, because all these predicates are with regard to intuition non-valid, entailing no consequences with regard to objects of experience, and therefore entirely empty."

The existence and immortality of the soul is, for Kant, a postulate or demand of the practical reason. "Of the psychic substance, regarded as an immortal soul, it is absolutely impossible to obtain any proof from a theoretical point of view," but if such an object must be thought *a priori* in order for "pure practical reason to be used as duty commands," it becomes what Kant calls "matter of faith." Immortality seems to him rationally required as the practically necessary condition for the fulfillment of the moral law and the endless progress of the soul toward holiness of will.

William James questions even such practical arguments for the soul. The imperishability of a simple substance does not, he thinks, guarantee "immortality of a sort *we care for*." Nor, following Locke, does it seem to him that a substantial soul is required for personal identity and moral responsibility. Writing as an empirical or scientific psychologist, who feels "entirely free to discard the word Soul" because he finds the concept useless "so far as accounting for the actually verified facts of conscious experience goes," James tells those

who may find "any comfort in the idea" that they are "perfectly free to continue to believe in it; for our reasonings have not established the non-existence of the Soul; they have only proved its superfluity for scientific purposes."

JAMES'S CONCLUSION THAT "the substantial Soul . . . explains nothing and guarantees nothing," along with the arguments of Kant and Locke, may not apply to the soul conceived as the principle of life rather than as the agent of thought, or to the soul conceived as the form of an organic body rather than as a spiritual being associated with or somehow imprisoned in the body. Precisely because this other conception affirms reality of soul as something other than a complete substance, precisely because it applies to plants and animals as well as men, this other conception of soul would seem to require a different sort of criticism.

The Greek and Latin words—*psyche* and *anima*—which we translate by "soul" seem to have life as their primary connotation. In the *Cratylus*, Socrates suggests that "those who first used the name *psyche* meant to express that the soul when in the body is the source of life, and gives the power of breath and revival." Other dialogues express the Greek conception of the living thing as that which has the power of self-motion, and ascribe this power to the soul as source. In the *Phaedo*, for example, Socrates asks, "What is that the inherence of which will render the body alive?" to which Cebes answers, "Soul," and agrees with Socrates' further statement that "whatever the soul takes possession of, to that she comes bearing life." In the *Laws*, Cleinias having identified the power of self-motion with life, the Athenian Stranger gains his assent to the proposition that whatever has life or self-motion also has soul.

To this much Aristotle also agrees. "What has soul in it," he says, "differs from what has not, in that the former displays life"; to which he adds that "living may mean thinking or perception or local movement, or movement in the sense of nutrition and growth," so that we must "think of plants also as living," and as having souls. But Aristotle goes further. In defining soul as the cause of life, and in dif-

ferentiating three kinds of souls—vegetative, sensitive, and rational—according to the vital powers manifested by the activities of plants, animals, and men, he uses his general theory of corporeal substances to state precisely what the soul is and how it is related to the body.

Corporeal substances are, according to him, all composite of two principles, form and matter. "What is called matter is potentiality, what is called form, actuality." As exemplified in works of art, wood is the matter which has the potentiality for a certain shape and a certain function that is the actuality or form of a chair. In the case of natural things, that which determines "the essential whatness" of a body is its form or, as Aristotle sometimes says, "its formulable essence."

If living things are essentially distinct from inert bodies, as Aristotle supposes them to be, then the forms which determine their essences must be different from the forms of inanimate substances. It is this difference in forms which Aristotle appropriates the word "soul" to signify. In each kind of living thing, the soul is the substantial form or "the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it."

He speaks of the first grade of actuality here to distinguish merely being alive or besouled from the various acts which, as operations of the vital powers, constitute living. If an ax or an eye had a soul, it would consist of its power to cut or to see, not in its actually cutting or seeing. While nourishing or thinking "is actuality corresponding to the cutting and the seeing, the soul is actuality in the sense corresponding to the power of sight and the power in the tool . . . As the pupil *plus* the power of sight constitutes the eye, so the soul *plus* the body constitutes the animal."

From this conception of soul as the form or actuality of a living substance, "it indubitably follows," Aristotle says, "that the soul is inseparable from its body, or at any rate certain parts of it are—for the actuality of some of them is nothing but the actualities of their bodily parts." Where Plato holds that the soul is prior in existence to the body, Aristotle holds that soul and body come into existence together when the organism is generated. Where Plato attributes an independent

mode of being to the soul, distinct in character from that of bodies, Aristotle says that "the soul cannot be without a body. Yet it cannot *be* a body; it is not a body, but something relative to a body. That is why it is *in* a body and a body of a definite kind," being nothing more than "the actuality or formulable essence of something that possesses the potentiality of being besouled."

Aquinas is an Aristotelian with regard to soul, but Calvin is a Platonist: "man consists of a body and a soul; meaning by soul, an immortal though created essence, which is his nobler part. Sometimes he is called a spirit . . . When spirit is used by itself it is equivalent to soul."

FURTHER CONSEQUENCES follow from these conflicting conceptions of soul. In the *Timaeus*, Plato advances the view that only the lowest grade of soul—the plant soul—is mortal, in contrast to the souls of animals and men. Aristotle would seem to attribute mortality to every grade of soul. If any exception is to be made, it is only for the human soul because it involves the power of rational thought. Mind or the power to think, he writes, "seems to be a widely different kind of soul, differing as what is eternal from what is perishable."

The critical point is whether thinking, unlike all other psychic powers, is an activity of the soul alone. For the most part, "there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body . . . Thinking seems the most probable exception; but," Aristotle adds, "if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as the condition of its existence. If there is any way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul, soul will be capable of separate existence; if there is none, its separate existence is impossible."

Is there any way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul? Aristotle seems to answer this question affirmatively when he says that "insofar as the realities it knows are capable of being separated from their matter, so is it also with the powers of mind." On one interpretation this means that the mind or intellect is as immaterial in its mode of operation as

some of its objects are in their mode of being; with the further consequence that what is capable of acting apart from body is also able to exist apart from body. But whether Aristotle's further statement that "mind set free from its present conditions . . . is immortal and eternal" applies to the intellect alone or to the rational soul as a whole, has been disputed by various interpreters. Adopting Aristotle's conception of soul as the form which is the actuality of life in an organic body, Aquinas for one seems to think that the immortality of a rational soul can be demonstrated from the special character of its intellectual powers.

A theory of the soul which regarded it as a simple and incorporeal substance, or as having a being independent of the body, would seem to harmonize more readily with the Christian belief in the human soul's special creation and its individual survival after death. But Aquinas rejects such a theory on the ground that then man would be two substances or two beings, not one; or else if the human person is identified with the soul, man would be a soul using a body rather than a single substance of composite nature. The doctrine of body and soul which holds them to be related as matter and form, preserves the unity of man and, in the opinion of Aquinas, fits the way in which man learns through his senses, experiences passions, and, in thinking, depends upon imagination.

But though he admits that men cannot think without images, Aquinas also insists, contrary to Locke, that thinking, insofar as it involves abstract concepts, cannot be performed by matter. To make matter think is beyond even the power of God. Unlike nourishing or sensing, *understanding* is not and cannot be "the act of a body, nor of any corporeal power."

This theory—that the acts of understanding by which the intellect abstracts and receives universal concepts cannot be accounted for by the motions of the brain—is further discussed in the chapter on UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR. Here we are concerned simply to note that, for Aquinas, the fact that the concepts with which men think are universal, means that they are abstracted from matter; and the fact that they are abstracted from matter means that the various acts of understanding must also be imma-

terial—that is, not acts of bodily organs like the brain. To these premises Aquinas adds one further principle, namely, that a thing's mode of being is indicated by its mode of operation. In these terms he concludes that, since the intellect has "an operation *per se* apart from the body," the human soul, which is called rational because of its power of understanding, can have a being *per se* apart from the body. Hence it is "something incorporeal and subsistent."

Nevertheless, according to Aquinas, though the human soul can subsist separately, it belongs to its nature to be embodied, that is, to be the form of a material substance. "The soul, as part of human nature," he writes, "has its natural perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body." Furthermore, if the entire nature of man were to be a soul—the soul making "use of the body as an instrument, or as a sailor uses a ship"—there would be no need for the resurrection of the body after the Last Judgment. The Christian dogma of the resurrected body more properly accords, in Aquinas' view, with a conception of soul "united to the body as form to matter"; for, as he says in another place, "if it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, it is unnatural for it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection."

In the consideration of the relation of body and soul, an opposite estimation of the body's role goes with an opposite theory of the soul's nature. Socrates, in the *Phaedo*, describes the body as the soul's prison house, or worse, the source of the soul's contamination by the impurities of sense and passion. "In this life," he says, "we make the nearest approach to knowledge when we have the least possible intercourse or communion with the body, and are not surfeited with the bodily nature." But complete purification requires "the separation of the soul from the body . . . the release of the soul from the chains of the body." That is why, Socrates tells his friends gathered in the cell where he is to drink the hemlock, "true philosophers are ever seeking to release the soul" and "are always occupied in the practice of dying."

It is also the opinion of Plotinus that it is evil



for the soul to be in the body. But Christian theologians, for the most part, take a contrary view. Aquinas, for example, criticizes Origen for holding that "souls were embodied in punishment of sin." To him there is nothing "of a penal and afflicting nature" in the soul's union with the body. Though Scripture says that "the corruptible body weigheth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle presseth down the mind," Augustine interprets this to mean, not that the flesh is evil in itself, but that man is beset by sin when "the flesh lusteth against the spirit."

"There is no need, therefore," according to Augustine, "that in our sins and vices we accuse the nature of the flesh to the injury of the Creator, for in its own kind and degree the flesh is good." Man is both body and soul, human nature is a thing of both flesh and spirit, and "he who extols the nature of the soul as the chief good," Augustine continues, "and condemns the nature of the flesh as if it were evil, assuredly is fleshly both in his love of the soul and his hatred of the flesh."