THE nature of sensation seems at first to be as obvious as its existence. In the tradition of the great books there may be controversy concerning the existence of sense in plants as well as in animals, and there may be controversy over the existence in man of faculties higher than sense. But no one disputes that men and other animals are endowed with a power of sense.

The extent of this power may be questioned, but not the fact that animals and men, when awake, experience sensations or perceive through their senses. Sleep, according to Aristotle, can occur only in those living things which have the power of sense perception. "If there be an animal not endowed with sense-perception, it is impossible that this should either sleep or wake, since both these are affections of the activity of the primary faculty of sense-perception."

The existence of the sensible—of an external something which causes sensation and can be sensed—also seems to escape denial or dispute. The existence of a purely intelligible reality—of a world of immaterial things incapable of being sensed—is subject to debate in all periods of western thought. The sensible world is sometimes regarded as the only reality; sometimes it is regarded as mere seeming, or appearance, in comparison with the reality of purely intelligible being. Men may also differ on the question whether things possess sensible qualities when they are not being sensed. But with few exceptions, notably Berkeley and Hume, the existence of a sensible world of material things is not denied or seriously doubted.

The controversies and issues indicated above are, for the most part, discussed elsewhere. The chapter on ANIMAL considers the sensitivity of plants. There also, as well as in the chapters on MAN, IDEA, and MIND, is considered the distinction between the senses and the higher faculties of reason or intellect. The chapter on MEMORY AND IMAGINATION deals with these two functions in their relation to sense and sense perception; and the contrast between sensible and intelligible reality is discussed in the chapters on BEING, FORM , IDEA, and MATTER. Some of these topics necessarily recur here, especially as they bear on what for this chapter are the primary problems—the nature of sensation, the analysis of the power of sense, and the character of the knowledge which is afforded by the senses,

AS WE HAVE ALREADY observed, no difficulty seems to arise at first concerning the nature of sensation. It is supposed by many inquirers, early and late in the tradition, that matter is sensitive as well as sensible. Animals have sense organs which react to physical stimulation. Bodies either act directly upon the sense organs, as in the case of touch and taste; or, as in the case of vision, hearing, and smell, they exert their influence through an intervening medium, yet in a manner which seems to be no less the action and reaction of bodies,

Those who distinguish between living organisms and inanimate bodies tend to regard sensitivity as a property of living matter, but it does not follow for all who make this distinction that other than material factors are needed to explain sensation. On the contrary, some writers seem to think that the motions of matter account for sensation as readily as the laws of mechanics account for all the sensible changes we are able to perceive.

Lucretius, for example, holds that living things consist of body and soul, and that the soul (or mind) differs from .the body only in the size, the fineness of texture, and the mobility of the material particles which compose it. Sensation occurs when the particles of body and soul together are set in motion by the impact of external bodies upon the organs of sense. "Our eyes receive / One kind of impulse when they look at white / And quite another from black." Similarly, "Noise is audible / Because its body penetrates the ears, / Impinging on the sense; voices and sounds / Are bodily in nature, since they strike / With impact on the senses."

Either the external body itself, as in touch, strikes the sense and sets up those bodily motions in the animal which are sensation; or, according to Lucretius, minute replicas or images—composed of atoms, as all things are—fly off from the surface of distant bodies and enter through the pores of our sense organs to awaken in us vision, hearing, or smell. In either case, sensation is a bodily reaction; and, for Lucretius, imagination and memory, even thought, are consequent motions in the atoms of the mind—further bodily reverberations, as it were, of sensation.

"The cause of sense," writes Hobbes, "is the external body, or object, which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in the taste and touch; or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling: which pressure, by the mediation of nerves and other strings and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart to deliver itself: which endeavour, because outward, seemeth to be some matter without. And this seeming, or fancy, Is that which men call *sense.*"

The object seems to be colored or hot or sweet when it causes certain sensations in us which are projected outward upon it, in response or counteraction to the inward motions it sets up. But, says Hobbes, these sensible qualities are, in the object, nothing but "so many seyeral motions of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed are they anything else but diverse motions (for motion produceth nothing but motion)."

THE FOREGOING THEORY, reducing sensation to bodily motion, seems to draw its cogency from the fact that only bodies are sensible, that sense organs are bodily parts, and that sense organs must be activated by some sort of physical contact for sensations to occur. Some writers, like Descartes, accept the theory for animals, but reject it for men; or they distinguish, in the case of men, between thought and sensation. They regard sensation, with its subsidiary functions of memory and imagination, as reducible to corporeal motions, but refuse to grant that external sense impressions or interior fancy can produce knowledge without the activity of an immaterial soul.

To animals, Descartes declares, "we can ascribe ... no knowledge at all, but only fancy of a purely corporeal kind." In contrast, "that power by which we are said to know things is purely spiritual, and not less distinct from every part of the body than blood from bone, or hand from eye." In men as well as animals, the external senses, "in so far as they are part *oi* the body . . . perceive in virtue of passivity alone, just in the way that wax receives an impression from a seal." Fancy or imagination is also "a genuine part of the body"; and "memory, at least that which is corporeal and similar to that of the brutes, is in no respect distinct from imagination."

These corporeal faculties are, according to Descartes, of use to the understanding or the mind only when it "proposes to examine something that can be referred to the body"; but if it "deal with matters in which there is nothing corporeal or similar to the corporeal, it cannot be helped by those faculties." Hence, for Descartes, the "mind can act independently of the brain; for certainly the brain can be of no use in pure thought; its only use is for imagining and perceiving."

For others, like William James, the discinction between sensation and thought, so far as their relation to matter is concerned, seems quite untenable. He objects to those who look upon sensational consciousness as "something *quasi-material,* hardly cognitive,

which one need not much wonder about," while they regard rational consciousness as "quite the reverse, and the mystery of it [as] unspeakable." We can correlate consciousness with the brain's workings only in an empirical fashion, James thinks, and we ought to confess that "no glimmer of explanation of it is yet in sight. That brains should give rise to a knowing consciousness at all, this is the one mystery which returns, no matter of what sort the consciousness or of what sort the knowledge may be. Sensations, aware of mere qualities, involve the mystery as much as thoughts, aware of complex systems, involve it."

Still others, like Plotinus and Aristotle, think that the mystery of conscious matter is not essentially different from the mystery of living matter, for if there is anything mysterious about nutrition and growth, or sensation and imagination, it consists in the same thing—the union of material and immaterial principles, of body and soul.

"If the soul were a corporeal entity," Plotinus writes, "there could be no sense-perception, no mental act, no knowledge ... If the sentient be a material entity (as we are invited to believe), sensation could only be of the order of seal-impressions struck by a ring on wax." Perception is not a passively received impression. It is, according to Plotinus, an act of awareness "determined by the nature and character of the living being in which it occurs ... In any perception we attain by sight, the object is grasped there where it lies in the direct line of vision ... The mind looks outward; this is ample proof that it has taken and takes no inner imprint, and does not see in virtue of some mark made upon it, like that of the ring on the wax; it need not look outward at all if, even as it looked, it already held the image of the object, seeing by virtue of an impression made upon itself."

According to Aristotle, "two characteristic marks have above all others been recognized as distinguishing that which has soul in it from that which has not—self-movement and sensation." By self-movement he appears to mean such things as the nutrition and growth which is found in plants, as well as the additional animal faculty of local motion. Both self-movement and sensation require soul as well as body. "Nothing grows or decays naturally," he writes, "except what feeds itself, and nothing feeds itself except what has a share of soul in it." So, too, "nothing except what has sou! in it is capable of sensation." But "the exercise of sense-perception does not belong to soul or body exclusively." Sensation "is not an affection of the soul" by itself, nor has a soulless body "the potentiality of perception."

BUT, ARISTOTLE ASKS, are all affections of the soul "affections of the complex body and soul, or is there any one among them peculiar to the soul by itself?... If we consider the majority of them, there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body; *e.g.*, anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally. Thinking seems to be the most probable exception; but if this too proves to be a form of imagination, or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence."

Aquinas tries to answer the question Aristotle asks, with a threefold distinction which places sensation and imagination midway between the vegetative functions and rational thought. The power of thought, or "the intellectual power," Aquinas says, "does not belong to a corporeal organ, as the power of seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding is an act which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, like the act of seeing."

At the other extreme from this "operation of the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that it is not even performed by any corporeal organ," are those "operations of the soul. . . performed by a corporeal organ and by virtue of a corporeal quality." Because it is a kind of self-movement, digestion requires soul as well as body, but it is a corporeal action in the way in which, according to Aquinas, it involves "the action of heat." Between these extremes, Aquinas places sensation and imagination, operations "performed through a corporeal organ, but not through a corporeal quality."

He explains this further by means of a distinction between natural and spiritual itnmutation—physical and psychic change. "Natural

immutation takes place by the form of the thing which causes the immutation being received, according to its natural existence, into the thing in which the immutation is effected, as heat is received into the heated thing." Vegetative activities, while remaining psychic in the sense of occurring only in living or besouled matter, involve only natural immutations in the vital organs involved.

In contrast, "spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the thing causing the immutation being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing in which the immutation is effected, as the form of color is received into the eye, which does not thereby become colored." Though some sensations may require a natural immutation of the sense organ, as hot and cold do, all sensations necessarily involve a spiritual immutation, which enables the sense organ to perform its proper act of knowing, as the eye knows color without becoming colored. "Otherwise," Aquinas says, "if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel when they undergo alteration."

THESE DIVERSE VIEWS of the nature of sensation seem to be paralleled by diverse views of the sensitive faculty. That the function of the senses is somehow to apprehend or know does not seem to be disputed. But whether the senses—including memory and imagination—are the only faculty of knowing is an issue to which the great books seem to give a variety of answers.

The opposite answers appear to be correlated, not only with conflicting positions in respect to body and soul, but also with opposing theories of the distinction between men and other animals. Those who hold that the motions of matter are adequate to explain the phenomena of knowing and thinking, tend to make sense perception the primary function of the mind and to treat not only memory and imagination, but also reasoning or thought as subsequent activities of the same general faculty which receives impressions from external sources in the first instance. Since other animals possess senses and give evidence that perception in them has consequences for memory and imagination, those who hold this view also tend to attribute thought to animals and to regard man as differing from them only in degree.

Those who take the contrary view that knowing involves an immaterial principle or cause—a soul as well as a body—tend to distinguish the various functions of sense from the activities of thought—such as conception, judgment, and reasoning. They also take the position that man, while sharing sense perception, memory, and imagination with other animals, alone possesses the higher faculty. The difference between men and brutes is thus conceived as one of kind, not of degree, when the difference between the senses and the reason in man is also conceived as a difference in kind. A functional relationship between sensation and thought is not thereby denied, but a distinct faculty is affirmed to be necessary for going beyond the apprehension of particulars to knowledge of the universal, or for rising above the imagination to abstract thought.

The distinction between sense and reason as faculties of knowing is sometimes stated in terms of a difference in their objects—the particular versus the universal, becoming versus being, the material versus the immaterial. Sometimes it is stated in terms of the difference between a corporeal power requiring a bodily organ and a spiritual power which belongs exclusively to the soul. Sometimes it is stated in terms of the contrast between sense as intuitive and reason as discursive, the one beholding its objects immediately, the other forming concepts, judgments, or conclusions about objects which are either beheld by the senses or cannot be intuitively apprehended at all.

The exceptions to the foregoing summary are almost as numerous as the exemplifications of the points mentioned. Nothing less than this intricate pattern of agreements and differences will serve, however, to represent the complexity of the discussion and the way in which diverse theories of sense imply different views of nature and man, of mind and knowledge. The situation can be illustrated by taking certain doctrines which seem to be opposite

on most points, and then considering other theories which seem to agree, on this point or that, with both extremes.

WE HAVE ALREADY observed the opposition between Hobbes and Aquinas with regard to matter and spirit in relation to the activity of the senses. Hobbes, like Lucretius, not only treats all mental phenomena as manifestations of bodily motion, but also reduces thought to the train or sequence of images. Images are in turn reducible to the sensation from which they derive.

"As we have no imagination," Hobbes writes "whereof we have not formerly had sense,'in whole or in parts; so we have no transition from one imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our senses." Using the word "thoughts" to stand for the images derived from sense, Hobbes goes on to say that "besides sense, and thoughts, and the train of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the help of speech, and method, the same faculties may be improved to such a height as to distinguish men from all other living creatures."

Only man's use of words makes the difference in the exercise of the imagination "that we generally call understanding," and which, according to Hobbes, "is common to man and beast." Similarly, it is only the fact that common names have general significance which gives human discourse the appearance of abstract thought, for Hobbes denies abstract ideas Thoughts or images are no less particular than sensations, "there being nothing in the world universal but names."

Berkeley and Hume seem to agree with Hobbes that a man has no abstract ideas or universal concepts; that all the operations of thought are merely elaborations of the original impressions of sense; and that no special power, but only the use of language, distinwishes men from other animals.

° Berkeley uses the word "idea" to stand for sense impressions—"ideas actually imprinted on :he senses"—and for whatever is "perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind." To these two he adds a third: "ideas formed by the help of memory and imagination, either compounding or dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways." The only difference between the first and the third is that "the ideas of sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination." But our ideas of sense and imagination do not cover all the objects of which we can think. He admits, therefore, the possibility of our having *notions,* whereby we understand the meaning of a word like "spirit" or "soul" which refers to a substance of which we can form no idea,

Hume divides "all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated *thoughts* or *ideas.* The other he calls "impressions," meaning thereby "all our more lively perceptions." Impressions are the source of all other ideas, the creative power of the mind consisting in "no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the matenals afforded us by the senses" and every simple idea being "copied from similar impression."

Yet, though Berkeley and Hume seem to agree with Hobbes in reducing all thought to primary sense perceptions and derived memories or imaginations, Hume does not attempt to explain thought by the motions of matter, Berkeley differs even more radically. He denies that matter or bodies exist, and so he regards sense perception, like all the rest of thought, as purely spiritual. The soul passively receives its original impressions directly from God and actively forms the ideas it is able to derive from these impressions.

NOR DO ALL THOSE who somehow conceive man as composed of both body and soul agree upon the function of sense in relation to the rest of thought. Locke, for example, uses "understanding" *to* cover all sorts of mental activity. Mental activity begins with the passive reception of the simple ideas of sense-the impressions produced in us when "the bodies that surround us do diversely affect our organs"—and the simple ideas of reflection which arise from an awareness of our own mental operations. But mental activity

also includes the formation of complex ideas by the compounding of simple ones, and even the act whereby we form abstract ideas, in doing which man, in Locke's opinion, is distinguished from brutes.

All these activities require soul as well as body. All are somehow nothing more than a reworking of the original sensations passively received. In this last respect, Locke's view accords with that of Hobbes, Berkeley, and Hume, though he differs from them with respect to abstract ideas and in his theory of body and soul. On the very point which he holds in common with Hobbes, Berkeley, and Hume, Locke seems to disagree with Descartes.

Thinking, for Descartes, is the activity of a purely spiritual substance—the rational soul—peculiar to the dual nature of man; whereas sensation and imagination, common to men and brutes, are purely corporeal functions. In man, the soul or thinking substance may form certain of its ideas, those relative to bodies, under the influence of sense or fancy; but with regard to other ideas, such as those we have of geometric figures, Descartes says he cannot admit that they "have at any time entered our minds through the senses." He objects to the use of the word "idea" for images, or what he calls "pictures in the corporeal imagination, *i.e.*-, in some part of the brain." He criticizes those who "never raise their minds above the things of sense," so accustomed are they "to consider nothing except by imagining it," with the result that whatever "is not capable of being imagined appears to them not to be intelligible at all."

Against the maxim which Locke, no less than Hobbes or Berkeley, would approve—that "there is nothing in the understanding which has not first of all been in the senses"—Descartes offers the ideas of God and of the soul as plainly contrary examples, ideas clearly in the mind which have no origin in sensation or fancy. "Those who desire to make use of their imagination to understand these ideas," he adds, "act in the same way as if, to hear sounds or smell odours, they should wish to make use of their eyes."

In making a sharp distinction between the faculties of sense and understanding or reason, Descartes seems to share the position of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, and Kant. Yet for Descartes as for Plato, the intellect in its own sphere of objects is like the senses in theirs, since each is able to behold its proper objects intuitively; whereas for Kant as for Aristotle, sense alone is a faculty of intuition. The ideas by which we apprehend intelligible objects, according to Plato, Descartes, and Spinoza, are not derived from sensations or images. According to Aristotle and Aquinas, on the other hand, the intellect abstracts all its ideas, or universal concepts, from the particulars of sense.

In this respect Aristotle and Aquinas seem to be in agreement with Locke, even though that agreement must be qualified by the observation that Locke sees no need for a special faculty to obtain abstract ideas. On the other hand, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Descartes all seem to agree in holding that understanding is as immaterial as its objects. Unlike sense, which requires bodily organs, rational thought is, according to them, an activity peculiar either to the soul itself or to a power of the soul which is not embodied in an organ, as the power of vision is embodied in the eye or the powers of memory and imagination are embodied in the brain.

James denies this. He holds the view that all forms of consciousness are somehow functions of the brain. Yet he also insists that percept and concept are radically distinct forms of consciousness. To this extent, James makes as sharp a separation as the authors above mentioned between the sensory and the rational phases of thought. He places sensation, perception, memory and imagination on one side, and conception, judgment, and reasoning on the other. But this is for him not a distinction of faculties of powers, but only of different functions which one and the same mind is able to perform.

CERTAIN POINTS OR problems in the traditional discussion of sense are unaffected by the basic issues just considered. For example, most writers tend to make some distinction between the special exterior senses, such as vision and hearing, touch and taste, and the several interior

senses which Aquinas enumerates as the common sense, memory, imagination, and the estimative or cogitative powers. Yet not all who consider memory and imagination as activities consequent upon sense perception call them "interior senses." Not all recognize a distinct estimative or cogitative power even when they recognize a kind of thinking about particulars done by animals and men with sensory materials. Nor do all who discuss discrimination or comparison, and the collation or combining of the impressions received from the special senses, attribute these functions to the special faculty which Aristotle first calls "the common sense."

Frequently the same analytic point is made in different ways. As indicated in the chapter on QUALITY, the distinction which Aristotle and Aquinas make between proper and common sensibles, according as the quality, such as color and odor, belongs to a single sense, or like shape and motion, can be perceived by two or more senses, seems to parallel the distinction between what Locke calls "secondary" and "primary" qualities. But where Locke and others treat the so-called "secondary qualities" as entirely subjective, occurring only in the experience of the sentient organism and having no reality in the sensible thing Aristotle takes a contrary view.

When it is not actually seen or smelled, the sensible thing, according to Aristotle, is potentially colorful or odoriferous; just as when it is not actually seeing or smelling, the sense of vision or smell is also in a state of potentiality with respect to these qualities. But when the sensible thing is actually sensed, then, Aristotle says, "the actuality of the sensible object and ofthe sensitive faculty is *one* actuality." The thing is actually colored when it is actually seen, though it is only potentially colored when it is merely able to be so seen. "Earlier students of nature," he writes, "were mistaken in their view that without sight there was no white or black, without taste no savor. This statement of theirs is partly true, partly false: 'sense' and 'the sensible object' are ambiguous terms, *i.e.,* they may denote either potentialties or actualities. The statement is true of the latter, false of the former."

Another example of the same analytic point (which is made differently by different writers) concerns the distinction between sensation and perception. According to Russell, as well as many other writers in the 20th century, a sharp distinction must be made between sense data and physical objects, the latter being objects of sense perception, but not of any one or another of the special senses. "If the physical sun had ceased to exist within the last eight minutes, that would make no difference to the sense-data which we call 'seeing the sun' "; and this, Russell adds, illustrates "the necessity of distinguishing between sense-data and physical objects." Ten people sitting around a dinner table all perceive one and the same table and all the physical objects on it, but "the ^sense-data are private to each separate person."

According to James, "perception involves sensation as a portion of itself, and sensation in turn never takes place in adult life without perception also being there." The difference between them is that the function of sensation is "that of mere acquaintance with a fact," whereas "perception's function ... is knowledge *about* a fact, and this knowledge admits of numberless degrees of complication." Hearing a sound is having a sensation, but perception occurs when, as James points out, we "hear a sound, and say 'a horse-car.' "

But James does not agree that, when perception is so described, it is, as other psychologists have suggested, a species of reasoning, "If, every time a present sign suggests an absent reality to our mind, we make an mference, and if every time we make an inference we reason; then," James admits, "perception is indubitably reasoning. Only one sees no room in it for any unconscious part." No inference is consciously made in perception; and James thinks that "to call perception unconscious reasoning is either a useless metaphor, or a positively misleading confusion between two different things." In his opinion, "perception differs from sensation [simply] by the consciousness of further facts associated with the objects of sensation." For him, "perception and reasoning are coordinate varieties of that deeper sort of process known psychologically as the association of ideas."

What James treats as the object of sensation, Aristotle refers to as a quality sensed by one or more of the special senses, either a proper or a common sensible. What James treats as the object of perception, Aristotle calls an "accidental object of sense," because it is strictly not sensible at all by any of the exterior senses, singly or in combination. When we call "the white object we see" the son of Diares or a man, we have an example of an accidental sensible or an object incidentally perceived, because " 'being the son of Diares' is incidental to the directly visible white patch" we see with our eyes.

This distinction between sensation and perception seems to have a bearing on the problem of the fallibility of the senses. Again the same point seems to be differently made. Aristotle, for example, holds that whereas each of the senses is normally infallible in the apprehension of its proper object or appropriate quality, error is possible in the perception of the complex thing, which is not strictly an object of special senses. "While the perception that there is white before us cannot be false," he writes, "the perception that what is white is this or that may be false." Planck points out that "when a person happens to be deceived by a mirage, the fault lies not with his ... visual image, which is actually present, but in his inferences which draw false conclusions from the given sensory data. The sensory impression is always a given fact, and therefore incontestable. What conclusions the individual attaches to it, is another story."

Lucretius likewise insists that the senses themselves are never deceived, but that all the errors attributed to the senses are the result of a false inference or judgment which reason makes on the basis of the eyidence presented by the senses. That also seems to be the opinion of Descartes, who thinks that "no direct experience can ever deceive the understanding if it restricts its attention accurately to the object presented to it... Thus if a man suffering from jaundice persuades himself that the things he sees are yellow, this thought of his , will be composite, consisting partly of[1] what his imagination presents to him, and partly of what he assumes on his own account, namely. that the color looks yellow, not owing to the defect in his eye, but because the things he sees really are yellow.. . We can go wrong only when the things we believe are in some way compounded by ourselves." Descartes holds that "no falsity can reside" in sensations themselves, but only in those judgments which, on the basis of sensations, we are "accustomed to pass about things external to us."

THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL judgment which men make on the basis of sensation is that an external world exists—a reality not of our own making. Descartes argues from the evidence of the senses to the independent existence of a world of bodies. Though Berkeley argues, on the contrary, that bodies do not exist except as objects of perception, he attributes the sense impressions, over which we seem to have no control, to the action of an external cause—to God, who uses them as signs for instructing us.

Locke defines sensitive knowledge as that which informs us of "the existence of things actually present to our senses." Ws may know our own existence intuitively, and God's existence demonstratively, but "the knowledge of the existence of any other thing we can have only by sensation." And though he adds, "the notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us ... be not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge or the deductions of our reason ... yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge."

Whitehead agrees with Locke. "There is not one world of things for my sensations and another for yours, but one world in which we both exist." For Russell, common sense "unhesitatingly" asserts the existence of a world that is independent of our individual sense impressions. Whenever any of us say that we are perceiving this or that physical object, we are at the same time asserting that that physical object really exists in a world that is independent of our sense. "We want," Russell writes, "the *same* object for different people . . . But the sense-data are private to each separate person; what is immediately present to the sight of one is not immediately present to the sight of another."

Against such views, the most fundamental skepticism goes further than doubting the veracity of the senses because of the illusions and hallucinations they cause us to suffer. "By what arguments," Hume asks, "can it be proved that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by the external objects ... and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself or from the suggestion of some visible or unknown spirit?"

"It is a question of fact," he adds, "whether the perception of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them. How shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be, entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning." If Hume's skepticism is unfounded, it arises from his failure to distinguish between sensation and perception.