

# Revolution

## INTRODUCTION

Most of the words commonly used as synonyms for "revolution," such as "insurrection," "uprising," "rebellion," or "civil war," carry the connotation of violence and the use of armed force. Most of the great revolutions in western history which come readily to mind—those in the city-states and empires of the ancient world, the Peasants' Revolt in Germany in the 15th century, the rebellion led by Cromwell in 17th-century England, the American and French Revolutions in the 18th century, the Russian and the Spanish Revolutions in the 20th century—have been affairs of bloodshed. Yet neither in political theory nor in historic fact does revolution always involve the use of force or the resort to violence.

Thucydides describes both violent and non-violent revolutions in the alternations of democracy and oligarchy in the constitution of the Greek city-states. In England, the Great Rebellion which, by civil war, succeeds in beheading one Stuart king, is followed by the Bloodless Revolution of 1688 which, without any war at all, unseats another. Some of the revolutions in the European states in the middle years of the 19th century are accompanied by barricades and fighting. Some, however, like the revolutions accomplished by the Reform Bills in England or by constitutional amendments in the United States, are fundamental changes in government effected by due process of law, by peaceful shifts in the distribution of political power.

A revolution may involve action in defiance of the law and yet be prosecuted without violence on the part of the revolutionists, as in the case of the rebellion which Gandhi led against British rule in India by the method of civil disobedience. The use of armed force may

not, however, be the only technique of revolutionary violence. "Revolutions are effected in two ways," according to Aristotle, "by force and by fraud." Though fraud does no physical violence, it does violence to the will of those who are deceived. In some cases when fraud is used, "the citizens are deceived into acquiescing in a change of government, and afterwards," Aristotle observes, "they are held in subjection against their will." In other cases, they may subsequently be persuaded and their allegiance and goodwill won. But as Machiavelli's later consideration of these two techniques of seizing power indicates, the choice between force and fraud is one of expediency rather than of principle. He recommends guile as an alternative to force, with force held in reserve should cunning fail. Both methods, however, employ the strategy of warfare.

As opposed to both force and fraud, and even to the method of civil disobedience, which acts outside the law or in violation of it, the writers of *The Federalist* conceive the possibility of a revolutionary process which is at once peaceful and legal. It is precisely because they think that the Constitution of the United States affords the opportunity for achieving political change by constitutional amendment that they defend the clause which guarantees "to every State in this Union a republican form of government," and promises to protect each of them, upon application to the federal government, "against domestic violence." To the objection that such a guaranty may involve "an officious interference in the domestic concerns of the members," Hamilton replies: "It could be no impediment to reforms of the State constitutions by a majority of the people in a legal and peaceable mode. This

right would remain undiminished. The guaranty could only operate against changes to be effected by violence. Towards the prevention of calamities of this kind, too many checks cannot be provided."

In another of the Federalist papers, Madison considers the possibility of "an insurrection pervading all the States, and comprising a superiority of the entire force, though not a constitutional right." He thinks such a case beyond "the compass of human remedies." It is enough if the Constitution "diminishes the risk of a calamity for which no possible constitution can provide a cure." Nor does "a conflagration through a whole nation, or through a very large proportion of it, proceeding either from weighty causes of discontent given by the government or from the contagion of some violent popular paroxysm" seem to Hamilton to "fall within any ordinary rules of calculation." In his estimation, "no form of government can always either avoid or control" such revolutions. But, he adds, "where the whole power of the government is in the hands of the people, there is the less pretence for the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional distempers of the State."

WHEN ARISTOTLE THINKS of revolution as taking place without violence, he does not have in mind the strictly modern device of constitutional amendment. Political change, he suggests, may be the result of accidents rather than of planned actions. "Political revolutions," he writes, sometimes "spring from a disproportionate increase in any part of the state . . . And this disproportion may sometimes happen by accident, as at Terentum, from a defeat in which many of the notables were slain in a battle with the Iapygians just after the Persian War, the constitutional government in consequence becoming a democracy." Or "when the rich grow numerous or properties increase, the form of government changes into an oligarchy or a government of families."

On the other hand, to writers like Hobbes and Locke, revolution means war and is inseparable from violence. Those who "deny the authority of the Commonwealth"—apart from which, according to Hobbes, men live in

a state of war—by renouncing their subjection to the Sovereign, "relapse into the condition of war commonly called Rebellion . . . For rebellion is but war renewed." Unlike bees and ants, the peace of whose societies is never threatened by rebellion, there are "amongst men . . . very many that think themselves wiser, and abler to govern the public, better than the rest; and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into distraction and civil war."

Locke's principle seems to be that "whoever uses force without right—as everyone does in society who does it without law—puts himself into a state of war with those against whom he so uses it." Having entered into society "and introduced laws for the preservation of property, peace and unity amongst themselves," men who "set up force again in opposition to the laws, do *rebellare*—that is, bring back again the state of war—and are properly rebels."

Aquinas also seems to align revolution (which he calls "sedition") with war and strife, though he thinks it differs from them in two respects: "First, because war and strife denote actual aggression on either side, whereas sedition may be said to denote either actual aggression or the preparation for such aggression . . . Secondly, they differ in that war is, properly speaking, carried on against external foes, being as it were between one people and another, whereas strife is between one individual and another, while sedition, in its proper sense, is between the mutually dissentient parts of one people, as when one part of the state rises in tumult against another part."

THOUGH THE WORD "revolution" may be used in both senses, it nevertheless seems to be the case that traditional discussions of the causes and prevention of revolution, theories of revolutionary strategy and tactics, and the great issue of the right of rebellion all seem to contemplate the resort to, or at least the threat of, force to gain an end. This also seems to be implied in the popular conception of the difference between revolution and evolution.

The contrast between revolution and evolution may explain why the note of violence, disorder, or disruption colors the idea

of revolution. The word "evolution" usually signifies change which is gradual and which tends in one direction rather than another, that direction being for the most part toward a progressive development of changes already accomplished. Revolution is abrupt. Revolutions can occur in either direction, against the tide as well as with it. As action and reaction can be equal and opposite in physical motion, so in social change revolution and counter-revolution can aim in opposite directions. In either case, whether revolution reverses the direction of change or precipitates a radical transformation toward which things are moving too slowly, revolution seems to involve *overthrowing* the established order rather than *developing* its latent tendencies.

It is in this sense that the revolutionist is a radical. He may also be a reactionary in the sense that the radical change he is willing to use force to achieve, is a return to some earlier condition rather than one which, in the judgment of his opponents, is in the line of progress or evolution. But whether reactionary or progressive the revolutionist is never conservative. If the established order does not submit readily to the radical change which a revolutionary person or party seeks, or if it resists, it must be forced to yield. The revolutionist can be reluctant to use force, but he can never forswear it entirely.

This seems to be the sense in which Marx and Engels conceive the program of the *Communist Manifesto* as a revolutionary program. Their conception of a revolutionary class or party is not, however, limited to the proletariat in their struggle against the bourgeoisie. They apply it to the bourgeoisie, not in the contemporary world when the established order of capitalism makes the bourgeoisie conservative or reactionary, but in the 18th century when the bourgeoisie overthrew the landed aristocracy.

"The bourgeoisie," they write, "historically has played a most revolutionary part . . . The French Revolution, for example, abolished feudal property in favour of bourgeois property." And again: "When Christian ideas succumbed in the 18th century to rationalist ideas, feudal society fought its death-battle

with the then revolutionary bourgeoisie." That the French Revolution represents the struggle not between the propertied and propertyless classes, but between two propertied classes—the bourgeoisie and the aristocrats—seems evident to Marx in the fact that "during the very first storms of the revolution, the French Bourgeoisie dared to take away from the workers the right of association just acquired."

NO LESS THAN THE *Communist Manifesto*, the American Declaration of Independence is a revolutionary document. Its signers are prepared to use force to overthrow the established order which, in their view, has worked grievous iniquities and injustices upon the colonies. But in the Marxist view the rebellion of the colonists, unlike the French Revolution, is political rather than economic, even if it has economic as well as political motivations. This distinction between economic and political revolution seems to be peculiarly modern.

It is not that the ancients—Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle, for example—fail to recognize the "class war," which is paramount for Marx. They observe (as is indicated in the chapter on OLIGARCHY) the struggle between the rich and the poor for control of the state. They know that the opponents, in the frequent and violent revolutions which disturbed the Greek city-states, are the oligarchs and the democrats—the men of great property and the men of little or none.

The revolt of the helots in Sparta is the exceptional case of a rebellion of slaves against their master. For the most part, the struggle is between freemen belonging to different economic classes. The oligarchic and democratic revolutions which these classes in society form are political in the sense of seeking to change the constitution rather than the economic system itself, even though the constitutional changes may have economic as well as political effects. "In the opinion of some," Aristotle reports, "the regulation of property is the chief point of all, that being the question upon which all revolutions turn."

Aristotle is willing to admit that "the equalization of property" may "prevent the citizens from quarrelling," but he does not think that

economic injustice is the only cause of revolution, or economic justice its absolute cure. "The avarice of mankind," he writes, "is insatiable; at one time two obols was pay enough; but now, when this sum has become customary, men always want more and more without end; for it is of the nature of desire not to be satisfied, and most men live only for the gratification of it. The beginning of reform," in his opinion, "is not so much to equalize property as to train the nobler sorts of natures not to desire more, and to prevent the lower from getting more; that is to say, they must be kept down, but not ill-treated." Such a reform would hardly cure the evil of chattel slavery. That requires a revolution which effects the equalization of political status, not the equalization of property.

If a rebellion of slaves in the ancient world had succeeded in abolishing the institution of slavery, it would have been, in the modern view, an economic as well as a political revolution, for it would have radically altered the mode of production. It is in this sense that what Adam Smith describes as the change from an agrarian to a manufacturing economy, is strictly an economic revolution, though it is Marx, not Smith, who gives currency to the word "revolution" as used in this sense. It is exemplified in our common understanding of the phrase "the industrial revolution" which refers to the radical change in an economy based on manufactures, when mass production by machines in factories replaces the system of production by workers using their own tools in their own homes.

"In manufacture," writes Marx, "the revolution in the mode of production begins with labour-power; in modern industry it begins with the instruments of labour. Our first inquiry then is, how the instruments of labour are converted from tools into machines, or what is the difference between a machine and the implements of a handicraft?" But for Marx the meaning of economic revolution is not limited to radical changes in the physical conditions of production. Such changes necessarily involve equally radical changes in the social relationships of economic classes, and in their possession of political power. In the

*Manifesto*, "the modern bourgeoisie" is said to be "itself the product of a long course of development, of a series of revolutions in the modes of production and of exchange." The bourgeoisie, in turn, "cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society."

According to Marx and Engels, "each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political advance of that class. An oppressed class under the sway of the feudal nobility, . . . an armed and self-governing association in the mediaeval commune . . . afterwards, in the period of manufacture proper, serving either the semi-feudal or the absolute monarchy as a counterpoise against the nobility . . . the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of modern industry and of the world market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative state, exclusive political sway."

ON THE QUESTION whether economic revolutions, in their social and political aspects, require violence, the writers of the *Manifesto* seem to be unambiguous—at least so far as the communist program is concerned. Since "the Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations," and "involves the most radical rupture with traditional ideas," it can hardly be expected to occur without open warfare, no less violent than the earlier struggle of the bourgeoisie against the aristocrats. Standing "face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class," in whose development Marx and Engels see the transition from a "more or less veiled civil war raging within existing society, up to the point where that war breaks out into open revolution, and where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat."

It is precisely on the use of force that the *Manifesto* distinguishes between communism and socialism, especially the "utopian" variety of the latter. The Socialists "reject all political, and especially all revolutionary, action; they

wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, and endeavour by small experiments, necessarily doomed to failure, and by the force of example, to pave the way for the new social gospel . . . They, therefore, endeavour, and that consistently, to deaden the class struggle and to reconcile the class antagonisms." Communist strategy, on the contrary, everywhere supports "every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things . . . The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions."

Though fundamentally economic, the communist revolution cannot help having political effects. "Political power," according to Marx and Engels, "is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another." This applies to the proletariat's conquest of power. Yet they also seem to think that the dictatorship of the proletariat is only a temporary phase in the communist revolution. "If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled by the force of circumstances to organize itself as a class; if by means of a revolution it makes itself the ruling class and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class." In aiming at the economically classless society, with the consequent transformation of the state, the communist program seems to conceive its revolution as abolishing the possibility of or need for any further revolutions, peaceful or violent, economic or political.

Discussing why great revolutions will become rare with the advent of a politically as well as an economically classless society, Tocqueville asks, "Does equality of social conditions habitually and permanently drive men toward revolutions? Does it contain some disturbing principle which prevents society from settling down? . . ." While Tocqueville tells us that he does not think so, he also fears that the democratic societies of the future "will

end up by being too unalterably fixed with the same institutions, prejudices, and mores, so that mankind will stop progressing and will dig itself in."

IN ADDITION TO the issues raised by the economic theory and history which underlie revolutionary communism, there is the debatable question whether an economically classless society means the withering away of the state, or at least such changes in political institutions that revolution would cease to be possible or necessary. Even a hypothetical consideration of this question seems to call for attention to the various ways in which political revolutions take place. With the advent of the "classless society," no opportunity would remain, at least in theory, for the type of revolution in which one ruling class replaces another. But in such a society it is still conceivable that the equivalent of a palace revolution might substitute one ruling individual for another—by the old-fashioned methods of assassination or usurpation.

For Aristotle, however, all revolutions which produce a change from one form of government to another also involve the replacement of one ruling class by another. He distinguishes between such revolutions as affect the constitution, "when men seek to change from an existing form into some other, for example, from democracy into oligarchy, or from oligarchy into democracy," and those revolutions which do not affect the constitution, when men, "without disturbing the form of government, whether oligarchy or monarchy or any other, try to get the administration into their own hands." To these two types of revolution Aristotle adds a third, which "may be directed against only a portion of the constitution, *e.g.*, the establishment or overthrow of a particular office; as at Sparta, it is said that Lysander attempted to overthrow the monarchy, and king Pausanias, the ephoralty."

Conceivably, any of these political changes might be accomplished without violence. In modern constitutional states, the basic principle of constitutions can be changed from oligarchy to democracy by amendments or legal reforms which extend the franchise. The

structure of the government, as to its offices or their organization, can be changed by some form of peaceful plebiscite. As the Federalists point out, the polls provide a "natural cure for an ill-administration in a popular or representative constitution," namely, a change of men. But such changes of government in the ancient city-states, even when constitutional, appear to Aristotle to be revolutionary in the double sense of involving violence, or the threat of it, and of being radical transformations of the polity. What is true of constitutional changes in ancient republics is also true of monarchies and tyrannies, both ancient and modern.

When absolute power is concentrated in the hands of one man, his subjects are necessarily without juridical means for redressing their grievances by changing the occupant of the throne, much less for abolishing the monarchy entirely in favor of self-government. Machiavelli's advice to the prince on safeguarding his power against usurping rivals or rebellious subjects seems to be written against the background of force and fraud as the normal methods of changing rulers or modes of rule. They are the very same methods which the prince in power must employ to maintain his position.

"There are two ways of contesting," Machiavelli writes, "the one by law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the man . . . Being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, [a prince] ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves." It follows, according to Machiavelli, that the prince seldom can be, though he should always try to *appear* to be, "merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright . . . A prince, especially a new one, cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity, friendship, humanity, and religion."

The stories of oriental despotism told by Herodotus, the account of the Caesars given

by Tacitus and Gibbon, the chronicle of the English monarchy in the historical plays of Shakespeare, all seem to indicate that crowns seldom change heads without bloodshed. Machiavelli's rules for the prince do not greatly enlarge upon Aristotle's description of "the arts by which the tyrant preserves his power." Even when Aristotle proposes, as an alternative method, that the tyrant can try to be benevolent, he adds the Machiavellian suggestion that the tyrant should at least "appear to act" like a good king.

The tyrant, Aristotle writes, "should lop off those who are too high. He must put to death men of spirit . . . He must be on his guard against anything which is likely to inspire either courage or confidence among his subjects. He must prohibit literary assemblies or other meetings for discussion, and he must take every means to prevent people from knowing one another." After enumerating many similar practices which he calls "Persian and barbaric arts," Aristotle concludes that "there is no wickedness too great for the tyrant" if he is to maintain himself in power.

These matters are more fully discussed in the chapter on TYRANNY AND DESPOTISM. In our present consideration of the types of revolution, we must note one other political change which usually involves the widespread turbulence of civil war. That is the rebellion of subject peoples against their imperial masters. Unlike civil uprisings, which seek to overthrow governments or effect a change in the ruling classes or persons, these wars of rebellion seek to liberate one people from another or to establish the independence of colonies at the expense of empire.

Still another type of insurrection aims at the dissolution of the state itself. What Rousseau deals with in theory as the degeneration of the state into anarchy by the repudiation of the social contract, calls to mind no historic examples; but the few historic instances of "wars of secession" certainly illustrate the point. They aim to dissolve a federal state by severing ties of union which have something like a contractual character.

The distinction between these types of civil war may be clear in theory, yet difficult to

apply to historic cases. Which sort of insurrection—a rebellion of colonies or a secession of states—does the Declaration of Independence announce? A theory current among American political writers in 1775 suggests that the thirteen colonies claimed the status of self-governing dominions in a confederacy united under the British crown. On this theory, does the principle stated in the Declaration—that it is sometimes “necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature’s God entitle them”—cover the secession of the Southern states from the American union, as well as the revolt of the American states from Great Britain, or the British Commonwealth of nations? Questions of fact are involved, of course, in any comparison of the Revolutionary War of 1776 and the war between the states in 1861; but the question of principle turns on the whole issue of whether revolution is a matter of might or right.

THE RIGHT OF REVOLUTION does not seem to be a central consideration in ancient political theory. The ancient discussion of revolutions appears to be more concerned with their causes, their methods, and their prevention. This does not mean that the ancients treat revolutions entirely as contests for power. On the contrary, Aristotle declares that “the universal and chief cause of the revolutionary impulse” is “the desire of equality, when men think that they are equal to others who have more than themselves; or, again, the desire of inequality and superiority, when conceiving themselves to be superior they think that they have not more but the same or less than their inferiors—pretensions which may or may not be just.”

Nevertheless, Aristotle’s elaborate treatise on revolution in the fifth book of his *Politics* deals alike with revolutions that spring from real and from fancied injustices. The object of his inquiry seems to be “what modes of destruction apply to particular states, and out of what and into what they mostly change; also what are the modes of preservation in states

generally, or in a particular state, and by what means each state may be best preserved”—not how revolution can be justified or why rebellion is the crime of treason or the folly of anarchy. Such questions seem to come to the foreground in modern political theory, though they also have a certain prominence in medieval teaching.

Aquinas, for example, holds that sedition is “a special kind of sin” because it is “opposed to a special kind of good, namely, the unity and peace of a people.” He qualifies this, however, in the case of an uprising against tyranny, even if it involves civil strife. Since in his view “a tyrannical government is not just, because it is directed, not to the common good but to the private good of the ruler . . . there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this kind, unless indeed the tyrant’s rule be disturbed so inordinately that his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance than from the tyrant’s government. Indeed,” Aquinas writes, “it is the tyrant rather who is guilty of sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition among his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely.”

Holding that “the end of government is the good of mankind,” Locke asks, in a similar vein, which is better: “that the people should be always exposed to the boundless will of tyranny, or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and employ it for the destruction and not the preservation of the property of their people”? Since “force is to be opposed to nothing but unjust and unlawful force,” Locke argues that a king may be resisted when he exceeds his authority or prerogative and uses his power unlawfully. Since such a king “has dethroned himself, and put himself in a state of war with his people, what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who is no king, as they would any other man who has put himself into a state of war with them?”

The right to resist a tyrant, or a king turned despot, may lead to regicide, but this seems no different to Locke from the punishment of any other criminal. “He who may resist must be allowed to strike”; and furthermore, Locke continues, “he has a right, when he prevails,

to punish the offender, both for the breach of the peace, and all the evils that followed upon it." Rousseau is even less hesitant to condone tyrannicide. "The contract of government is so completely dissolved by despotism," writes Rousseau, "that the despot is master only so long as he remains the strongest; as soon as he can be expelled, he has no right to complain of violence. The popular insurrection that ends in the death or deposition of a Sultan is as lawful an act as those by which he disposed, the day before, of the life and fortunes of his subjects. As he was maintained by force alone, it is force alone that overthrows him."

In the 20th century, the century of the Russian Revolution, Orwell's *Animal Farm* is the bitter satiric attack on how revolutions undertaken with the highest aims can woefully miscarry. In *Animal Farm* the story begins with the old boar Major's dream of an animal rebellion against their human masters; and it ends with the betrayal of every hope that Major pictured in his dream. In the character of the pig Napoleon, we see Stalin perfectly portrayed.

Those who say that "it may occasion civil wars or intestine broils, to tell the people they are absolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made upon their liberties or properties . . . may as well say upon the same ground," in Locke's opinion, "that honest men may not oppose robbers and pirates because this may occasion disorder or bloodshed." Nor does Locke think that the right to resist injustice means that governments will be overthrown "upon every little mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part," he writes, "many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty will be borne by the people without mutiny or murmur. But if a long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to the people . . . it is not to be wondered that they should then rouse themselves and endeavor to put the rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends for which government was at first erected."

Hence, to those who say that his revolutionary principle "lays a perpetual foundation

for disorder," Locke replies that it will never operate until "the inconvenience is so great that the majority feel it, and are weary of it, and find it necessary to have it amended." Rebellions will occur only when the majority feel that "their laws, and with them their estates, liberties, and lives are in danger, and perhaps their religion too," and so will exercise their natural right to resist, with force if necessary, the illegal force used against them. But strictly, it is not the people who rebel; rather it is they who put down the sedition of the tyrant.

What Locke states as a right of resistance, the Declaration of Independence seems to put more positively as a right of rebellion, apparently deducing it from other natural rights—of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It is to secure these rights that "governments are instituted among men," so that "whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it and to institute a new government." The Declaration admits that "governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes"; but when a people suffer "a long train of abuses and usurpations . . . it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their security." Jefferson's view of the necessity of revolution is repeated in a famous letter to Madison: "I hold it that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical."

AGAINST SUCH REVOLUTIONARY sentiments or principles Hobbes, Kant, and Hegel seem to take a stand, though in each case they place some qualification on their denial of a right of resistance or rebellion. Hobbes, for example, denies the right of men to change their form of government, or of subjects to resist their Sovereign, *except for the sake of self-preservation*. When men covenant to form a commonwealth, they are bound, Hobbes says, to uphold the actions and judgments of the Sovereign they have created; they "cannot lawfully make a new covenant amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other . . . without his permission . . . They that are subjects to a

monarch, cannot without his leave cast off monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude."

Furthermore, "because every subject is by this institution, author of all the actions and judgments of the Sovereign instituted, it follows," according to Hobbes, "that whatsoever he doeth, it can be no injury to any of his subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice." Yet "every subject has liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot by covenant be transferred," such as the right of a man to defend his own body, "to resist those that assault him," or to have access to "food, air, medicine, or any other thing without which he cannot live."

Kant disallows rebellion as a matter of right, unless resistance is required to fulfill a moral duty outside the sphere of public right. " 'Obey the authority which has power over you' (in everything which is not opposed to morality) is a Categorical Imperative." Hence, though a juridical constitution "may be vitiated by great defects and coarse errors, it is nevertheless absolutely unallowable and punishable to resist it."

Since, in his view, public right is founded on the institution of "a *sovereign* will, uniting all particular wills by one law," Kant argues that "to allow a right of resistance to this sovereignty, and to limit its power, is a contradiction." It should be remembered also that for Kant the only legitimate form of government is a republic, resting on the founda-

tion of popular sovereignty. Kant is not considering resistance to tyrannical or despotic power which lacks all juridical authority.

A similar qualification appears in Hegel's distinction between the rebellion of a conquered people and revolution in a well-organized state. Only the latter action is a crime, for only the latter situation corresponds to the Idea of the state—fully realized, for Hegel, only in a constitutional monarchy, never in a despotism or tyranny. "A rebellion in a province conquered by war," he says, "is a different thing from a rising in a well-organized state. It is not against their prince that the conquered are in rebellion, and they are committing no crime against the state, because their connexion with their master is not a connexion within the Idea, or one within the inner necessity of the constitution. In such a case, there is only a contract, no political tie."

With such qualifications on their position, those who disfavor revolution or deny its basis in right may not be completely opposed to those who apparently think rebellions can be justified. There may be qualifications on the other side too. Aquinas, for example, justifies sedition, not against any government or ruler, but only against tyranny. The signers of the Declaration of Independence speak of a right to alter or abolish "any form of government," but the writers of the Federalist papers do not seem equally willing to acknowledge a right to overthrow the Constitution of the United States.