

to demonstrate their merits, when they relate to a battle that has been won.

Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, X, 28

72 The result of a battle is decided not by the orders of a commander in chief, nor the place where the troops are stationed, nor by the number of cannon or of slaughtered men, but by that intangible force called the spirit of the army.

Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, X, 35

73 The activity of a commander in chief does not at all resemble the activity we imagine to ourselves when we sit at ease in our studies examining some campaign on the map, with a certain number of troops on this and that side in a certain known locality, and begin our plans from some given moment. A commander in chief is never dealing with the *beginning* of any event—the position from which we always contemplate it. The commander in chief is always in the midst of a series of shifting events and so he never can at any moment consider the whole import of an event that is occurring.

Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, XI, 2

74 The army has always been the basis of power, and it is so today. Power is always in the hands of

those who command it.

Tolstoy, *The Kingdom of God Is Within You*

75 An army, considered ideally, is an organ for the state's protection; but it is far from being such in its origin, since at first an army is nothing but a ravenous and lusty horde quartered in a conquered country; yet the cost of such an incubus may come to be regarded as an insurance against further attack, and so what is in its real basis an inevitable burden resulting from a chance balance of forces may be justified in afterthought as a rational device for defensive purposes.

Santayana, *Life of Reason*, II, 3

76 The military classes, since they inherit the blood and habits of conquerors, naturally love war and their irrational combativeness is reinforced by interest; for in war officers can shine and rise, while the danger of death, to a brave man, is rather a spur and a pleasing excitement than a terror. A military class is therefore always recalling, foretelling, and meditating war; it fosters artificial and senseless jealousies toward other governments that possess armies; and finally, as often as not, it precipitates disaster by bringing about the objectless struggle on which it has set its heart.

Santayana, *Life of Reason*, II, 3

### 14.3 | *The Conditions of Peace*

It is said, in some of the passages below, that war is for the sake of peace; and it is also said that an unjust peace is to be preferred to a just war. The latter statement is challenged by those who question the genuineness of peace without justice and who point out that oppressive injustice breeds violence and rebellion which, as Locke observes in commenting on the etymology of the word (*re-bellare*), is a return to war. This difference of opinion is epitomized in two views of the *Pax Romana*—the Virgilian view of it as a boon that Rome conferred by conquest and the opposite view that Tacitus

gives voice to in the words of the defeated British chieftain, Galgacus: the Romans make a desolation, he said, and call it peace.

The basic distinction that emerges in Section 14.1 on WARFARE AND THE STATE OF WAR is of primary relevance to the conception of peace as a positive, not merely a negative, state of affairs—not just the absence of actual fighting, but the elimination of the need for recourse to violence in order to settle disputes. Animals, it has been asserted, have only one way of settling their differences—by fighting; but men have two ways—by fighting and by law. Civil society, Locke

tells us, is a state of peace in which the um-  
 piracy of government and the reign of law  
 provide the instrumentalities for settling dis-  
 putes without recourse to violence; for the  
 use of authorized force by government is not  
 violence. Other writers, notably Augustine  
 and Aquinas, fill out this positive conception  
 of peace by the notion that genuine concord  
 is essential to the tranquility of order and by  
 the insistence that genuine concord is impos-  
 sible without justice and love.

Both here and in Section 14.1, there is  
 some discussion of the possibility of abolish-  
 ing war—not merely actual warfare, but  
 also the state of war. The negative voices on  
 this subject, found mainly in Section 14.1,  
 regard war as inevitable and irremediable,  
 given man as he is and societies as they are.  
 Sometimes this is said with regret, as by  
 Freud, and sometimes with acquiescence, as

by Hegel. Of an opposite tenor is the hope  
 that emerges here from the recognition that,  
 the ultimate cause of war being anarchy, the  
 ultimate condition of peace is government.  
 If local civil peace has been established here  
 and there by local government, then per-  
 haps there is some prospect for world civil  
 peace through world government. The read-  
 er will find this insight presented and this  
 hope weighed in passages drawn from  
 Dante, Kant, *The Federalist*, and Tennyson;  
 but in the absence of twentieth-century  
 voices, the impact of the discussion is not as  
 encouraging as it might be.

As already indicated, materials of rele-  
 vance to the future of war and peace will be  
 found in Section 14.1; and with regard to  
 the role of government in the establishment  
 of civil peace, turn to Section 10.3 on GOV-  
 ERNMENT: ITS NATURE, NECESSITY, AND FORMS.

1 Great peace have they which love thy law: and  
 nothing shall offend them.

*Psalm 119:165*

2 When a man's ways please the Lord, he maketh  
 even his enemies to be at peace with him.

*Proverbs 16:7*

3 [The Lord] shall judge among the nations, and  
 shall rebuke many people: and they shall beat  
 their swords into plowshares, and their spears into  
 pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword  
 against nation, neither shall they learn war any  
 more.

*Isaiah 2:4*

4 The wolf . . . shall dwell with the lamb, and the  
 leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf  
 and the young lion and the fatling together; and a  
 little child shall lead them.

*Isaiah 11:6*

5 *Trygaeus*. Think of all the thousand pleasures,  
 Comrades, which to Peace we owe,  
 All the life of ease and comfort  
 Which she gave us long ago:  
 Figs and olives, wine and myrtles,  
 Luscious fruits preserved and dried,  
 Banks of fragrant violets, blowing  
 By the crystal fountain's side;

Scenes for which our hearts are yearning,  
 Joys that we have missed so long—

—Comrades, here is Peace returning,  
 Greet her back with dance and song!

*Chorus*. Welcome, welcome, best and dearest,  
 welcome, welcome, welcome, home.

We have looked and longed for thee,  
 Looking, longing, wondrously,

Once again our farms to see.

O the joy, the bliss, the rapture, really to behold  
 thee come.

Thou wast aye our chief enjoyment, thou wast aye  
 our greatest gain.

We who ply the farmer's trade  
 Used, through thy benignant aid,

All the joys of life to hold.

Ah! the unbought pleasures free

Which we erst received of thee

In the merry days of old,

When thou wast our one salvation and our roast-  
 ed barley grain.

Now will all the tiny shoots,

Sunny vine and fig-tree sweet,

All the happy flowers and fruits,

Laugh for joy thy steps to greet.

*Aristophanes, Peace, 571*

6 *Lacedaemonian envoys*. If great civilities are ever to  
 be really settled, we think it will be, not by the  
 system of revenge and military success, and by

forcing an opponent to swear to a treaty to his disadvantage, but when the more fortunate combatant waives these his privileges, to be guided by gentler feelings, conquers his rival in generosity, and accords peace on more moderate conditions than he expected. From that moment, instead of the debt of revenge which violence must entail, his adversary owes a debt of generosity to be paid in kind, and is inclined by honour to stand to his agreement. And men oftener act in this manner towards their greatest enemies than where the quarrel is of less importance; they are also by nature as glad to give way to those who first yield to them, as they are apt to be provoked by arrogance to risks condemned by their own judgment.

Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, IV, 19

- 7 *Hemocrates*. In the face of the universal consent that peace is the first of blessings, how can we refuse to make it amongst ourselves; or do you not think that the good which you have, and the ills that you complain of, would be better preserved and cured by quiet than by war; that peace has its honours and splendours of a less perilous kind, not to mention the numerous other blessings that one might dilate on, with the not less numerous miseries of war?

Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, IV, 62

- 8 *Athenian Stranger*. No one can be a true statesman, whether he aims at the happiness of the individual or state, who looks only, or first of all, to external warfare; nor will he ever be a sound legislator who orders peace for the sake of war, and not war for the sake of peace.

Plato, *Laws*, I, 628B

- 9 Facts, as well as arguments, prove that the legislator should direct all his military and other measures to the provision of leisure and the establishment of peace. For most of these military states are safe only while they are at war, but fall when they have acquired their empire; like unused iron they lose their temper in time of peace. And for this the legislator is to blame, he never having taught them how to lead the life of peace.

Aristotle, *Politics*, 1334<sup>a</sup>3

- 10 An unjust peace is better than a just war.

Cicero, *Ad Atticum*, VII, 14

- 11 The only excuse for going to war is to be able to live in peace undisturbed. When victory is won we should spare those who have not been blood-thirsty or barbarous in their warfare.

Cicero, *De Officiis*, I, 11

- 12 Rome, 't is thine alone, with awful sway,  
To rule mankind, and make the world obey,  
Disposing peace and war by thy own majestic way;

To tame the proud, the fetter'd slave to free:  
These are imperial arts, and worthy thee.

Virgil, *Aeneid*, VI

- 13 There is no employment that gives so keen and quick a relish for peace as husbandry and a country life, which leave in men all that kind of courage that makes them ready to fight in defence of their own, while it destroys the licence that breaks out into acts of injustice and rapacity.

Plutarch, *Numa Pompilius*

- 14 Janus, whether in remote antiquity he were a demigod or a king, was certainly a great lover of civil and social unity, and one who reclaimed men from brutal and savage living; for which reason they figure him with two faces, to represent the two states and conditions out of the one of which he brought mankind, to lead them into the other. His temple at Rome has two gates, which they call the gates of war, because they stand open in the time of war, and shut in the times of peace; of which latter there was very seldom an example, for, as the Roman empire was enlarged and extended, it was so encompassed with barbarous nations and enemies to be resisted, that it was seldom or never at peace. Only in the time of Augustus Cæsar, after he had overcome Antony, this temple was shut; as likewise once before, when Marcus Atilius and Titus Manlius were consuls; but then it was not long before, war breaking out, the gates were again opened.

But, during the reign of Numa, those gates were never seen open a single day, but continued constantly shut for a space of forty-three years together; such an entire and universal cessation of war existed. For not only had the people of Rome itself been softened and charmed into a peaceful temper by the just and mild rule of a pacific prince, but even the neighbouring cities, as if some salubrious and gentle air had blown from Rome upon them, began to experience a change of feeling, and partook in the general longing for the sweets of peace and order, and for life employed in the quiet tillage of soil, bringing up of children, and worship of the gods. Festival days and sports, and the secure and peaceful interchange of friendly visits and hospitalities prevailed all through the whole of Italy.

Plutarch, *Numa Pompilius*

- 15 To robbery, slaughter, plunder, they [the Romans] give the lying name of empire; they make a desolation and call it peace.

Tacitus, *Agricola*

- 16 [The earthly city] desires earthly peace for the sake of enjoying earthly goods, and it makes war in order to attain to this peace; since, if it has conquered, and there remains no one to resist it, it enjoys a peace which it had not while there were

opposing parties who contested for the enjoyment of those things which were too small to satisfy both. This peace is purchased by toilsome wars; it is obtained by what they style a glorious victory. Now, when victory remains with the party which had the juster cause, who hesitates to congratulate the victor, and style it a desirable peace? These things, then, are good things, and without doubt the gifts of God. But if they neglect the better things of the heavenly city, which are secured by eternal victory and peace never-ending, and so inordinately covet these present good things that they believe them to be the only desirable things, or love them better than those things which are believed to be better—if this be so, then it is necessary that misery follow and ever increase.

Augustine, *City of God*, XV, 4

- 17 Peace is a good so great, that even in this earthly and mortal life there is no word we hear with such pleasure, nothing we desire with such zest, or find to be more thoroughly gratifying.

Augustine, *City of God*, XIX, 11

- 18 It is . . . with the desire for peace that wars are waged, even by those who take pleasure in exercising their warlike nature in command and battle. And hence it is obvious that peace is the end sought for by war. For every man seeks peace by waging war, but no man seeks war by making peace. For even they who intentionally interrupt the peace in which they are living have no hatred of peace, but only wish it changed into a peace that suits them better. They do not, therefore, wish to have no peace, but only one more to their mind.

Augustine, *City of God*, XIX, 12

- 19 Even wicked men wage war to maintain the peace of their own circle, and wish that, if possible, all men belonged to them, that all men and things might serve but one head, and might, either through love or fear, yield themselves to peace with him!

Augustine, *City of God*, XIX, 12

- 20 Peace between man and man is well-ordered concord. Domestic peace is the well-ordered concord between those of the family who rule and those who obey. Civil peace is a similar concord among the citizens. The peace of the celestial city is the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God, and of one another in God. The peace of all things is the tranquillity of order.

Augustine, *City of God*, XIX, 13

- 21 If one man concord with another, not by a spontaneous will but through being forced, as it were, by the fear of some evil that threatens him, such concord is not really peace, because the order of each concordant is not observed, but is disturbed

by some fear-inspiring cause.

Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II-II, 29, 1

- 22 Even those who seek war and dissension desire nothing but peace, which they do not consider themselves to have. For . . . there is no peace when a man agrees with another man counter to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war to break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that they may obtain a peace in which nothing is contrary to their will. Hence all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than that which they had before.

Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II-II, 29, 2

- 23 Peace is the work of justice indirectly, in so far as justice removes the obstacles to peace; but it is the work of charity directly, since charity, according to its very notion, causes peace.

Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II-II, 29, 3

- 24 The proper work of mankind taken as a whole is to exercise continually its entire capacity for intellectual growth, first, in theoretical matters, and, secondarily, as an extension of theory in practice. And since the part is a sample of the whole, and since individual men find that they grow in prudence and wisdom when they can sit quietly, it is evident that mankind, too, is most free and easy to carry on its work when it enjoys the quiet and tranquillity of peace.

Dante, *De Monarchia*, I, 4

- 25 Wherever there can be contention, there judgment should exist; otherwise things would exist imperfectly, without their own means of adjustment or correction, which is impossible, since in things necessary, God or Nature is not defective. Between any two governments, neither of which is in any way subordinate to the other, contention can arise either through their own fault or that of their subjects. This is evident. Therefore there should be judication between them. And since neither can know the affairs of the other, not being subordinated (for among equals there is no authority), there must be a third and wider power which can rule both within its own jurisdiction. This third power is either the world-government or it is not. If it is, we have reached our conclusion; if it is not, it must in turn have its equal outside its jurisdiction, and then it will need a third party as judge, and so *ad infinitum*, which is impossible. So we must arrive at a first and supreme judge for whom all contentions are judicable either directly or indirectly; and this will be our world-governor or emperor. Therefore, world-government is necessary for the world.

Dante, *De Monarchia*, I, 10

- 26 World government . . . must be understood in

the sense that it governs mankind on the basis of what all have in common and that by a common law it leads all toward peace. This common norm or law should be received by local governments in the same way that practical intelligence in action receives its major premises from the speculative intellect. To these it adds its own particular minor premises and then draws particular conclusions for the sake of its action. These basic norms not only can come from a single source, but must do so in order to avoid confusion among universal principles. Moses himself followed this pattern in the law which he composed, for, having chosen the chiefs of the several tribes, he left them the lesser judgments, reserving to himself alone the higher and more general. These common norms were then used by the tribal chiefs according to their special needs. Therefore, it is better for mankind to be governed by one, not by many; and hence by a single governor, the world ruler; and if it is better, it is pleasing to God, since He always wills the better. And when there are only two alternatives—the better is also the best, and is consequently not only pleasing to God, but the choice of “one” rather than “many” is what most pleases Him. Hence it follows that mankind lives best under a single government, and therefore that such a government is necessary for the well-being of the world.

Dante, *De Monarchia*, I, 14

- 27 The reins of man are held by a double driver according to man's twofold end; one is the supreme pontiff, who guides mankind with revelations to life eternal, and the other is the emperor, who guides mankind with philosophical instructions to temporal happiness. And since none or very few (and these with difficulty) can reach this goal, unless a free mankind enjoys the tranquility of peace and the waves of distracting greed are stilled, this must be the constant aim of him who guides the globe and whom we call Roman Prince, in order that on this threshing floor of life mortals may exist free and in peace.

Dante, *De Monarchia*, III, 16

- 28 Let none presume to tell me that the Pen is preferable to the Sword; for be they who they will, I shall tell them they know not what they say: For the Reason they give, and on which chiefly they rely, is, that the Labour of the Mind exceeds that of the Body, and that the Exercise of Arms depends only the Body, as if the use of them were the Business of Porters, which requires nothing but much Strength. Or, as if This, which we who profess it call Chivalry, did not include the Acts of Fortitude, which depend very much upon the Understanding. Or else, as if that Warriour, who commands an Army or defends a City besieged, did not labour as much with the Mind as with the Body. If this be not so, let Experience teach us

whether it be possible by bodily Strength to discover or guess the Intentions of an Enemy. The forming Designs, laying of Stratagems, overcoming of Difficulties, and shunning of Dangers, are all Works of the Understanding, wherein the Body has no Share. It being therefore evident, that the Exercise of Arms requires the Help of the Mind as well as Learning, let us see in the next place, whether the Scholar or the Soldier's Mind undergoes the greatest Labour. Now this may be the better known, by regarding the End and Object each of them aims at; for that Intention is to be most valued, which makes the noblest End its Object. The Scope and End of Learning, I mean, human Learning (in this Place I speak not of Divinity, whose aim is to guide Souls to Heaven, for no other can equal a Design so infinite as that) Is to give a Perfection to distributive Justice, bestowing upon every one his due, and to procure and cause good Laws to be observ'd; an End really Generous, Great, and worthy of high Commendation; but yet not equal to that which Knight-Erantry tends to, whose Object and End is Peace, which is the greatest Blessing Man can wish for in this Life. And therefore the first good News the World receiv'd, was that the Angels brought in the Night, which was the Beginning of our Day, when they sang in the Air, Glory to God on high, Peace upon Earth, and to Men Good-will. And the only manner of Salutation taught by the best Master in Heaven, or upon Earth, to his Friends and Favourites, was, that entering any House they should say, Peace be to this House. And at other times he said to them, My Peace I give to you, My Peace I leave to you, Peace be among you. A Jewel and Legacy worthy of such a Donor, a Jewel so precious, that without it there can be no Happiness either in Earth or Heaven. This Peace is the true End of War; for Arms and War are one and the same thing.

Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, I, 37

- 29 In the very heat of war the greatest security and expectation of divine support must be in the unabated desire, and invariable prospect of peace, as the only end for which hostilities can be lawfully begun. So that in the prosecution of war we must never carry the rage of it so far, as to unlearn the nature and dispositions of men.

Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace*,  
Bk. III, XXV, 2

- 30 How rightly do we distinguish men by external appearances rather than by internal qualities! Which of us two shall have precedence? Who will give place to the other? The least clever. But I am as clever as he. We should have to fight over this. He has four lackeys, and I have only one. This can be seen; we have only to count. It falls to me to yield, and I am a fool if I contest the matter. By

- this means we are at peace, which is the greatest of boons.  
Pascal, *Pensées*, V, 319
- 31 No War, or Battails sound  
Was heard the World around,  
The idle spear and shield were high up hung;  
The hooked Chariot stood  
Unstain'd with hostile blood,  
The Trumpet spake not to the armed throng,  
And Kings sate still with awfull eye,  
As if they surely knew their sovran Lord was by.  
Milton, *On the Morning of Christs Nativity*, 53
- 32 Peaee hath her victories  
No less renownd then warr, new foes aries  
Threatning to bind our soules with secular  
ehaines:  
Helpe us to save free Conscience from the paw  
Of hireling wolves whose Gospell is their maw.  
Milton, *To the Lord Generall  
Cromwell May 1652*
- 33 The more commonwealths there are, that have  
contracted a joint treaty of peace, the less each of  
them by itself is an object of fear to the remainder,  
or the less it has the authority to make war. But it  
is so much the more bound to observe the condi-  
tions of peace; that is, the less independent, and  
the more bound to accommodate itself to the gen-  
eral will of the contracting parties.  
Spinoza, *Political Treatise*, III, 16
- 34 If the innocent honest man must quietly quit all  
he has for peace sake to him who will lay violent  
hands upon it, I desire it may be considered what  
kind of a peace there will be in the world which  
consists only in violence and rapine, and which is  
to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers  
and oppressors. Who would not think it an admi-  
rable peace betwixt the mighty and the mean,  
when the lamb, without resistance, yielded his  
throat to be torn by the imperious wolf?  
Locke, *II Civil Government*, XIX, 228
- 35 I should have wished to choose myself a coun-  
try, diverted, by a fortunate impotence, from the bru-  
tal love of conquest, and secured, by a still more  
fortunate situation, from the fear of becoming it-  
self the conquest of other States: a free city situat-  
ed between several nations, none of which should  
have any interest in attacking it, while each had  
an interest in preventing it from being attacked  
by the others; in short, a Republic which should  
have nothing to tempt the ambition of its neigh-  
bours, but might reasonably depend on their assis-  
tance in case of need. It follows that a republican  
State so happily situated could have nothing to  
fear but from itself; and that, if its members  
trained themselves to the use of arms, it would be  
rather to keep alive that military ardour and cou-  
rageous spirit which are so proper among free-  
men, and tend to keep up their taste for liberty,  
than from the necessity of providing for their de-  
fence.  
Rousseau, *Origin of Inequality*, Dedication
- 36 Johnson. It is thus that mutual cowardice keeps us  
in peace. Were one half of mankind brave, and  
one half cowards, the brave would be always beat-  
ing the cowards. Were all brave, they would lead  
a very uneasy life; all would be continually fight-  
ing: but being all cowards, we go on very well.  
Boswell, *Life of Johnson* (Apr. 28, 1778)
- 37 Hereafter, perhaps, . . . the inhabitants of all the  
different quarters of the world may arrive at that  
equality of courage and force which, by inspiring  
mutual fear, can alone overawe the injustice of  
independent nations into some sort of respect for  
the rights of one another. But nothing seems more  
likely to establish this equality of force than that  
mutual communication of knowledge and of all  
sorts of improvements which an extensive com-  
merce from all countries to all countries naturally,  
or rather necessarily, carries along with it.  
Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, IV, 7
- 38 The . . . daring [Roman General] Probus pur-  
sued his Gallic victories, passed the Rhine, and  
displayed his invincible eagles on the banks of the  
Elbe and the Neckar. He was fully conviuced that  
nothing could reconcile the minds of the barbar-  
ians to peace, unless they experienced in their  
own country the calamities of war.  
Gibbon, *Decline and Fall  
of the Roman Empire*, XII
- 39 The natural state of nations as well as of individu-  
al men is a state which it is a duty to pass out of,  
in order to enter into a legal state. Hence, before  
this transition occurs, all the right of nations and  
all the external property of states acquirable or  
maintainable by war are merely provisory; and  
they can only become peremptory in a universal  
union of states analogous to that by which a na-  
tion becomes a state. It is thus only that a real  
state of peace could be established. But with the  
too great extension of such a union of states over  
vast regions, any government of it, and conse-  
quently the protection of its individual members,  
must at last become impossible; and thus a multi-  
tude of such corporations would again bring  
rouud a state of war. Hence the perpetual peace,  
which is the ultimate end of all the right of na-  
tions, becomes in fact an impracticable idea. The  
political principles, however, which aim at such  
an end, and which enjoin the formation of such  
unions among the states as may promote a contin-  
uous approximation to a perpetual peace, are not  
impracticable; they are as practicable as this ap-  
proximation itself, which is a practical problem

involving a duty, and founded upon the right of individual men and states.

Kant, *Science of Right*, 61

- 40 The morally practical reason utters within us its irrevocable veto: *There shall be no war*. So there ought to be no war, neither between me and you in the condition of nature, nor between us as members of states which, although internally in a condition of law, are still externally in their relation to each other in a condition of lawlessness; for this is not the way by which any one should prosecute his right. Hence the question no longer is as to whether perpetual peace is a real thing or not a real thing, or as to whether we may not be deceiving ourselves when we adopt the former alternative, but we must *act* on the supposition of its being real. We must work for what may perhaps not be realized, and establish that constitution which yet seems best adapted to bring it about (mayhap republicanism in all states, together and separately). And thus we may put an end to the evil of wars, which have been the chief interest of the internal arrangements of all the states without exception. And although the realization of this purpose may always remain but a pious wish, yet we do certainly not deceive ourselves in adopting the maxim of action that will guide us in working incessantly for it; for it is a duty to do this. To suppose that the moral law within us is itself deceptive, would be sufficient to excite the horrible wish rather to be deprived of all reason than to live under such deception, and even to see oneself, according to such principles, degraded like the lower animals to the level of the mechanical play of nature.

Kant, *Science of Right*, Conclusion

- 41 Confidence in the principles of an enemy must remain even during war, otherwise a peace could never be concluded; and hostilities would degenerate into a war of extermination since war in fact is but the sad resource employed in a state of nature in defence of rights; force standing there in lieu of juridical tribunals. Neither of the two parties can be accused of injustice, since for that purpose a juridical decision would be necessary. But here the event of a battle (as formerly the *judgments of God*) determine the justice of either party; since between states there cannot be a war of punishment no subordination existing between them. A war, therefore, which might cause the destruction of both parties at once, together with the annihilation of every right, would permit the conclusion of a perpetual peace only upon the vast burial-ground of the human species.

Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, Section I, 6

- 42 With men, the state of nature is not a state of peace, but of war; though not of open war, at

least, ever ready to break out. A state of peace must therefore be established; for, in order to be sheltered against every act of hostility, it is not sufficient that none is committed; one neighbour must guarantee to another his personal security, which cannot take place except in a state of legislation; without which one may treat another as an enemy, after having in vain demanded this protection.

Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, Section II, Intro.

- 43 If it is a duty, if the hope can even be conceived, of realizing, though by an endless progress, the reign of public right—perpetual peace, which will succeed to the suspensions of hostilities, hitherto named treaties of peace, is not then a chimera, but a problem, of which time, probably abridged by the uniformity of the progress of the human mind, promises us the solution.

Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, Appendix, 2

- 44 In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice lies, what better umpires could be desired by two violent factions, flying to arms and rearing a State to pieces, than the representatives of confederate States not heated by the local flame? To the impartiality of judges they would unite the affection of friends. Happy would it be if such a remedy for its infirmities could be enjoyed by all free governments; if a project equally effectual could be established for the universal peace of mankind!

Madison, *Federalist* 43

- 45 War is on its last legs; and a universal peace is as sure as is the prevalence of civilization over barbarism, of liberal governments over feudal forms. The question for us is only How soon?

Emerson, *War*

- 46 The war-drum throb'd no longer, and the battle-flags were fur'd  
In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.

There the common sense of most shall hold a fruitful realm in awe.  
And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law.

Tennyson, *Locksley Hall*, 127

- 47 I devoutly believe in the reign of peace and in the gradual advent of some sort of a socialistic equilibrium. The fatalistic view of the war-function is to me nonsense, for I know that war-making is due to definite motives and subject to prudential checks and reasonable criticisms, just like any other form of enterprise. And when whole nations are the armies, and the science of destruction vies in intellectual refinement with the sciences of pro-

duction, I see that war becomes absurd and impossible from its own monstrosity. Extravagant ambitions will have to be replaced by reasonable claims, and nations must make common cause against them. I see no reason why all this should not apply to yellow as well as to white countries, and I look forward to a future when acts of war

shall be formally outlawed as between civilized peoples.

William James, *Moral Equivalent of War*

48 The only way to abolish war [is] to make peace heroic.

Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, II, 3

---