

92 Civilization, as we know it, is a movement and not a condition, a voyage and not a harbour. No known civilization has ever reached the goal of civilization yet. There has never been a communion of saints on earth. In the least uncivilized society at its least uncivilized moment, the vast majority of its members have remained very near indeed to the primitive human level. And no society has ever been secure of holding such ground as it has managed to gain in its spiritual advance. All the civilizations that we know of, including the Greek, have already broken down and gone to pieces with the single possible exception of our own Western civilization—and no child of this

civilization who has been born into our generation can easily imagine that our own society is immune from the danger of suffering the common fate.

Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial*, IV

93 Humanity is not an animal species, it is a historical reality. Human society is an antiphysis—in a sense it is against nature; it does not passively submit to the presence of nature but rather takes over the control of nature on its own behalf. This arrogation is not an inward, subjective operation; it is accomplished objectively in practical action.

Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, III

15.3 | *Fate, Fortune, and Destiny*

The common thread running through the three subjects treated in this section lies in the conception of forces or factors at work in history that are totally beyond the control of man. The notion of fate—of an inexorable and blind necessity governing everything that happens—is most evident in the quotations drawn from antiquity, especially in the many quotations from the ancient poets. Some of them even go so far as to declare that the gods themselves are subject to the decrees of Fate and cannot set them aside. Nevertheless, there are a few ancient writers, Cicero for one, who question the universal domination of Fate or think that man's freedom is not totally obliterated by it.

In the Christian era, the notion of fate tends to be replaced by that of Divine providence and of predestination. Christian theologians, such as Augustine and Aquinas, attempt to reconcile human freedom with

predestination and with the providential ordering of things by the will of God. For others, such as Luther and Calvin, providence and predestination have the same inexorability that the ancients accorded fate, a view that is echoed in Spinoza's declaration that everything is necessitated by God. The reader will find other quotations relevant to this subject in Chapter 5 on MIND, Section 5.7 on WILL: FREE CHOICE.

The discussion of fortune is more closely related to the consideration of cause and chance, which are treated in Sections 19.3 and 19.4 of Chapter 19 on NATURE AND THE COSMOS. Here the treatment of fortune stresses its implications for ethics and politics—the role that good fortune plays in the conduct of human life and in the pursuit of happiness; and the way in which it either facilitates or impedes the best laid plans of princes or statesmen to gain the objectives

they have in view. Thus, we find Machiavelli advising the prince to regard Fortune as a woman who will yield only to bold advances.

1 Except the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it: except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain.

Psalms 127:1

2 Man also knoweth not his time: as the fishes that are taken in an evil net, and as the birds that are caught in the snare; so are the sons of men snared in an evil time, when it falleth suddenly upon them.

Ecclesiastes 9:12

3 Cast thy bread upon the waters: for thou shalt find it after many days.

Ecclesiastes 11:1

4 If a man live many years, and rejoice in them all; yet let him remember the days of darkness; for they shall be many.

Ecclesiastes 11:8

5 *Zeus*. For this among the immortal gods is the mightiest witness
I can give, and nothing I do shall be vain nor revocable
nor a thing unfulfilled when I bend my head in assent to it.

Homer, *Iliad*, I, 525

6 *Hektor*. No man is going to hurl me to Hades, unless it is fated,
but as for fate, I think that no man yet has escaped it
once it has taken its first form, neither brave man nor coward.

Homer, *Iliad*, VI, 487

7 *Achilleus*. There are two urns that stand on the door-sill of Zeus. They are unlike
for the gifts they bestow: an urn of evils, an urn of blessings.

If Zeus who delights in thunder mingles these and bestows them

on man, he shifts, and moves now in evil, again in good fortune.

But when Zeus bestows from the urn of sorrows, he makes a failure

of man, and the evil hunger drives him over the shining

earth, and he wanders respected neither of gods nor mortals.

Homer, *Iliad*, XXIV, 527

8 *Chorus*. Once a man fostered in his house a lion cub, from the mother's milk torn, craving the breast given.

In the first steps of its young life mild, it played with children and delighted the old.

Caught in the arm's cradle they pampered it like a newborn child, shining eyed and broken to the hand to stay the stress of its hunger.

But it grew with time, and the lion in the blood strain came out; it paid grace to those who had fostered it in blood and death for the sheep flocks, a grim feast forbidden.

The house reeked with blood run nor could its people beat down the bane, the giant murderer's onslaught.

This thing they raised in their house was blessed by God to be priest of destruction.

Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 716

9 *Electra*. The day of destiny waits for the free man as well

as for the man enslaved beneath an alien hand.

Aeschylus, Libation Bearers, 103

10 *Chorus*. All providence

Is effortless: throned,

Holy and motionless,

His will is accomplished.

Aeschylus, Suppliant Maidens, 97

11 *Prometheus*. It is an easy thing for one whose foot is on the outside of calamity to give advice and to rebuke the sufferer.

I have known all that you have said: I knew, I knew when I transgressed nor will deny it.

In helping man I brought my troubles on me;

but yet I did not think that with such tortures I should be wasted on these airy cliffs,

this lonely mountain top, with no one near.

But do not sorrow for my present suffering;

alight on earth and hear what is to come

that you may know the whole complete: I beg you

alight and join your sorrow with mine: misfortune

wandering the same track lights now upon one

and now upon another.

Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, 265

12 *Prometheus*. Craft is far weaker than necessity.

Chorus. Who then is the steersman of necessity?

Prom. The triple-formed Fates and the remembering Furies.

Ch. Is Zeus weaker than these?

Prom. Yes, for he, too, cannot escape what is fated.

Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound*, 513

13 The Egyptians . . . discovered to which of the gods each month and day is sacred; and found out from the day of a man's birth what he will meet with in the course of his life, and how he will end his days, and what sort of man he will be.

Herodotus, *History*, II, 82

14 *Chorus*. Fate has terrible power.

You cannot escape it by wealth or war.

No fort will keep it out, no ships outrun it.

Sophocles, *Antigone*, 951

15 *Chorus*. Nothing painless

has the all-accomplishing King

dispensed for mortal men. But

grief and joy come circling

to all, like the turning paths

of the Bear among the stars.

The shimmering night does not stay

for men, nor does calamity,

nor wealth, but swiftly they are gone,

and to another man it comes

to know joy and its loss.

Sophocles, *Women of Trachis*, 126

16 *Philoctetes*. Look how men live, always precariously balanced between good and bad fortune.

If you are out of trouble, watch for danger.

And when you live well, then consider the most your life, lest ruin take it unawares.

Sophocles, *Philoctetes*, 502

17 *Heracles*. Fortune is dark; she moves, but we cannot see the way

nor can we pin her down by science and study her.

Euripides, *Alcestis*, 785

18 *Attendant*. Don't envy men

Because they seem to have a run of luck,

Since luck's a nine days' wonder. Wait their end.

Euripides, *Heracleidae*, 864

19 *Megara*. The man who sticks it out against his fate shows spirit, but the spirit of a fool.

No man alive can budge necessity.

Euripides, *Heracles*, 309

20 *Iphigenia*. Who knows on whom such strokes of fate will fall? for all that Heaven decrees, proceeds unseen, and no man knoweth of the ills in store; for Fate misleads us into doubtful paths.

Euripides, *Iphigenia in Tauris*, 475

21 *Hermocrates*. The incalculable element in the fu-

ture exercises the widest influence, and is the most treacherous, and yet in fact the most useful of all things, as it frightens us all equally.

Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, IV, 62

22 *Athenian Stranger*. God governs all things, and . . . chance and opportunity co-operate with him in the government of human affairs.

Plato, *Laws*, IV, 709A

23 Chance or fortune is called 'good' when the result is good, 'evil' when it is evil. The terms 'good fortune' and 'ill fortune' are used when either result is of considerable magnitude. Thus one who comes within an ace of some great evil or great good is said to be fortunate or unfortunate. The mind affirms the presence of the attribute, ignoring the hair's breadth of difference. Further, it is with reason that good fortune is regarded as unstable; for chance is unstable, as none of the things which result from it can be invariable or normal.

Aristotle, *Physics*, 197^a25

24 It were better to follow the myths about the gods than to become a slave to the Destiny of the natural philosophers; for the former suggests a hope of placating the gods by worship, whereas the latter involves a necessity which knows no placation.

Epicurus, *Letter to Menoecus*

25 That men, in the infirmity of human nature, should fall into misfortunes which defy calculation, is the fault not of the sufferers but of Fortune, and of those who do the wrong; but that they should from mere levity, and with their eyes open, thrust themselves upon the most serious disasters is without dispute the fault of the victims themselves. Therefore it is that pity and sympathy and assistance await those whose failure is due to Fortune: reproach and rebuke from all men of sense those who have only their own folly to thank for it.

Polybius, *Histories*, II, 7

26 Reason forces us to agree that everything happens by fate. By fate, I mean that orderly succession of causes whereby causes are linked together, and each cause produces an effect. This undying truth has its source in eternity. Therefore everything that has happened was bound to happen. Nothing will happen that does not have an efficient cause in nature. Consequently, fate is that which is, not out of ignorance, but scientifically, named the eternal cause of things past, present, and future. This observation will inform us what effect will most likely proceed from most causes, even if the cause is not known at all. It would be too much to presume that it is known in all cases.

Cicero, *Divination*, I, 55

27 I would think that it is not even within God's

power to know what events will happen by accident or by chance. If he does know, then obviously the event must happen. But if it must happen, chance does not exist. Yet chance does exist. There is therefore no foreknowledge of things that happen by chance.

Cicero, *Divination*, II, 7

28 If there were no such word, or thing, or force as Fate, and if everything happened by chance, would the course of events be different than they are? Why then keep harping on Fate? If everything can be explained in terms of nature or fortune, why drag Fate in?

Cicero, *Fate*, III

29 What is the use of a philosophy that insists that everything happens by fate? It is a philosophy for old women, and ignorant old women at that.

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, I, 20

30 The Fates, when they this happy web have spun,
Shall bless the sacred clue, and bid it smoothly run.

Virgil, *Eclogues*, IV

31 Here stood her [Juno's] chariot; here, if Heav'n were kind,

The seat of awful empire she design'd.
Yet she had heard an ancient rumor fly,
(Long cited by the people of the sky,
That times to come should see the Trojan race
Her Carthage ruin, and her tow'rs deface;
Nor thus confin'd, the yoke of sov'reign sway
Should on the necks of all the nations lay.
She ponder'd this, and fear'd it was in fate;
Nor could forget the war she wag'd of late
For conqu'ring Greece against the Trojan state.
Besides, long causes working in her mind,
And secret seeds of envy, lay behind;
Deep graven in her heart the doom remain'd
Of partial Paris, and her form disdain'd;
The grace bestow'd on ravish'd Ganymed,
Electra's glories, and her injur'd bed.
Each was a cause alone; and all combin'd
To kindle vengeance in her haughty mind.
For this, far distant from the Latian coast
She drove the remnants of the Trojan host;
And sev'n long years th' unhappy wand'ring train
Were toss'd by storms, and scatter'd thro' the main.

Such time, such toil, requir'd the Roman name,
Such length of labor for so vast a frame.

Virgil, *Aeneid*, I

32 *Jove*. Each to his proper fortune stand or fall;
Equal and unconcern'd I look on all.
Rutulians, Trojans, are the same to me;
And both shall draw the lots their fates decree.
Let these assault, if Fortune be their friend;

And, if she favors those, let those defend:
The Fates will find their way.

Virgil, *Aeneid*, X

33 What next morn's sun may bring, forbear to ask;
But count each day that comes by gift of chance
So much to the good.

Horace, *Odes*, I, 9

34 Fortune, her cruel trade quite to her mind,
Persistent still her wanton game to play,
Transfers her favours day by day,—
To me, to others, kind.

Horace, *Odes*, III, 29

35 We should project our thoughts ahead of us at every turn and have in mind every possible eventuality instead of only the usual course of events. For what is there that fortune does not when she pleases fell at the height of its powers? What is there that is not the more assailed and buffeted by her the more lustrous its attraction? What is there that is troublesome or difficult for her? Her assaults do not always come along a single path, or even a well-recognized path. At one time she will call in the aid of our own hands in attacking us, at another she will be content with her own powers in devising for us dangers for which no one is responsible. No moment is exempt: in the midst of pleasures there are found the springs of suffering. In the middle of peace war rears its head, and the bulwarks of one's security are transformed into sources of alarm, friend turning foe and ally turning enemy. The summer's calm is upset by sudden storms more severe than those of winter. In the absence of any enemy we suffer all that an enemy might wreak on us. Overmuch prosperity if all else fails will hit on the instruments of its own destruction. Sickness assails those leading the most sensible lives, tuberculosis those with the strongest constitutions, retribution the utterly guiltless, violence the most secluded. Misfortune has a way of choosing some unprecedented means or other of impressing its power on those who might be said to have forgotten it. A single day strews in ruins all that was raised by a train of construction extending over a long span of time and involving a great number of separate works and a great deal of favour on the part of heaven. To say a 'day', indeed, is to put too much of a brake on the calamities that hasten down upon us: an hour, an instant of time, suffices for the overthrow of empires. It would be some relief to our condition and our frailty if all things were as slow in their perishing as they were in their coming into being: but as it is, the growth of things is a tardy process and their undoing is a rapid matter.

Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 91

36 Let fate find us ready and eager. Here is your noble spirit—the one which has put itself in the hands of fate; on the other side we have the puny

degenerate spirit which struggles, and which sees nothing right in the way the universe is ordered, and would rather reform the gods than reform itself.

Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 107

- 37 We know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose.

For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren.

Moreover whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified.

Romans 8:28–30

- 38 Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ:

According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love.

Ephesians 1:3–4

- 39 What a poet fortune sometimes shows herself.

Plutarch, *Romulus*

- 40 Though fortune may often . . . defeat the efforts of virtue to avert misfortunes, it cannot, when we incur them, prevent our bearing them reasonably.

Plutarch, *Caius Gracchus*

- 41 It is common enough for people, when they fall into great disasters, to discern what is right, and what they ought to do; but there are but few who in such extremities have the strength to obey their judgment, either in doing what it approves or avoiding what it condemns; and a good many are so weak as to give way to their habits all the more, and are incapable of using their minds.

Plutarch, *Antony*

- 42 Fortune makes kings of slaves and gives the captive a triumph,

Yet the fortunate man is very much harder to come on

Than a white crow.

Juvenal, *Satire VII*

- 43 So—should men pray for nothing at all? If you're asking my counsel,

You will permit the gods themselves to make the decision

What is convenient to give, and what befits our estate.

We shall not get what we want, but the things most suitable for us.

Man is dearer to gods than he is to himself. We are foolish,

Led by blind desire, the spirit's extravagant impulse,

Asking for marriage and offspring, but the gods know what they'll be like,

Our wives and our sons. But still, just for the sake of the asking,

For the sake of something to give to the chapels, ritual entrails,

The consecrated meat of a little white pig, pray for one thing,

Pray for a healthy mind in a healthy body, a spirit

Unafraid of death, but reconciled to it, and able To bear up, to endure whatever troubles afflict it,

Free from hate and desire, preferring Hercules' labors

To the cushions and loves and feasts of Sardana-pallus.

I show you what you can give to yourself: only through virtue

Lies the certain road to a life that is blessed and tranquil.

If men had any sense, Fortune would not be a goddess.

We are the ones who make her so, and give her a place in the heavens.

Juvenal, *Satire X*

- 44 The wider the scope of my reflection on the present and the past, the more am I impressed by their mockery of human plans in every transaction.

Tacitus, *Annals*, III, 18

- 45 Just as we must understand when it is said, That Aesculapius prescribed to this man horse-exercise, or bathing in cold water or going without shoes; so we must understand it when it is said, That the nature of the universe prescribed to this man disease or mutilation or loss or anything else of the kind. For in the first case Prescribed means something like this: he prescribed this for this man as a thing adapted to procure health; and in the second case it means: That which happens to (or, suits) every man is fixed in a manner for him suitably to his destiny. For this is what we mean when we say that things are suitable to us, as the workmen say of squared stones in walls or the pyramids, that they are suitable, when they fit them to one another in some kind of connexion. For there is altogether one fitness, harmony. And as the universe is made up out of all bodies to be such a body as it is, so out of all existing causes necessity (destiny) is made up to be such a cause as it is. And even those who are completely ignorant understand what I mean, for they say, It (necessity, destiny) brought this to such a person.

Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, V, 8

- 46 Whatever of the things which are not within thy power thou shalt suppose to be good for thee or evil, it must of necessity be that, if such a bad

thing befall thee or the loss of such a good thing, thou wilt blame the gods, and hate men too, those who are the cause of the misfortune or the loss, or those who are suspected of being likely to be the cause; and indeed we do much injustice, because we make a difference between these things. But if we judge only those things which are in our power to be good or bad, there remains no reason either for finding fault with God or standing in a hostile attitude to man.

Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, VI, 41

47 This universe of ours is a wonder of power and wisdom, everything by a noiseless road coming to pass according to a law which none may elude—which the base man never conceives though it is leading him, all unknowingly, to that place in the All where his lot must be cast—which the just man knows, and, knowing, sets out to the place he must, understanding, even as he begins the journey, where he is to be housed at the end, and having the good hope that he will be with gods.

Plotinus, *Fourth Ennead*, IV, 45

48 God, the author and giver of felicity, because He alone is the true God, Himself gives earthly kingdoms both to good and bad. Neither does He do this rashly, and, as it were, fortuitously—because He is God not fortune—but according to the order of things and times, which is hidden from us, but thoroughly known to Himself; which same order of times, however, He does not serve as subject to it, but Himself rules as lord and appoints as governor.

Augustine, *City of God*, IV, 33

49 Human kingdoms are established by divine providence. And if any one attributes their existence to fate, because he calls the will or the power of God itself by the name of fate, let him keep his opinion, but correct his language.

Augustine, *City of God*, V, 1

50 Those who are of opinion that, apart from the will of God, the stars determine what we shall do, or what good things we shall possess, or what evils we shall suffer, must be refused a hearing by all, not only by those who hold the true religion, but by those who wish to be the worshippers of any gods whatsoever, even false gods. For what does this opinion really amount to but this, that no god whatever is to be worshipped or prayed to? Against these, however, our present disputation is not intended to be directed, but against those who, in defence of those whom they think to be gods, oppose the Christian religion. They, however, who make the position of the stars depend on the divine will, and in a manner decree what character each man shall have, and what good or evil shall happen to him, if they think that these same stars have that power conferred upon them by the supreme power of God, in order that they

may determine these things according to their will, do a great injury to the celestial sphere, in whose most brilliant senate, and most splendid senate-house, as it were, they suppose that wicked deeds are decreed to be done—such deeds as that, if any terrestrial state should decree them, it would be condemned to overthrow by the decree of the whole human race. What judgment, then, is left to God concerning the deeds of men, who is Lord both of the stars and of men, when to these deeds a celestial necessity is attributed?

Augustine, *City of God*, V, 1

51 If there is free will, all things do not happen according to fate; if all things do not happen according to fate, there is not a certain order of causes; and if there is not a certain order of causes, neither is there a certain order of things foreknown by God—for things cannot come to pass except they are preceded by efficient causes—but, if there is no fixed and certain order of causes foreknown by God, all things cannot be said to happen according as He foreknew that they would happen. And further, if it is not true that all things happen just as they have been foreknown by Him, there is not, says he, in God any foreknowledge of future events.

Now, against the sacrilegious and impious darings of reason, we assert both that God knows all things before they come to pass and that we do by our free will whatsoever we know and feel to be done by us only because we will it. But that all things come to pass by fate, we do not say; nay we affirm that nothing comes to pass by fate; for we demonstrate that the name of fate, as it is wont to be used by those who speak of fate, meaning thereby the position of the stars at the time of each one's conception or birth, is an unmeaning word, for astrology itself is a delusion. But an order of causes in which the highest efficiency is attributed to the will of God, we neither deny nor do we designate it by the name of fate, unless, perhaps, we may understand fate to mean that which is spoken, deriving it from *fari*, to speak; for we cannot deny that it is written in the sacred Scriptures, "God hath spoken once; these two things have I heard, that power belongeth unto God. Also unto Thee, O God, belongeth mercy: for Thou wilt render unto every man according to his works." Now the expression, "Once hath He spoken," is to be understood as meaning "*immovably*," that is, unchangeably hath He spoken, inasmuch as He knows unchangeably all things which shall be and all things which He will do. We might, then, use the word fate in the sense it bears when derived from *fari*, to speak, had it not already come to be understood in another sense, into which I am unwilling that the hearts of men should unconsciously slide. But it does not follow that, though there is for God a certain order of all causes, there must therefore be nothing depending

on the free exercise of our own wills, for our wills themselves are included in that order of causes which is certain to God and is embraced by His foreknowledge, for human wills are also causes of human actions; and He Who foreknew all the causes of things would certainly among those causes not have been ignorant of our wills.

Augustine, *City of God*, V, 9

52 [The human] race we have distributed into two parts, the one consisting of those who live according to man, the other of those who live according to God. And these we also mystically call the two cities, or the two communities of men, of which the one is predestined to reign eternally with God, and the other to suffer eternal punishment with the devil.

Augustine, *City of God*, XV, 1

53 Of all suffering from Fortune, the unhappiest misfortune is to have known a happy fortune.

Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy*, II

54 *Philosophy*. Providence is the very divine reason which arranges all things, and rests with the supreme disposer of all; while Fate is that ordering which is a part of all changeable things, and by means of which Providence binds all things together in their own order. Providence embraces all things equally, however different they may be, even however infinite: when they are assigned to their own places, forms, and times, Fate sets them in an orderly motion; so that this development of the temporal order, unified in the intelligence of the mind of God, is Providence. The working of this unified development in time is called Fate. These are different, but the one hangs upon the other. For this order, which is ruled by Fate, emanates from the directness of Providence.

Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy*, IV

55 *Philosophy*. A wise man should never complain, whenever he is brought into strife with fortune; just as a brave man cannot properly be disgusted whenever the noise of battle is heard, since for both of them their very difficulty is their opportunity, for the brave man of increasing his glory, for the wise man of confirming and strengthening his wisdom. From this is virtue itself so named, because it is so supported by its strength that it is not overcome by adversity. And you who were set in the advance of virtue have not come to this pass of being dissipated by delights, or enervated by pleasure; but you fight too bitterly against all fortune. Keep the middle path of strength and virtue, lest you be overwhelmed by misfortune or corrupted by pleasant fortune. All that falls short or goes too far ahead, has contempt for happiness, and gains not the reward for labour done. It rests in your own hands what shall be the nature of the fortune which you choose to form for yourself. For all for-

tune which seems difficult, either exercises virtue, or corrects or punishes vice.

Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy*, IV

56 It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence. . . . Now it belongs to providence to order things towards their end.

Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I, 23, 1

57 Even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair, and security would beget negligence in the predestined.

Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I, 23, 1

58 As predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those divinely ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence. . . . Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory, so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.

God loves all men and all creatures, in so far as He wishes them all some good, but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good—namely, eternal life—He is said to hate or reprobate them.

Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined—namely, glory—and of what is received in this life—namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present—namely, sin, but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future—namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free choice of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way the word of the prophet is true—namely, *Destruction is thy own, O Israel*.

Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility, but only conditional impossibility. . . . that the predestined must necessarily be saved, yet by a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of choice. Hence, although anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from his free choice. And so it is rightly imputed to him as guilt.

Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I, 23, 3

59 The number of the predestined is said to be certain to God not only by reason of His knowledge, because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the sea are certain to God), but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination.

Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I, 23, 7

60 The majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life, and those who have not this knowledge are said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall short.

Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I, 23, 7

61 Those who are ordained to possess eternal life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life absolutely, because they are written therein to have eternal life in itself; such are never blotted out from the book of life. Those, however, who are ordained to eternal life not through the divine predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the book of life not absolutely, but relatively, for they are written therein not to have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. These latter are blotted out of the book of life, though this blotting out must not be referred to God as if God foreknew a thing, and afterwards knew it not, but to the thing known, namely, because God knows one is first ordained to eternal life, and afterwards not ordained when he falls from grace.

Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I, 24, 3

62 What happens here by accident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a pre-ordaining cause, which is Divine Providence.

Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I, 116, 1

63 The Divine power or will can be called fate as being the cause of fate. But essentially fate is the very disposition or series, that is, the order, of second causes.

Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I, 116, 2

64 "Master." I said to him, "now tell me also: this Fortune, of which thou hintest to me; what is she, that has the good things of the world thus within *her* clutches?"

And he [Virgil] to me: "O foolish creatures, how

great is this ignorance that falls upon ye! Now I wish thee to receive my judgment of her.

He whose wisdom is transcendent over all, made the heavens and gave them guides, so that every part shines to every part,

equally distributing the light; in like manner, for worldly splendours, he ordained a general minister and guide,

to change betimes the vain possessions, from people to people, and from one kindred to another beyond the hindrance of human wisdom:

hence one people commands, another languishes; obeying her sentence, which is hidden like the serpent in the grass.

Your knowledge cannot understand her: she provides, judges, and maintains her kingdom, as the other Gods do theirs.

Her permutations have no truce; necessity makes her be swift; thus he comes oft who doth a change obtain.

This is she, who is so much reviled, even by those who ought to praise her, when blaming her wrongfully, and with evil words."

Dante, *Inferno*, VII, 67

65 When the game of dice breaks up, he who loses stays sorrowing, repeating the throws, and sadly learns:

with the other all the folk go away: one goes in front, another plucks him from behind, and another at his side recalls him to his mind.

He halts not and attends to this one and to that: those to whom he stretches forth his hand press no more; and so he saves him from the crowd.

Dante, *Purgatorio*, VI, 1

66 *Pandar*. For every person hath his happy chance, If good faith with his fortune he will hold.

But if he turns aside with scornful glance
When fortune comes, unwelcoming and cold,
Then for ill luck he may not fortune scold,
But his own sloth and feebleness of heart,
And he must take all blame from end to start.

Chaucer, *Troilus and Cressida*, II, 41

67 Too short a fleeting time, alas the while,
Great joy endures, and Fortune wills it so,
Who truest seems when most she will beguile,
And most allures when she will strike a blow,
And from her wheel some hapless victim throw;
For when some wretch slips down and disappears,
She laughs at him and comforts him with jeers.

Chaucer, *Troilus and Cressida*, IV, 1

68 "I am," he [Troilus] said, "but done for, so to say;
For all that comes, comes by necessity,
Thus to be done for is my destiny.

"I must believe and cannot other choose,
That Providence, in its divine foresight,
Hath known that Cressida I once must lose,

Since God sees everything from heaven's height
And plans things as he thinks both best and right,
According to their merits in rotation,
As was arranged for by predestination.

"But still I don't quite know what to believe!
For there have been great scholars, many a one,
Who say that destined fate we must receive,
Yet others prove that this need not be done,
And that free choice hath been denied to none.
Alack, so sly they are, these scholars old,
I can't make out what doctrine I should hold!

"For some declare, what God perceives before,
(And God of course can never be misled)
All that must be, though men may it deplore,
Because foreordination hath so said;
Wherefore the thought still lingers in my head,
If God foreknows the thought and act of each
Of us, we have no choice, as scholars preach.

"For neither thought nor deed might ever be,
Or anything, unless foreordination,
In which there may be no uncertainty,
Perceives it without shade of variation;
For if there were the slightest hesitation
Or any slip in God's foreordering,
Foreknowledge then were not a certain thing,

"But rather one would call it expectation,
Unsteadfast, not foreknowledge absolute;
And that, indeed, were an abomination,
For God's foreknowledge thus to substitute
Imperfect human doubts and mere repute;
In God such human error to imply
Were false and foul and cursed treason high.

"Then there is this opinion held by some,
Whose tansured foreheads quite imposing shine;
They say whatever happens does not come
Because foreknowledge sees with fixed design
That come it must, but rather they incline
To say that come it will, and reason so,
That such foreknowledge doth but merely know.

"But there resides here a perplexity
That in some proper way must be explained,
That things that happen do not have to be
Merely because they may be foreordained;
Yet still this truth at least must be maintained,
That all the things that ever shall befall,
Must surely be ordained, both one and all.

"You see that I am trying to find out
Just what is cause and what is consequence.
Is God's foreknowledge cause beyond a doubt
As necessary in his plan prepense
Of all the human things we call events,
Or does necessity in them reside
And thus ordaining cause for them provide?"

"I must confess I can't pretend to show
Just how the reasons stand, but this I'll say,
That every thing that happens, must do so,

And must have been foreknown in such a way
That made it necessary, though it may
Be that foreknowledge did not so declare
That it must happen, be it foul or fair.

"But if a man is sitting on a chair,
Then this necessity you can't evade,
That true it is that he is sitting there,
And thus a truthful judgment you have made;
And furthermore against this may be laid
A supplement to this and its contrary,
As thus—pray heed, and just a moment tarry.

"I say if that opinion which you hold
That he sits there is true, then furthermore
He must be sitting there, as I have told;
There's thus necessity on either score,
That he must sit, as we agreed before,
And you must think he does, and so say I,
Necessity on both of you doth lie.

"But you may urge, this man, he does not sit
Because your judgment on this may be true,
But rather, since he sat ere you thought it,
Your judgment from his sitting doth ensue;
But I say, though your judgment may be due
To his first sitting there, necessity
To judge and sit distributed must be.

"These arguments I think I may advance,
And make apply, for so it seems to me,
To God's foreknowledge and foreordination,
In all the happenings that come to be.
And by these arguments you well may see,
That all the things that on the earth befall,
By plain necessity they happen all.

"Though things to come must all be foreordained,
Their cause therein you cannot simply find,
For these two points apart must be maintained,
But yet foreordainance cannot be blind,
And God must foreordain with truthful mind,
Or else whatever foreordained should be,
Would come to pass through blind necessity,

"But no more arguments I need display
To show that free choice is an idle dream.
Yet this, however, 'tis quite false to say,
That temporal things one should esteem
As cause of God's foreknowledge aye supreme;
From such opinion only errors grow,
That things that happen cause him to foreknow.

"I must suppose then, had I such a thought,
That God ordains each thing that is to come
Because it is to come, and for else naught!
Why, then, I might believe things, all and some,
From ages past, whate'er they issued from,
Are cause of God's high power that before
Hath known all things and nothing doth ignore!

"I have just one more point to add hereto,
That when I know that there exists a thing,
I know my knowing of that thing is true,

And so, whatever time to pass shall bring,
Those things I know must come; the happening
Of things foreknown ere their appointed hour,
Can be prevented by no human power.”

Chaucer, *Troilus and Cressida*, IV, 137–154

69 It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let chance govern them. . . . Sometimes pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion. Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions, but that she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less.

I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may pass away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where valour has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where she knows that barriers and defences have not been raised to constrain her.

Machiavelli, *Prince*, XXV

70 Fortune being changeful and mankind steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her.

Machiavelli, *Prince*, XXV

71 Concerning predestination, it is best to begin below, at Christ, as then we both hear and find the Father; for all those that have begun at the top have broken their necks. I have been thoroughly plagued and tormented with such cogitations of predestination; I would needs know how God intended to deal with me, etc. But at last, God be praised! I clean left them; I took hold again on

God's revealed word; higher I was not able to bring it, for a human creature can never search out the celestial will of God; this God hides, for the sake of the devil, to the end the crafty spirit may be deceived and put to confusion. The revealed will of God the devil has learned from us, but God reserves his secret will to himself. It is sufficient for us to learn and know Christ in his humanity, in which the Father has revealed himself.

Luther, *Table Talk*, H661

72 Predestination, by which God adopts some to the hope of life, and adjudges others to eternal death, no one, desirous of the credit of piety, dares absolutely to deny. But it is involved in many cavils, especially by those who make foreknowledge the cause of it. We maintain, that both belong to God; but it is preposterous to represent one as dependent on the other. When we attribute foreknowledge to God, we mean that all things have ever been, and perpetually remain, before his eyes, so that to his knowledge nothing is future or past, but all things are present; and present in such a manner, that he does not merely conceive of them from ideas formed in his mind, as things remembered by us appear present to our minds, but really beholds and sees them as if actually placed before him. And this foreknowledge extends to the whole world, and to all the creatures. Predestination we call the eternal decree of God, by which he has determined in himself, what he would have to become of every individual of mankind. For they are not all created with a similar destiny; but eternal life is foreordained for some, and eternal damnation for others. Every man, therefore, being created for one or the other of these ends, we say, he is predestinated either to life or to death. This God has not only testified in particular persons, but has given a specimen of it in the whole posterity of Abraham, which should evidently show the future condition of every nation to depend upon his decision. “When the Most High divided the nations, when he separated the sons of Adam, the Lord's portion was his people; Jacob was the lot of his inheritance.” The separation is before the eyes of all: in the person of Abraham, as in the dry trunk of a tree, one people is peculiarly chosen to the rejection of others: no reason for this appears, except that Moses, to deprive their posterity of all occasion of glorying, teaches them that their exaltation is wholly from God's gratuitous love. He assigns this reason for their deliverance, that “he loved their fathers, and chose their seed after them.”

Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, III, 21

73 Though it is sufficiently clear, that God, in his secret counsel, freely chooses whom he will, and rejects others, his gratuitous election is but half

displayed till we come to particular individuals, to whom God not only offers salvation, but assigns it in such a manner, that the certainty of the effect is liable to no suspense or doubt. . . . In conformity . . . to the clear doctrine of the Scripture, we assert, that by an eternal and immutable counsel, God has once for all determined, both whom he would admit to salvation, and whom he would condemn to destruction. We affirm that this counsel, as far as concerns the elect, is founded on his gratuitous mercy, totally irrespective of human merit; but that to those whom he devotes to condemnation, the gate of life is closed by a just and irreprehensible, but incomprehensible, judgment. In the elect, we consider calling as an evidence of election, and justification as another token of its manifestation, till they arrive in glory, which constitutes its completion. As God seals his elect by vocation and justification, so by excluding the reprobate from the knowledge of his name and the sanctification of his Spirit, he affords an indication of the judgment that awaits them.

Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, III, 21

- 74 Fortune does us neither good nor harm; she only offers us the material and the seed of them, which our soul, more powerful than she, turns and applies as it pleases, sole cause and mistress of its happy or unhappy condition.
Montaigne, *Essays*, I, 14,
That the Taste of Good
- 75 Not only in medicine but in many more certain arts Fortune has a large part. Poetic sallies, which transport their author and ravish him out of himself, why shall we not attribute them to his good luck? He himself confesses that they surpass his ability and strength, and acknowledges that they come from something other than himself and that he does not have them at all in his power, any more than orators say they have in theirs those extraordinary impulses and agitations that push them beyond their plan. It is the same with painting: sometimes there escape from the painter's hand touches so surpassing his conception and his knowledge as to arouse his wonder and astonishment. But Fortune shows still more evidently the part she has in all these works by the graces and beauties that are found in them, not only without the workman's intention, but even without his knowledge. An able reader often discovers in other men's writings perfections beyond those that the author put in or perceived, and lends them richer meanings and aspects.
Montaigne, *Essays*, I, 24,
Various Outcomes
- 76 God, in the roll book of the causes of events which he has in his foreknowledge, has also those which are called fortuitous, and the voluntary ones, which depend on the freedom he has given to our will; and he knows that we shall err, because we shall have willed to err.
Montaigne, *Essays*, II, 29, Of Virtue
- 77 *King Edward*. What fates impose, that men must needs abide;
It boots not to resist both wind and tide.
Shakespeare, *III Henry VI*, IV, iii, 58
- 78 *John of Gaunt*. All places that the eye of heaven visits
Are to a wise man ports and happy havens.
Teach thy necessity to reason thus;
There is no virtue like necessity.
Shakespeare, *Richard II*, I, iii, 275
- 79 *Warwick*. There is a history in all men's lives,
Figuring the nature of the times deceased;
The which observed, a man may prophesy,
With a near aim, of the main chance of things
As yet not come to life, which in their seeds
And weak beginnings lie intreasured.
Such things become the hatch and brood of time.
Shakespeare, *II Henry IV*, III, i, 80
- 80 *Fluellen*. Here is the man.
Pistol. Captain, I thee beseech to do me favours:
The Duke of Exeter doth love thee well.
Flu. Ay, I praise God; and I have merited some love at his hands.
Pist. Bardolph, a soldier, firm and sound of heart,
And of buxom valour, hath, by cruel fate,
And giddy Fortune's furious fickle wheel,
That goddess blind,
That stands upon the rolling restless stone—
Flu. By your patience, Aunchient Pistol. Fortune is painted blind, with a muffler afore her eyes, to signify to you that Fortune is blind; and she is painted also with a wheel, to signify to you, which is the moral of it, that she is turning, and inconstant, and mutability, and variation: and her foot, look you, is fixed upon a Spherical stone, which rolls, and rolls, and rolls: in good truth, the poet makes a most excellent description of it: Fortune is an excellent moral.
Shakespeare, *Henry V*, III, vi, 21
- 81 *Cassius*. Men at some time are masters of their fates:
The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
But in ourselves, that we are underlings.
Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, I, ii, 139
- 82 *Hamlet*. My excellent good friends! How dost thou, Guildenstern? Ah, Rosencrantz! Good lads, how do ye both?
Rosencrantz. As the indifferent children of the earth.

Guildestern. Happy, in that we are not overhappy;

On fortune's cap we are not the very button.

Ham. Nor the soles of her shoe?

Ros. Neither, my lord.

Ham. Then you live about her waist, or in the middle of her favours?

Guil. 'Faith, her privates we.

Ham. In the secret parts of fortune? O, most true; she is a strumpet.

Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, II, ii, 228

83 *Hamlet.* Our indiscretion sometimes serves us well,
When our deep plots do pall; and that should
teach us

There's a divinity that shapes our ends.

Rough-hew them how we will—

Horatio.

That is most certain.

Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, V, ii, 8

84 *Hamlet.* We defy augury. There's a special providence
in the fall of a sparrow. If it be now, 'tis not
to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if it be
not now, yet it will come; the readiness is all.

Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, V, ii, 230

85 *Edmund.* This is the excellent foppery of the world,
that, when we are sick in fortune—often the surfeit
of our own behaviour—we make guilty of our
disasters the sun, the moon, and the stars, as if we
were villains by necessity, fools by heavenly compulsion,
knaves, thieves, and treachers, by spherical predominance,
drunkards, liars, and adulterers, by an enforced obedience
of planetary influence, and all that we are evil in, by a divine
thrusting on. An admirable evasion of whoremaster
man, to lay his goatish disposition to the charge of a star!

Shakespeare, *Lear*, I, ii, 128

86 When, in disgrace with Fortune and men's eyes,
I all alone bewep my outcast state
And trouble deaf heaven with my bootless cries
And look upon myself and curse my fate,
Wishing me like to one more rich in hope,
Featured like him, like him with friends possess'd,
Desiring this man's art and that man's scope,
With what I most enjoy contented least;
Yet in these thoughts myself almost despising,
Haply I think on thee, and then my state,
Like to the lark at break of day arising
From sullen earth, sings hymns at heaven's gate.

Shakespeare, *Sonnet XXIX*

87 Your Grace must know, answer'd Don *Quixote*,
that almost every thing that relates to Me, is
manag'd quite contrary to what the Affairs of
other Knights-Errant us'd to be. Whether it be
the unfathomable Will of Destiny, or the Implacable
Malice of some envious Inchanter orders it
so, or no, I can't well tell. For 'tis beyond all

doubt, that most of us Knights-Errant still have had something peculiar in our Fates. One has had the Privilege to be above the Power of Inchantments, another Invulnerable, as the famous *Orlando*, one of the twelve Peers of *France*, whose Flesh, they tell us, was impenetrable every where but in the Sole of his left Foot, and even there too he cou'd be Wounded with no other Weapon than the Point of a great Pin; so that when *Bernardo del Carpio* deprived him of Life at *Roncesvalles*, finding he cou'd not Wound him with his Sword, he lifted him from the Ground, and squeeze'd him to Death in his Arms; remembering how *Hercules* kill'd *Antoëus*, that cruel Giant, who was said to be the Son of the Earth. Hence I infer, that probably I may be secur'd in the same manner, under the Protection of some particular Advantage, tho' 'tis not that of being Invulnerable; for I have often found by Experience, that my Flesh is tender, and not impenetrable. Nor does any private Prerogative free me from the Power of the Inchantment; for I have found myself clapp'd into a Cage, where all the World cou'd not have Lock'd me up, but the Force of Necromantick Incantations. But since I got free again, I believe that even the Force of Magick will never be able to confine me thus another time. So that these Magicians finding they cannot work their wicked Ends directly on me, revenge themselves on what I most esteem, and endeavour to take away my Life by persecuting that of *Dulcinea*, in whom, and for whom I live. And therefore I believe, when my Squire deliver'd my Embassy to her, they Transform'd her into a Country-Dowdy, poorly busied in the low and base Employment of Winnowing Wheat. But I do aver, that it was neither Rye, nor Wheat, but Oriental Pearl: and to prove this, I must acquaint your Graces, that passing t'other Day by *Toboso*, I could not so much as find *Dulcinea's* Palace; whereas my Squire went the next Day, and saw her in all her native Charms, the most beautiful Creature in the World! yet when I met her presently after, she appear'd to me in the Shape of an Ugly, Coarse, Country-Mawkin, Boorish, and Illbred, though she really is Discretion itself. And therefore, because I myself cannot be Inchantèd, the unfortunate Lady must be thus Inchantèd, Misus'd, Disfigur'd, Chopp'd and Chang'd. Thus my Enemies wreaking their Malice on Her, have reveng'd themselves on Me, which makes me abandon my self to Sorrow, till she be restor'd to her former Perfections.

Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, II, 32

88 Don *Quixote*, as he went out of *Barcelona*, cast his Eyes on the Spot of Ground where he was overthrown. Here once *Troy* stood, said he; here my unhappy Fate, and not my Cowardice, depriv'd me of all the Glories I had purchas'd. Here Fortune, by an unexpected Reverse, made me sensi-

ble of her Unconstancy and Fickleness. Here my Exploits suffer'd a total Eclipse; and, in short, here fell my Happiness, never to rise again. *Sancho* hearing his Master thus dolefully paraphrasing on his Misfortune, Good Sir, quoth he, 'tis as much the Part of great Spirits to have Patience when the World frowns upon 'em, as to be joyful when all goes well: And I judge of it by my self; for if when I was a Governor I was merry, now I am but a poor Squire afoot I am not sad. And indeed I have heard say, that this same She Thing they call Fortune, is a whimsical freakish drunken Queen, and blind into the Bargain; so that she neither sees what she does, nor knows whom she raises, nor whom she casts down. Thou art very much a Philosopher, *Sancho*, said *Don Quixote*, thou talk'st very sensibly. I wonder how thou cam'st by all this; but I must tell thee there is no such Thing as Fortune in the World; nor does any Thing that happens here below of Good or Ill come by Chance, but by the particular Providence of Heaven; and this makes good the Proverb, That every Man may thank himself for his own Fortune. For my Part, I have been the Maker of mine, but for want of using the Discretion I ought to have us'd, all my presumptuous Edifice sunk, and tumbl'd down at once. I might well have consider'd, that *Rosinante* was too weak and feeble to withstand the Knight of the *White Moon's* huge and strong-built Horse. However, I would needs adventure; I did the best I could, and was overcome. Yet though it has cost me my Honour, I have not lost, nor can I lose, my Integrity to perform my Promise. When I was a Knight-Errant, valiant and bold, the Strength of my Hands and my Actions gave a Reputation to my Deeds; and now I am no more than a dismounted Squire, the Performance of my Promise shall give a Reputation to my Words. Trudge on then, Friend *Sancho*, and let us get home, to pass the Year of our Probation. In that Retirement we shall recover new Vigour to return to that, which is never to be forgotten by me, I mean the Profession of Arms.

Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, II, 66

89 Chiefly the mould of a man's fortune is in his own hands.

Bacon, *Of Fortune*

90 When all looks fair about, and thou seest not a cloud so big as a Hand to threaten thee, forget not the Wheel of things: Think of sullen vicissitudes, but beat not thy brains to fore-know them. Be armed against such obscurities, rather by submission than fore-knowledge.

Sir Thomas Browne, *Christian Morals*, III, 16

91 Others apart sat on a Hill retir'd,
In thoughts more elevate, and reason'd high
Of Providence, Foreknowledge, Will, and Fate,

Fixt Fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute,
And found no end, in wandering mazes lost.

Milton, *Paradise Lost*, II, 557

92 *Raphael*. God made thee perfer, not immutable;
And good he made thee, but to persevere
He left it in thy power, ordain'd thy will
By nature free, not over-rul'd by Fate
Inextricable, or strict necessity;
Our voluntarie service he requires,
Not our necessitated, such with him
Finds no acceptance, nor can find, for how
Can hearts, not free, be tri'd whether they serve
Willing or no, who will but what they must
By Destinie, and can no other choose?

Milton, *Paradise Lost*, V, 524

93 When God shakes a Kingdom with strong and healthful commotions to a general reforming, 'tis not untrue that many sectaries and false teachers are then busiest in seducing; but yet more true it is, that God then raises to His own work men of rare abilities, and more than common industry, not only to look back and revise what hath been taught heretofore, but to gain further and go on some new enlightened steps in the discovery of truth.

Milton, *Areopagitica*

94 We know that all things follow from the eternal decree of God, according to that same necessity by which it follows from the essence of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles.

Spinoza, *Ethics*, II, Prop. 49

95 Since no one can do anything save by the predetermined order of nature, that is by God's eternal ordinance and decree, it follows that no one can choose a plan of life for himself, or accomplish any work save by God's vocation choosing him for the work or the plan of life in question, rather than any other.

Spinoza, *Theologico-Political Treatise*, III

96 The Power of Fortune is confest only by the Miserable; for the Happy impute all their Success to Prudence or Merit.

Swift, *Thoughts on Various Subjects*

97 Nothing more aggravates ill success than the near approach to good. The gamester, who loses his party at piquet by a single point, laments his bad luck ten times as much as he who never came within a prospect of the game. So in a lottery, the proprietors of the next numbers to that which wins the great prize, are apt to account themselves much more unfortunate than their fellow-suffers. In short, these kind of hairbreadth missings of happiness look like the insults of Fortune, who

may be considered as thus playing tricks with us, and wantonly diverting herself at our expense.

Fielding, *Tom Jones*, XIII, 2

- 98 To reconcile the indifference and contingency of human actions with prescience; or to defend absolute decrees, and yet free the Deity from being the author of sin, has been found hitherto to exceed all the power of philosophy. Happy, if she be thence sensible of her temerity, when she pries into these sublime mysteries; and leaving a scene so full of obscurities and perplexities, return, with suitable modesty, to her true and proper province, the examination of common life; where she will find difficulties enough to employ her enquiries, without launching into so boundless an ocean of doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction!

Hume, *Concerning Human Understanding*, VIII, 81

- 99 Boswell. "It appears to me, Sir, that predestination, or what is equivalent to it, cannot be avoided, if we hold an universal prescience in the Deity." *Johnson*. "Why, Sir, does not GOD every day see things going on without preventing them?" *Boswell*. "True, Sir; but if a thing be *certainly* foreseen, it must be fixed, and cannot happen otherwise; and if we apply this consideration to the human mind, there is no free will, nor do I see how prayer can be of any avail." He mentioned Dr. Clarke, and Bishop Bramhall on *Liberty and Necessity*, and bid me read South's *Sermons on Prayer*; but avoided the question which has excruciated philosophers and divines, beyond any other. I did not press it further.

Boswell, *Life of Johnson* (Oct. 26, 1769)

- 100 I expressed a horror at the thought of death. *Mrs. Knowles*. "Nay, thou should'st not have a horror for what is the gate of life." *Johnson*. (standing upon the hearth rolling about, with a serious, solemn, and somewhat gloomy air,) "No rational man can die without uneasy apprehension." *Mrs. Knowles*. "The Scriptures tell us, 'The righteous shall have hope in his death.'" *Johnson*. "Yes, Madam; that is, he shall not have despair. But, consider, his hope of salvation must be founded on the terms on which it is promised that the mediation of our SAVIOUR shall be applied to us,—namely, obedience; and where obedience has failed, then, as suppletory to it, repentance. But what man can say that his obedience has been such, as he would approve of in another, or even in himself upon close examination, or that his repentance has not been such as to require being repented of? No man can be sure that his obedience and repentance will obtain salvation." *Mrs. Knowles*. "But divine intimation of acceptance may be made to the soul." *Johnson*. "Madam, it may; but I should not think the better of a man who should tell me

on his death-bed he was sure of salvation. A man cannot be sure himself that he has divine intimation of acceptance; much less can he make others sure that he has it." *Boswell*. "Then, Sir, we must be contented to acknowledge that death is a terrible thing." *Johnson*. "Yes, Sir. I have made no approaches to a state which can look on it as not terrible."

Boswell, *Life of Johnson* (Apr. 15, 1778)

- 101 Men of merit, who have no success in life, may be forgiven for *lamenting*, if they are not allowed to *complain*. They may consider it as *hard* that their merit should not have its suitable distinction. Though there is no intentional injustice towards them on the part of the world, their merit not having been perceived, they may yet repine against *fortune*, or *fate*, or by whatever name they choose to call the supposed mythological power of *Destiny*.

Boswell, *Life of Johnson* (Mar. 23, 1783)

- 102 The overweening conceit which the greater part of men have of their own abilities is an ancient evil remarked by the philosophers and moralists of all ages. Their absurd presumption in their own good fortune has been less taken notice of. It is, however, if possible, still more universal. There is no man living who, when in tolerable health and spirits, has not some share of it. The chance of gain is by every man more or less overvalued, and the chance of loss is by most men undervalued, and by scarce any man, who is in tolerable health and spirits, valued more than it is worth.

Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, I, 10

- 103 The doctrine of eternal decrees and absolute predestination is strictly embraced by the Mohammedans; and they struggle with the common difficulties, *how* to reconcile the prescience of God with the freedom and responsibility of man; *how* to explain the permission of evil under the reign of infinite power and infinite goodness.

Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, L

- 104 The Koran inculcates, in the most absolute sense, the tenets of fate and predestination, which would extinguish both industry and virtue, if the actions of man were governed by his speculative belief. Yet their influence in every age has exalted the courage of the Saracens and Turks. The first companions of Mohammed advanced to battle with a fearless confidence: there is no danger where there is no chance: they were ordained to perish in their beds; or they were safe and invulnerable amidst the darts of the enemy.

Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, L

- 105 *Mephistopheles*. How closely linked are Luck and Merit,
Is something fools have never known.
Goethe, *Faust*, II, 1, 5061
- 106 From every point of view the concept predestination may be considered as an abortion, for having unquestionably arisen in order to relate freedom and God's omnipotence it solves the riddle by denying one of the concepts and consequently explains nothing.
Kierkegaard, *Journals*
(Aug. 19, 1834)
- 107 We may be partial, but Fate is not.
Emerson, *The Conservative*
- 108 So strange a dreaminess did there then reign all over the ship and all over the sea, only broken by the intermitting dull sound of the sword, that it seemed as if this were the Loom of Time, and I myself were a shuttle mechanically weaving and weaving away at the Fates. There lay the fixed threads of the warp subject to but one single, ever returning, unchanging vibration, and that vibration merely enough to admit of the crosswise interblending of other threads with its own. This warp seemed necessity; and here, thought I, with my own hand, I ply my own shuttle and weave my own destiny into these unalterable threads.
Melville, *Moby Dick*, XLVII
- 109 *Ahab*. What is it, what nameless, inscrutable, unearthly thing is it; what cozening, hidden lord and master, and cruel, remorseless emperor commands me; that against all natural longings and longings, I so keep pushing, and crowding, and jamming myself on all the time; recklessly making me ready to do what in my own proper, natural heart, I durst not so much as dare? Is Ahab, Ahab? Is it I, God, or who, that lifts this arm? But if the great sun move not of himself; but is as an errand-boy in heaven; nor one single star can revolve, but by some invisible power; how then can this one small heart beat; this one small brain think thoughts; unless God does that beating, does that thinking, does that living, and not I.
Melville, *Moby Dick*, CXXXII
- 110 There are two sides to the life of every man, his individual life, which is the more free the more abstract its interests, and his elemental hive life in which he inevitably obeys laws laid down for him.
Man lives consciously for himself, but is an unconscious instrument in the attainment of the historic, universal, aims of humanity. A deed done is irrevocable, and its result coinciding in time with the actions of millions of other men assumes an historic significance. The higher a man stands on the social ladder, the more people he is connected
- with and the more power he has over others, the more evident is the predestination and inevitability of his every action.
"The king's heart is in the hands of the Lord."
A king is history's slave.
Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, IX, 1
- 111 The innumerable people who took part in the war acted in accord with their personal characteristics, habits, circumstances, and aims. They were moved by fear or vanity, rejoiced or were indignant, reasoned, imagining that they knew what they were doing and did it of their own free will, but they all were involuntary tools of history, carrying on a work concealed from them but comprehensible to us. Such is the inevitable fate of men of action, and the higher they stand in the social hierarchy the less are they free.
Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, X, 1
- 112 For history, the insoluble mystery presented by the incompatibility of free will and inevitability does not exist as it does for theology, ethics, and philosophy. History surveys a presentation of man's life in which the union of these two contradictions has already taken place.
In actual life each historic event, each human action, is very clearly and definitely understood without any sense of contradiction, although each event presents itself as partly free and partly compulsory.
Tolstoy, *War and Peace*,
II Epilogue, IX
- 113 When a man has let himself go time after time, he easily becomes impressed with the enormously preponderating influence of circumstances, hereditary habits, and temporary bodily dispositions over what might seem a spontaneity born for the occasion. "All is fate," he then says; "all is resultant of what pre-exists. Even if the moment seems original, it is but the instable molecules passively tumbling in their preappointed way. It is hopeless to resist the drift, vain to look for any new force coming in; and less, perhaps, than anywhere else under the sun is there anything really mine in the decisions which I make." This is really no argument for simple determinism. There runs throughout it the sense of a force which might make things otherwise from one moment to another, if it were only strong enough to breast the tide. A person who feels the *impotence* of free effort in this way has the acutest notion of what is meant by it, and of its possible independent power. How else could he be so conscious of its absence and of that of its effects? But genuine determinism occupies a totally different ground; not the *impotence* but the *unthinkability* of free-will is what it affirms. It admits something phenomenal called free effort, which seems to breast the tide,

but it claims this as a *portion of the tide*. The variations of the effort cannot be independent, it says; they cannot originate *ex nihilo*, or come from a fourth dimension; they are mathematically fixed functions of the ideas themselves, which are the tide. Fatalism, which conceives of effort clearly

enough as an independent variable that might come from a fourth dimension if it *would* come, but that does *not* come, is a very dubious ally for determinism. It strongly imagines that very possibility which determinism denies.

William James, *Psychology*, XXVI
