
Chapter 7

PROVISION FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE

INTRODUCTION

I am sick and tired of war. Its glory is all moonshine. It is only those who have never fired a shot nor heard the shrieks and groans of the wounded who cry aloud for blood, more vengeance, more desolation. War is hell.

WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN

We are the only nation in the world that waits until we get into a war before we start getting ready for it. Pacifists say, "If you are ready for war, you will have one." I bet there has not been a man insulted Jack Dempsey since he became champion.

WILL ROGERS

Since I do not foresee that atomic energy is to be a great boon for a long time, I have to say that for the present it is a menace. Perhaps it is well that it should be. It may intimidate the human race into bringing order into its international affairs, which, without the pressure of fear, it would not do.

ALBERT EINSTEIN

"DURING THE CENTURY AND THREE-QUARTERS since Independence," historian Henry Steele Commager noted in 1951, "the United States has been engaged in major wars for twenty-five years — one year out of every seven of national existence." In fact, the old War Department records show over 100 calls to active service, including more than 60 foreign expeditions and 76 Indian wars — several of which were costlier both in money and in loss of life than some of the "major" wars.

What is more, it was the United States that first demonstrated to the world what a really modern war was like, in the brutal and bloody civil conflict between brothers in 1861-1865. The Civil War's battles, communications, organization, economics, and logistics were studied carefully in the military academies and by the general staffs of the great European powers, and the lessons learned were applied in 1914.

In the world wars of the present century the United States again showed how to

wage and win modern technological wars; and it entered with great energy and expenditure into the new era of Cold War and undeclared hot wars that followed World War II. "War has become the normal and peace the abnormal situation," Commager observed in 1951, and the prospects were for a way of life and for domestic and foreign policy geared to war for a long time to come.

Nevertheless, the American people have consistently displayed a remarkably ambivalent attitude toward war. Though glorying on ceremonial occasions in the triumph of American arms and revealing a martial spirit and even bellicosity in times of crisis, Americans have probably been, on the whole, basically antimilitarist in attitude. "Peace is our policy," John Quincy Adams proclaimed in 1825, only ten years after a war that had carried American forces into Canada and twenty-one years before another that would bring them into Mexico. War has been a fact of the national life from the beginning, but it usually has been regarded as an evil, and professional military men have traditionally been looked upon with suspicion in a country that has entrusted its defense largely to citizen soldiers.

In its most obvious sense, provision for the common defense has meant defense of the national territory against armed invasion by enemy forces. [For discussion of the use of force to maintain law and order at home, see Ch. 6: DOMESTIC TRANQUILLITY.] This has been an extremely rare occurrence in our history, at least so far, and, from the first, protagonists of adequate defense have had much more in mind when they spoke of "the national interest" than mere territorial defense. John Jay and Alexander Hamilton, in *The Federalist*, stressed the economic rivalries in fisheries, shipping, and commerce, the strategic and political stakes in a possible future war between the great maritime powers, and the natural interest of the United States in establishing its hegemony

in the Western Hemisphere. The Federalist writers were thinking of these broader considerations when they stressed the need to build a strong national navy. Its geographical, economic, and political situation made the United States a sea power long before it was a land power.

In the next 150 years, far-off military and economic developments came to be considered as involved in the common defense, demanding the dispatch of navies, armies, and air forces to all corners of the world. Also the notion of national honor or prestige became closely associated with that of national interest, and the protection of Americans living abroad came to be regarded as part and parcel of the national interest. "On more than one hundred occasions," Charles A. Beard noted in 1934, "the armed forces of the United States have been landed on foreign soil for the protection of the lives and property of American citizens."

The underlying assumption of the common defense in the United States, as in other sovereign nations, has been that a conflict of interests exists among nations that is ultimately resolvable only by military force. According to this view, the normal state of affairs in the international community is one in which nations may take up arms against one another to get what they want or to secure what they have. In what is essentially a constant state of war — sometimes "cold" and sometimes "hot" — each nation must be ready at any moment to defend its "vital interests" and to win in any possible conflict with another power.

In the twentieth century the notion of "collective security" and the vision of a new order of international society based on law and the peaceful solution of conflicts seemed to offer a feasible alternative to the "war system." Regional or international associations, such as the Organization of American States, the League of Nations, and the United Nations, appeared to some



Recruiting poster by James Montgomery Flagg first used in World War I

to be steps along the road to a common defense that was multinational and worldwide. However, the tendency toward dependence on organizations of this sort was often severely criticized by those Americans who felt it to be destructive of the treasured national independence for which the Revolutionary fathers had fought.

Yet the horror unleashed by American might and know-how over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the specter of a nuclear holocaust hanging over the whole civilized world, not excluding the previously isolated and insulated United States of America, have tended to mute patriotic and nationalistic sentiments. Americans were faced with an agonizing dilemma after 1945. On the one hand, the mere fact of living in a dangerous world seemed to require determined efforts to maintain national security, even at the cost of traditional American ways and values. On the other hand, common defense in the old sense, as a matter of concern for a single nation, seemed to have become almost an absurdity. Such a national defense,

it appeared, could only mean national catastrophe, with the destruction of America's cities, industry, food supply, and a considerable portion of its civilian population.

As this country approached the 200th anniversary of its independence, the feeling grew ever stronger that some other way had to be found, and that, in the words of Pope Paul VI at the United Nations in 1965, there must be war no more.

1. CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

AMERICANS HAVE TRADITIONALLY FELT, and often asserted, that in our country, whatever the situation may be in other countries, the military is and must remain subject to civilian control. The point was made, for example, in the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, which declared that "in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power"; and it was made in the Constitution itself, which upheld the same principle a decade later in naming the President — an elected official — the commander in chief of the armed forces. And it has been made many times since.

This important principle was tested for the first time at the very beginning of our national history, when George Washington, the great and venerated military hero of the Revolutionary War, was unanimously elected the country's first President. The fear was voiced that Washington would follow "the example of Caesar and Sulla and Marius and Alcibiades and Pericles and Cromwell," all military leaders of republican armies who had assumed dictatorial powers; and there were even those who not only expected but also urged Washington to become a king and to establish a hereditary monarchy. But he resisted the pressures and conscientiously maintained the principle of the subordination of the military to civilian authority as essential to "republican liberty," returning to private life after his two

terms in office. He accepted the post of head of the armed forces in 1798 at the urging of Hamilton, who probably wanted him to take an active role in policy once again, but Washington was careful to make clear his subservience to John Adams, the duly elected chief executive and constitutional commander in chief.

The principle continued to be tested throughout much of the next century, and the political activities of military chiefs during the 1830s and 1840s troubled some civilians. Andrew Jackson, William Henry Harrison, and Zachary Taylor were popular generals who acceded to the White House. "The warrior captain becomes the civil chief of the great nation," complained a critic of the new military temper of the country in *De Bow's Review* in 1850, just after the Mexican War. Yet these backwoods and rural figures who rose from Army commands to political power were hardly the kind of military conqueror who aspires to dictatorship — indeed, they were more punctilious than not in upholding the constitutional authority of the civilian commander in chief — and the civil-military relationship on the whole remained unchanged.

The Civil War, a constitutional crisis as well as a sectional conflict, brought further tests. Both sides had difficulty in determining the proper limits of civil and military authority, and it is possible that a really strong and determined military leader might have been able to wrest the government either of the North or of the South from its elected rulers. In the South, however, although President Jefferson Davis was relatively weak, nothing could be done without the concurrence of Gen. Robert E. Lee, and he was an honorable man; and, in the North, the combination of Lincoln's great strength with the ineptitude of those who might have displaced him had the same effect. The most serious threat occurred in 1864, when George McClellan, whom Lincoln had removed from the command of

the Army of the Potomac, was nominated by the Democrats and ran on an end-the-war platform. But the threat was really not very serious, after all; McClellan annoyed the politicians, and Lincoln put him in his place without delay. In fact, the real trouble here was with McClellan himself, who was always half politician and half general, with the consequence that he was less than fully effective as either.

In 1868 began a new parade of generals to the White House, this time of Civil War vintage, and led by Ulysses S. Grant. Again there were those who viewed the granting of presidential power to a military hero with grave foreboding. But the course of events after the Civil War showed no sign of supplanting civil by military power. The administrations of Grant and such lesser Civil War leaders as Rutherford B. Hayes, James Garfield, and Benjamin Harrison (none of whom was a professional soldier) left the civil-military balance as it had been.

Leaving aside Theodore Roosevelt — who had been a citizen-soldier and who had been originally a candidate for the vice-presidency — no one with a military reputation was nominated for the presidency between 1880 and 1952. The military historian Samuel P. Huntington ascribes this perhaps remarkable fact to the development of a professional officer class that, with rare exceptions, scrupulously eschewed political ambitions and activities. However, World War II turned up one brilliant and renowned military commander who later posed a serious threat to civilian control of military policy, and another who later became President.

The first, Douglas MacArthur, followed his success as commander of Pacific operations in World War II and as commander of the occupation forces in Japan — a post he held with virtual proconsular power and prestige — with a determined and largely successful command of the United Nations forces in Korea during 1950-1951. His resistance to President Harry S. Truman's

policy of a limited war, however, and his insistence that new policy decisions be made for action against the Chinese forces that had intervened in the struggle resulted in his being relieved by the President. A fierce political debate ensued over the propriety of Truman's overruling an acknowledged master of strategy and tactics on a matter of basic war policy, as well as on the advisability of fighting a limited, "no-win" war. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, comprising the top professional military commanders of the nation, supported Truman's dismissal of MacArthur and the wisdom of a limited war strategy, and although MacArthur was considered as a presidential candidate by Republicans in 1944, 1948, and 1952, he never came very close to being nominated.

Dwight Eisenhower, a former aide of MacArthur's and an equally successful and highly admired commander of Allied forces in World War II, became Truman's successor in 1952 and perhaps the most widely liked President of the twentieth century. Though a lifetime professional soldier, he was more accessible than MacArthur had seemed to be — the ordinary American called him "Ike" — and his genial manner contrasted favorably with MacArthur's bearing and rhetoric.

Eisenhower continued Truman's "no-win" policy in Korea, secured an armistice in that unpopular war, and became known as a prudent man of peace. Indeed, it was the old general who advocated a drastic cut in military expenditures and succeeded in pushing it through against the alarmed protests of congressional critics, as no mere civilian could have done. And it was Eisenhower who, in his Farewell Address in 1961, warned his fellow citizens of the emergence of a "military-industrial complex" that might acquire "unwarranted influence" and "endanger our liberties or democratic processes."

Thus, though the political ascendancy of military heroes posed a dramatic problem to

the generation that made the Constitution, and troubled some later observers, the frequent occupancy of the White House by ex-officers did not endanger the principle of the subordination of the military to the civil power. The problem, as it only slowly became clear, lay elsewhere. Which branch of the civil power — the executive or the legislative — was to direct military policy? And what effect would the great technological advances of our time have on the traditional conception of civilian control?

As for the first of these problems, which are connected, the Constitution does not really help, for it seems to say that both the executive and the legislative branches of government have some control over the military. During the first fifty years or so of our national history, our armed forces were not large and the problem did not arise. But the Mexican War, to a great extent a venture of President James Polk, caused dismay among those congressional leaders who opposed the aggressive policy of the executive branch. Congress voted funds when the President asked for them, but it was not pleased. Fifteen years later more serious clashes occurred. A congressional "watch-dog" Committee on the Conduct of the (Civil) War, designed "to keep an anxious, watchful eye over all the executive agents who are carrying on the war," opposed Lincoln's policy as too moderate; and Congress reorganized the Union Army into corps, against the President's wishes.

In 1867 Republican Party leaders, in the course of their long conflict with Andrew Johnson over Reconstruction policy, presented the most serious congressional challenge to presidential control over the military in U.S. history. After the resounding Radical Republican victories in the off-year elections of 1866, Congress inserted a provision in the Army Appropriations Act requiring that all military orders go through the General of the Army (who at the time was Grant), and further undermined the President's authority as commander in chief



Courtesy, C. D. Batchelor, *New York "Daily News"*

Cartoon from the postwar 1940s by C. D. Batchelor

by passing the Tenure of Office Act, forbidding the President to remove officials without congressional consent. Johnson tested these fundamentally unconstitutional laws, was impeached, and escaped conviction by only a single vote. The two laws were later repealed, but Congress effectively held the reins over the military for the next fifty years.

A General Staff system, borrowed from the militaristic Prussians but adapted to American democratic needs, was instituted in 1903, to make the Army a more effective instrument of national policy and to insure its direction by civil executive officials. The staff, under a military chief, was directly responsible to the secretary of war, the appointed representative of the President. The change of title of the Army's top officer from "Commanding General" to "Chief of Staff," Henry I. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy noted, "emphasized the principle of civilian control by the President as Commander in Chief — the 'Chief of Staff' held his power as the President's agent, not as an independent commander."

The actual result, however, was to increase the administrative powers of the military chiefs and to reduce the civilian secretary of war to a position of relative unim-

portance compared to the powerful chief of staff. Yet this represented an extension of executive power and control, against which Congress could thereafter contend only by summoning generals to testify who agreed with its views on military policy or by making vain legislative efforts to curb the powers of the General Staff. Congress still retained its constitutional powers to declare war and levy military appropriations, but the new conditions of twentieth-century war and international politics made these powers of less and less weight in times of crisis and decision. Once U.S. forces had been dispatched by the President, Congress felt bound to support them and, publicly at least, to endorse the President's action.

By the 1960s, in a time of undeclared wars and crisis situations all over the world, it had become clear that the President had assumed the decisive voice in matters of war and peace, consulting with congressional leaders and informing them beforehand only insofar as he deemed it necessary and useful. The important decisions concerning Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam were made in the White House, in the light of advice and information from top military and civilian officials in the executive branch of government. Thus Eisenhower expressed the view of all mid-twentieth century Presidents, from Truman to Lyndon Johnson, when he rebuked the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for criticizing American actions off Quemoy in the Formosa Straits in 1958.

"I shall, as President and commander in chief of the armed forces of the United States, exercise my lawful authority and judgment in discharging the responsibility thus laid upon me," Eisenhower declared. "I welcome the opinions and counsel of others. But in the last analysis such opinions cannot legally replace my own."

In such matters, like it or not, the effective power in "declaring" and making war had become an executive, not a legislative, matter.

2. A CITIZEN ARMY

IT WAS A BASIC PRINCIPLE of the American political system that there must be no large standing army in time of peace. By "standing" was meant a permanent, regular, professional establishment, such as existed in European monarchies in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Such an establishment was considered to be politically dangerous in a republic and militarily unnecessary in the geopolitical situation in which the new nation found itself.

Objections to a standing army were heard from the very beginning. "A standing army will probably never exist in America," Noah Webster declared in 1785. "It is the instrument of tyranny and ought to be forever banished from free governments." Thomas Jefferson, in 1788, urged that the abolition of standing armies in time of peace be made part of the Bill of Rights in the new Constitution. "More than magazine guards will be useless if few, and dangerous if many," he warned, and he added that "no European nation can ever send against us such a regular army as we need fear, and it is hard if our militia are not equal to those of Canada or Florida."

Arguments continued to be advanced throughout the nineteenth century and up to the period of the two world wars that this was still the basic geographical-military situation. Only ill-advised and immoral policies of conquest and imperialism, it was said by Albert Gallatin in 1847 and by William Jennings Bryan in 1900, made large permanent military establishments necessary. If a moderate, peaceful, and just policy were followed in foreign affairs, they need not exist. Even as late as 1938, Mauritz Hallgren, an experienced observer of military and diplomatic affairs, contended that "it would take no more than a handful of troops and a single engagement to beat off any invader who might by some miracle break through the naval and coastal defenses."

How, then, did the opponents of a large standing army propose to provide for the common defense? For one thing, most of them were willing to have a *small* regular force, for police duties or to "guard the magazines," as Jefferson put it. Bryan, too, included "a small standing army" among the acceptable defense forces for a free republic.

More important, the antimilitarists placed their main reliance on naval and coastal defenses. Jefferson, for example, proposed a system of coastal fortifications and a fleet of small, inexpensive gunboats — a kind of naval militia — to defend the country against foreign military power. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Navy was considered as America's first line of defense — the justification for federal subsidies to the merchant marine and to the New England fishing industry was that they trained sailors for possible war duty — and the Navy was the prime object of preparedness advocates when the nation became a world power in two oceans after about 1890.

Somehow or other, a large navy did not seem as threatening to American political institutions as a large standing army. On the one hand, there was the example of England, which had had a large navy for centuries and retained freedom along with it. On the other hand, the Navy appeared to be more distant and less concerned with day-to-day political activities. Whatever the reason, the same feelings seemed to be present when a large air force was later proposed and, still later, when the question of a ballistic-missile force came to be considered. Aside from the vague fear in many people's minds that "the Pentagon" was growing too powerful, these devices for the national defense were not very widely or very vociferously opposed.

In addition to naval and coastal defenses, the antimilitarists also placed reliance for the nation's defense on citizen soldiers: the state militias in most contingencies and volunteers or conscripts during wartime. The

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idea was that in a republic — a free, popular government — the citizens must rely on themselves alone, or primarily, for their common defense. "A well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms," declared the Virginia Declaration of Rights, "is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state." The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution couples a similar declaration with a guarantee of the citizens' right to bear arms: "A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

Joel Barlow, commenting on this aspect of the American system in 1792, argued that it lays down a duty as well as a right; that it makes "every citizen a soldier, and every soldier a citizen; not only permitting every man to arm, but obliging him to arm." The best defense, he maintained, both against oppressive governments and foreign foes, is embattled citizens, "accustomed to the use of arms." Washington, in 1783, had likened military service to a tax that every citizen must pay and called for such service by all able-bodied citizens between the ages of eighteen and fifty, so "that the total strength of the country might be called forth at a short notice on any very interesting emergency."

This and similar proposals to create a national militia, a reserve force equipped and trained by the federal government, were frustrated by the dual state-federal control of the militia set up by the Constitution. In peace the state militias were controlled by the states and in war they were under an ambiguous dual control, whereby they might be called up by Congress and commanded by the President; but the state governors might object to the call-up, and the men themselves could vote on whether they would accept foreign service or not. In the Spanish-American War, for example, some "National Guard" units, as they were then called, refused to serve in foreign lands.

Since 1903 a series of acts has given the federal government decisive control of the National Guard in peacetime emergencies and complete disposition in time of war, when, as the National Guard of the United States, it is part of the national reserve forces, under the sole command of the President. Advocates of the Guard assert that it embodies the traditional American concept of the citizen soldier as the main defense of the nation and also retains the necessary element of state identity in a federal system. Some opponents of the Guard have criticized it for turning out "tin soldiers," encouraging militaristic attitudes, and being used mainly in suppressing strikes and other dissident civilian activities. Others have criticized it as a source of local political power, patronage, and corruption, as well as a powerful lobby exerting pressure on Congress to grant higher pay and privileges.

Increasingly in the twentieth century the military effectiveness of the state militias and their contribution to the national defense were questioned. Charles W. Eliot suggested in 1916 that the introduction of universal military service would make the militias unnecessary, and that the states might call on the national government for troops or use "local volunteer forces" for their domestic military needs. And Samuel Huntington, writing in 1964, in a time of universal peacetime military obligation, called the Guard "a Frankenstein monster created by the Constitution of the United States. That document underwrites its slogan that 'There will always be a National Guard.'"

Actually, the main source of land forces from the Revolution to World War I was volunteers who came from civilian pursuits in times of emergency. Voluntary service in wartime became a widely recognized civic duty, and enforced service was condemned as un-American and unconstitutional. As against this revered tradition, however, came the complaints of the military and civil administrators of the armed forces, that

voluntary service was a dangerously unreliable and ineffective source of manpower.

In 1814 Daniel Webster condemned the Madison administration's proposal to draft men (by lot) into the Army during the War of 1812 as a dictatorial measure "incompatible with any notion of personal liberty," a call "to throw the dice for blood," and not justified by any real emergency. Similarly, Robert A. Taft, speaking after America's participation in two world wars and in the early years of the Cold War, contended that "universal compulsory military training . . . utterly disregards the whole principle of liberty."

However, complaints against the voluntary system of enlistment began with George Washington, who had notoriously unfortunate experiences with the volunteers in the Continental Army. Alexander Hamilton declared for Washington, in 1778, that "voluntary enlistments seem to be totally out of the question," and suggested instead a one-year draft, with a \$25 "bounty" for reenlistment. Nevertheless, reliance on volunteers continued and grew during the first half of the nineteenth century, until by the Mexican War volunteers had supplanted the militia system. Winfield Scott, the commanding general in Mexico, suffered an embarrassment much like Washington's in the Revolution when he had to suspend operations at a crucial moment because his "twelve-months" volunteer units left for home when their term expired.

In the Civil War, the U.S. Army was composed not only of regulars, conscripts, and bona-fide volunteers, but also of substitutes who were paid either by unwilling draftees to serve their terms or by local communities to enlist so as to cut down the draft drain on their own citizens. In the Spanish-American War, the main forces were again contributed by volunteers, including the famous 1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry Regiment, or "Rough Riders," under Leonard Wood and Theodore Roosevelt.

Wood was chief of staff from 1910 to



Library of Congress

Scene during the draft riots in New York, 1863

1914; during his tenure in that position and thereafter he led the fight against the voluntary principle. "It is not safe in a real war to depend upon volunteers," he maintained in 1915. "The voluntary system failed us in the past and will fail us in the future." Moreover, Americans, who were "wholly unaccustomed to the use of the military rifle, let alone the modern fieldpiece," according to Henry L. Stimson in 1915, would now have to fight against highly organized, modern, efficient mass armies. Wood spoke instead of "universal military obligation" and Stimson of a trained "citizens' army" made up of men "willing to spend a short portion of their lives in undergoing the training which modern methods of war make absolutely necessary as a condition of usefulness on the battlefield."

During World War I about 2.8 million of the 4.8 million men in the armed forces were conscripted through "Selective Service." But professional military men and many civilian administrators were convinced after the war that effective defense in future wars would require *peacetime* conscription.

Hugh Scott, chief of staff, had called for this as early as 1916, likening it, as Washington had done, to a tax that every citizen should pay, and declaring that it had been "the cornerstone upon which has been built every republic in the history of the world." Peyton C. March, the new chief, advocated this in 1919, but the popular and political mood at that time was utterly opposed to anything that smacked of war and military service.

Peacetime conscription was first introduced during the "limited national emergency" proclaimed by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1939. The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 provided for the training of 2 million men for one year; however, the extension of the draft term for another eighteen months, in 1941, was passed by a mere one-vote margin in the House. New Selective Service legislation was enacted in the years after World War II, climaxed by the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, which required all fit men between 18½ and 26 to do eight years' service in the armed forces, at least two of which must be on active duty, the rest in the reserves. The Reserve Forces Act of 1955 provided young men with alternative, more convenient modes of performing their service, and was intended to attract more men into the trained, ready reserve.

The stepping-up of U.S. involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s brought increased draft calls and concerted, vehement opposition, including the burning of draft cards and other demonstrations of revolt. The actions seemed to be more the expression of resentment against our participation in the Vietnam conflict than a principled rejection of a peacetime draft. Yet many respected leaders of opinion increasingly criticized the way the draft worked — against the poor and the uneducated, especially against Negroes — and suggested a return to the traditional American policy of voluntary service and a reliance on professional elite trained forces.

Thus historian Walter Millis, for example, declared in 1957 that "the universal military obligation and the manpower system which has been built around it fails to meet the real requirements of national defense today, is inefficient in fulfilling the supposed requirements, and is increasingly unjust and discriminatory in its operation." If we have to keep the draft, he argued, then we must accept the present imperfect system with its theoretical notion of "universal obligation." But he contended that mid-twentieth-century conditions had made possible and desirable "conversion to a long-service, highly trained professional force, free to take only those men whom it really needs and can use in genuine military duty, free to design a reserve system which will meet the actual requirements, and no more than the actual requirements."

However, this and similar remarks by other leaders raised again the specter of a "standing army" that would be inimical to American institutions. The controversy continued, as it will probably continue in the years to come. At its basis are differing conceptions of the relative weight to be given to equality and to freedom in our society. Those who hold that equality is the greater good tend to emphasize the inequities of the draft and to urge the dependence on a professional force that will make the citizen's obligations no more than nominal. Those who hold that freedom is even more important than equality tend to fear the professional soldier more than they do the draft's injustice to some individuals, at the same time that they call for a system of universal military obligation that no citizen can evade and that will fall with equal severity on all.

3. PREPAREDNESS

THE ANCIENT MAXIM, "In time of peace prepare for war," was often repeated by early Americans. The Federalist writers stressed military preparedness as the best security

against foreign aggression. Washington warned his countrymen in his Farewell Address, in 1796, to keep themselves "by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture." And John Quincy Adams included in his political creed, in 1825, the belief "that the firmest security of peace is the preparation during peace of the defenses of war."

Yet the position of the United States at the beginning of every major military conflict during the nineteenth century — a mixture of surprise, confusion, chaos, improvisation, and waste — lent force to the arguments of the "preparedness" advocates of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There had been no real, deliberately considered, professionally organized preparation for war in the past, according to such caustic critics as Emory Upton, Elihu Root, Henry L. Stimson, and Leonard Wood. The United States, according to Wood and Stimson in 1915, had been fortunate never to have engaged a first-class military power, but could not continue to count on the good luck of having ill-prepared opponents. They would have accepted as equally true for their own era Franklin D. Roosevelt's declaration in 1941 that "in times like these it is immature — and, incidentally, untrue — for anybody to brag that an unprepared America, single-handed and with one hand tied behind its back, can hold off the whole world."

By "preparedness" these critics did not mean merely military training, conditioning men for combat, although that was certainly of primary importance in their projects. "Military preparedness," declared Wood, "means the organization of all the resources of a nation — men, materials, and money — so that the full power of the nation may be promptly applied and continued at maximum strength for a considerable period of time." Preparedness meant organized economic and technological power, as well as trained manpower.

One of the preparedness advocates, Alfred Thayer Mahan, presented a major idea in military strategy to the world in 1890 with his thesis concerning "the influence of sea power on history." According to this theory, the power, prestige, and wealth of a nation depend on its "due use and control" of the "lines of travel" through the sea, which Mahan likened to "a great highway" or "a wide common" on land. This means that in time of war a country must have a powerful armed fleet, strategically employed to dominate the waters, in order to keep open its lines of communication and transport and to block off the enemy's. In time of peace, it means not only the preparation and maintenance of such a naval force but also keeping up a strong merchant marine to travel the trade routes and provide a reserve of ships and trained seamen, plus colonies to provide trade outlets and secure bases for refueling and repairs.

In addition to the acclaim and unprecedented honors Mahan and his theory received abroad — in Germany, England, and Japan — at home he became the adored and favored theorist of such preparedness advocates as Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, because he offered a reasoned justification for building a large navy in time of peace. The "big navy" supporters played a predominant role in the various preparedness campaigns before World War II. Both Roosevelts, Theodore and Franklin, who were of this school, had been assistant secretaries of the Navy. Hence the Navy Department — "the admirals" — and pressure groups such as the Navy League were special targets of antipreparedness critics, such as Oswald Garrison Villard and Charles A. Beard.

The main reason for this was that Mahan's thesis raised other than purely military questions, and primarily raised the question of just what the objective of preparedness was. For exactly what task was preparedness to be "adequate"? Obviously it was

not merely for the territorial defense of the United States, as Mahan himself fully recognized. "Whether they will or not," he declared at a time when important interests were pushing for the annexation of Hawaii, "Americans must now begin to look outward."

In 1893 he advocated obtaining possession of Hawaii and other far-off places in order to control the strategic "maritime positions" that would give the United States "command of the seas." The conflicts shortly thereafter with Britain over Venezuela and with Spain over Cuba increased the demand for an "outward-looking" preparedness. At first this was couched in terms of "hemispheric defense," but the outward projection soon extended to the Philippines and other remote Pacific outposts.

Opponents of preparedness in this far-reaching sense castigated it as an abandonment of America's traditional values of peace and nonaggression, and as leading to a career of militarism and conquest, like that of the European nations. They also stressed that it resulted in a more insecure military position.


The creation of a large navy, Carl Schurz declared in 1893, would be "a most undesirable luxury" and "a dangerous plaything." A large armed fleet was not necessary to protect commercial shipping, he contended, for "the sea is the safest public highway in the world," and commercial advantages are obtained by providing better bargains and service, not by naval guns and battleships. Moreover, America's "unassailable defensive position would be lost," he warned, half a century before the Pearl Harbor attack, if it took on such a vulnerable spot as Hawaii, open to "a sudden stroke" by a strong enemy naval power. "Instead of taking pride in the possession of a big navy, the American people ought to be proud of not needing one. This is their distinguishing privilege, and it is their true glory."

This position in its essentials was that of most of the antipreparedness spokesmen from 1890 to mid-twentieth century. Aligned with Schurz at the time were eminent Americans such as E. L. Godkin, William James, Charles Eliot Norton, Henry Adams, Tom Reed, Charles W. Eliot, and Andrew Carnegie. They were dismissed by Theodore Roosevelt as backward-looking reactionaries, "futile sentimentalists of the international arbitration type," leading to "a flabby type of character which eats away the great fighting features of our race." And others were almost as intemperate in their attacks.

In the period just before America's entry into World War I, Villard and Randolph Bourne took the antipreparedness view (Eliot by this time had gone over to the preparedness side). Between the wars, many continued to maintain that the term "adequate defense" was a euphemism for the power to establish and maintain economic imperialism, engage in international adventures, and even wage aggressive wars. After World War II, this kind of talk persisted among pacifists and "anti-imperialist" groups. But the discussion was considerably more muted than it had been previously, owing to the Cold War. In the new era of seemingly permanent insecurity, Americans accepted with few qualms a gigantic and extremely expensive military establishment that would have been the subject of intense controversy and sharp division only a short time before.

4. JUSTIFICATION OF WAR

UNLIKE THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE, who have tended to accept war as one of the unpleasant facts of human life, and a familiar and frequent method of settling disputes between nations, the American people have usually found it necessary to state to the world some high moral or prudential aim



Courtesy, Karl Hubenthal, "Los Angeles Examiner"
 "Ad Infinitum"; cartoon by Karl Hubenthal, 1967

wherewith to sanction their resort to military force. These justifying ends have included the securing of natural or God-given rights, the attainment of political liberty and independence, the maintenance of federal union, the protection of national and hemispheric security, and the defense of Western or Christian culture — to say nothing of making the world safe for democracy, aiding "peace-loving" against "aggressor" nations, fighting "totalitarianism," maintaining national honor and prestige, fulfilling Manifest Destiny, and even ensuring peace through wars to end wars.

Thus, despite its many wars, the United States has never felt comfortable about the fact of war and the making of war. When it reorganized and unified its military establishment in 1947, after participating in two world wars and in the midst of the new Cold War, it dropped the name "war" entirely from its departmental and subdepartmental designations and called the new apparatus "the Department of Defense." Bil-

ions for defense, but not one cent for aggression or conquest — that comes close to summing up the American attitude toward war, in theory if not in practice, from the Revolution to the nuclear age.

Yet, as Walter Millis has pointed out, "the United States was born in an act of violence," at Concord, on April 19, 1775. The justification for this "shot heard round the world" was liberty — from the restrictive economic and fiscal policies of the British government. It was "liberty or death," as Patrick Henry put it in his prophetic speech a month before the event. It was death for liberty, as Emerson saw it, looking back at Concord Bridge in 1837 — "to die and leave their children free." Freedom and liberty, for themselves and others — these were to be the big words justifying military action, for Americans, from Massachusetts in 1775 to Vietnam in 1965.

Along with this went the note of defense against violence, first used, wantonly and treacherously, by the enemy. The notions of a "first strike" or of preventive war could not be publicly proclaimed as possible American war aims until the nuclear age, and even then many Americans did not feel comfortable or right about them. Nevertheless, the call to use all available technical means, and to use them first, came from many sides.

The hardheaded note of national interest was sounded by George Washington in 1796 when he advised his fellow Americans to "choose *peace or war, as our interest guided by our justice shall counsel.*" In the administration of his immediate successors, the question arose whether U.S. interests required peace or war with France or Great Britain, eventuating finally in a declared war against the latter. The debate for and against this action was an early instance of the conflict between the "hawks" and the "doves" that was to recur in future crises, down to the second half of the twentieth century. [See Ch. 8, FOREIGN POLICY.]

In the conflict with Mexico in the 1840s, arguments in favor of national expansion, Manifest Destiny, and strategic necessity clashed with fears of the spread of slavery and the overbalancing of Southern political power, and with charges that the United States had itself become an aggressor nation. It seemed to the Whig opponents of Polk — for example, Henry Clay and Abraham Lincoln — that the alleged occasion of the war was a trumped-up event to give the United States a pretext for conquest and expansion. The war was, in historian Norman Graebner's words, "the most bitterly criticized in American history" — at least before the Vietnam conflict of the 1960s.

The Spanish-American War and the acquisition of the Philippines and other possessions at the turn of the century also were bitterly opposed. They were justified as a crusade for Cuban liberty and as a safeguard for American economic and strategic interests and a step toward America's new imperial destiny. But it was also charged that the nation had embarked on a shameful program of conquest and subjugation of weaker peoples.

The role of the United States as a world power was sealed and demonstrated in World Wars I and II. World War I, like the War of 1812, was occasioned by the interference of belligerent powers — now Germany instead of England and France — with U.S. commerce and shipping and with other claimed neutral rights. The considerable trade of the United States with England and her allies, both in military and nonmilitary goods, coupled with the German decision to cut off those supplies and destroy the shipping involved through unrestricted submarine warfare and the American insistence on retaining its neutral rights, led to an impasse and ultimately to war between the United States and Germany.

The justification for America's action, Woodrow Wilson declared in his war mes-

sage to Congress in 1917, was defense of national and human rights against deliberate violation. America had been forced into this war "because there are no other means of defending our rights," and "the right is more precious than peace." The aim of the war was not national self-interest, he asserted, but a peaceful world order of self-governing nations. "The world," as he put it, "must be made safe for democracy."

After the war, a critical school of historians claimed that the real causes of the war had been America's vital economic and financial involvement with the Allies, and that the ultimate entrance into the conflict occurred because of the danger that this stake would be lost. Members of this "revisionist" school condemned America's participation in the war as unnecessary and destructive in its results.

Another school, however, saw the underlying reason for fighting the war in the threat to the security of the United States that would have been posed by the emergence of Germany as the dominant power of Europe. Maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, involving the preservation of England as a strong buffer to German pretensions, was seen as a matter of American national interest. According to this school, entrance into the war was a wise and necessary step.

The years before World War II were marked by an isolationist attitude on the part of both Congress and the people in the face of threats to peace by the aggressive new regimes in Europe. When war finally broke out in 1939, the isolationists, on the one hand, and the collective-security or "interventionist" schools, on the other hand, debated fiercely whether aid should be extended to the nations fighting against Germany and Italy. Roosevelt called for Lend-Lease aid to the Allies at the end of 1940 on the grounds that "the future and the safety of our country and our democracy are overwhelmingly involved" in what, in

effect, was the "armed defense of democratic existence." Reversing the neutralist trend, America was to act as "an arsenal" for the democracies, providing them with money, war supplies, and all means "short of war."

Col. Charles A. Lindbergh, the most famous of the isolationist spokesmen, maintained in 1941 that practical national interest required the United States to stay out of the war and not become involved in aid to one side. It was militarily impossible for the Allies to win the war, he declared, and the United States was too ill-prepared to wage a successful war in Europe. The most prudent thing for the United States to do was to quit "dabbling in Europe's wars" and concentrate on the defense of the hemisphere and nation from a position of natural, isolated strength.

The decisive and relatively autonomous power of the executive branch in military matters was demonstrated in the destroyers-for-bases exchange between Great Britain and the United States in September 1940, described by Roosevelt as "probably the most important thing that has come for American defense since the Louisiana Purchase." Like Jefferson on that occasion, Roosevelt declared, he had power as commander in chief to do this for the national defense without waiting for Senate approval. Similarly, he ordered surplus military supplies released to Britain in June 1939, authorized secret U.S.-British staff talks in January 1941, issued a joint communiqué with Winston Churchill on war aims in August 1941 (the Atlantic Charter), privately proposed joint British-U.S. research on the atomic bomb, and issued "shoot on sight" orders to U.S. naval vessels encountering German or Italian ships in U.S. "defensive waters" in September 1941. This, coupled with an administration-sponsored bill authorizing the arming of merchant ships and permitting them to sail into active war zones, led Senator Robert A. Taft to accuse

the President of leading the nation into "an undeclared naval war."

However, it was not the renewed conflict with German submarines that led to war this time, but the worsening relations with Japan, which had now expanded into former French possessions and which, in its bid to become the leading Asiatic power, challenged the position and aims of the United States in that area. The United States was unable to persuade or coerce Japan through economic embargoes of crucial materials to retreat from its position of hegemony in Eastern Asia; indeed, Japan was antagonized by the embargoes, which apparently stimulated it to, rather than deterred it from, further aggressive ventures. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and other U.S. Pacific outposts on December 7, 1941, brought a congressional declaration of war against Japan the next day, with only one dissenting vote, to be followed by an acknowledgement of a state of war with Germany and Italy a few days later.

Another dispute among historians followed the Second World War. The new "revisionists," led by Charles A. Beard, maintained that Roosevelt and his aides had deliberately led the nation into war, while pretending to be taking measures short of war and preventive of war. Moreover, the attack on Pearl Harbor, this argument ran, had been deliberately provoked and planned in order to unify a still-isolationist public behind an interventionist policy. The breaking of the Japanese secret code long before Pearl Harbor had revealed Japan's intentions, but, the revisionists claimed, the President and his advisers decided to permit the attack and therefore did not give adequate and timely warning to the commanders on the scene.

Spokesmen for the administration side in this historic debate contended that, although U.S. embargoes did irritate the Japanese war leaders, there was nothing the United



Courtesy, Ross A. Lewis, "The Milwaukee Journal"

"If there is another job to do, we'll do it," 1941

States could do to stop the Japanese drive toward acquiring more territory and resources. Moreover, U.S. policy directors, according to these historians, thought that Japan would attack French, English, and Dutch possessions first and then wait to see how this country reacted. The United States considered Germany the main enemy and hoped to keep Japan out of the war, not bring it in. Moreover, according to the antirevisionists, the possibility of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor had been recognized and plans to guard against it were taken, but unfortunately they were not followed in the actual event.

5. WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

AFTER WORLD WAR II the United States, along with the rest of the world, faced problems in international politics and strategy of an unprecedented nature. All the old

ideas about defending the nation and its widespread interests, as well as about keeping the peace and maintaining world order, seemed to have gone by the board. Many Americans, high and low in the political scale, were unable to grasp the situation in which they found themselves, and they reacted with bewilderment, anxiety, hysteria, or anger.

By 1945 America's isolation was so definitely a matter of the past that the "isolationism" of a mere four or five years before seemed something from a remote, ancient era. What had previously been a matter of intense debate and division was now "a plain fact," as Stimson remarked in 1947, and America was now involved all over the world, with a stake in events that could be no mere "limited liability."

But even if America's "stake in the peace and freedom of the world" was unlimited, as Stimson said, this country's power and its ability to control and shape events certainly were not. This was recognized by John F. Kennedy, after more than fifteen years of hard American experience in the postwar era. "We must face the fact that the United States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient," he said at Seattle in 1961, "that we are only 6 percent of the world's population, that we cannot impose our will upon the other 94 percent of mankind, that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each adversity, and that therefore there cannot be an American solution to every world problem."

Americans found this was true even where we were militarily involved. Thousands and tens of thousands of our young men were being maimed and killed — as in Korea and Vietnam — despite our preponderance of wealth, material, transport, and armaments, and despite — one might almost say because of — our possession of the atomic bomb. For aside from the moral opprobrium that might be involved in its

use, the use of the bomb against the camp of America's main opponents, led by the Soviet Union, most probably would lead to retaliation against the American homeland, which would then have to count its casualties in the tens of millions, in the "personnel losses" so calmly calculated by nuclear war strategists. The concepts of "nuclear deterrence" and "massive [nuclear] retaliation," Dean Acheson asserted in 1959, became obsolete as soon as the Soviet Union also became a major nuclear power.

Moreover, aside from the two-edged sword-of-Damocles aspect of nuclear armaments, the military problems presented by the political and tactical situations in the postwar era were not always suitable for handling by the superbly organized, highly mechanized, and abundantly supplied and financed forces with which the United States had demonstrated its military prowess in World War II. U.S. forces became involved in places and situations that lent themselves to guerrilla action and political intrigue and that were affected by nationalist and revolutionary ideologies and subject to the influence of sympathetic great powers, such as the Soviet Union or Communist China.

Hence the Korean armistice of 1953 was no victory in the conventional sense. The U.S. forces had not defeated the enemy forces, occupied the enemy country, and imposed its will on the enemy government, as in Japan after World War II. The threat of "the bomb," according to Eisenhower, was used only to force the enemy to agree to confer and to end the fighting on both sides.

In Vietnam the United States found itself engaged with hundreds of thousands of men in "a war which is somehow not a war," Millis said in 1965, "in which 'victory' is avowedly not the object of the fighting." Instead, the objectives were to "teach" the enemy that they could not obtain their political objectives in South Vietnam nor win

militarily against the superior forces of the United States, and to bring them to the conference table to negotiate an acceptable peace. The conflict was justified as an application of the doctrine of the "containment" of the "expansive tendencies" of the Communist powers, first enunciated by Truman in 1947 in response to Soviet threats to Greece and Turkey. (However, George F. Kennan, one of the architects of that policy, insisted in 1965 that what was applicable to conditions in the Balkans in the 1940s would not work in Southeast Asia in the 1960s, and that military intervention would not accomplish U.S. objectives and serve U.S. security.)

The frustrations and disappointing aftermath of World War II brought a new note of "realism" to the statements of commentators on U.S. military and foreign policy. Not only the old isolationism but also much of the old innocent idealism were absent now, in a highly precarious and uncertain world, where few of the great wartime visions had come to fruition. "We are forced to act in the world as it is," Stimson counseled in 1947, "and not in the world as we wish it were, or as we would like it to become." And we must not delude ourselves into thinking "that the world would overnight become good and clean and peaceful everywhere if only America would lead the way."

We must emerge out of the mental world of the nineteenth century, Dean Acheson declared in 1959, and give up conceptions fitted only to an age of unusual stability. We must attend to "the requirements of military security" and give up "the 'chimera' of a 'moral' solution of international conflicts."


Indeed a historic change had taken place in the American moral and political attitude toward military force, according to Samuel Huntington. "One of the more basic and obvious facts of our time," he wrote in 1964, "is that changes in technology and

international politics have combined to make security now the final goal of policy rather than its starting assumption."

Military historians like Huntington and Millis showed how a complete change took place in the position of the armed forces in this nation between the "emergency" of 1940 and the undeclared wars of the 1960s. In the latter period the United States had a permanent, large, standing army — or "defense" force — recruited through peacetime conscription, led by trained, battle-experienced officers, under the direction of a highly organized and relatively independent General Staff, dispatched, following secret consultation, by presidential orders, without declaration of war and without apprising the public or any but the most important congressional leaders beforehand. Despite the protests of a few senators and a segment of the intellectual community, all this became the accepted military procedure in the decades following World War II. Never before had the "war system," with its values and imperatives, become such an accepted part of the American way.

Yet this new militarization and professionalism came at a time when the very function of war making and military forces had become problematic. It could still be regarded in 1928, in Walter Lippmann's words, as "one of the ways by which great human decisions are made." But by 1961 it was generally accepted, even by many military leaders, that war, in Millis' words, "can no longer serve its greatest, social function — that of *ultima ratio* in human affairs — for it can no longer *decide*."

For, despite all the talk about "the balance of terror," "limited wars," and "massive deterrence," there seemed to be severely narrow technical and political restrictions on the use of military force in the last third of the twentieth century. It was hard to see in the 1960s what rational aims it could achieve, what its decisive function could be. The only point of eyeball-to-eyeball con-



Courtesy, Rube Goldberg, "The New York Sun"

"Peace Today"; cartoon by Rube Goldberg, 1947

frontation between the United States and another great nuclear power — as in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 — was that there should be no war, that the nuclear arms that were poised for use should not be used. Massive deterrence *had* to be mutually effective. It was too awful to imagine what would happen if both sides refused to blink.

6. ALTERNATIVES TO WAR

THE BELIEF THAT WAR IS EVIL and that some alternative can be found for it has been a feature of American thought from early times. William Penn taught in the late seventeenth century that "love and persuasion" have "more force than weapons of wars," and that "bearing of arms, even for self-defense, is unlawful" for a true Christian; and he founded the Quaker colony in Pennsylvania as a "holy experiment" in a nonviolent society.

In the nineteenth century, pacifism became part of the program of many moral

and social reformers, both religious and secular. Noah Worcester, a founder of one of the many peace societies in the United States, maintained in 1815 "that offensive war is murderous," unjust, and irrational, and pointed to the Quaker success with the Indians in Pennsylvania as a demonstration of the superiority of mildness over force. He called on all good Christians to wage peace with all their zeal in order to end the plague of war.

Rufus M. Jones, the eminent Quaker theologian, explaining the Quaker peace position in the midst of World War I (1915), called for opposition to war on the grounds "that it is absolutely and eternally wrong morally; that Christianity and war are utterly incompatible" apart from any economic or other expedient reasons. Quakers and other opponents of war have also argued that war is wrong practically — *i.e.*, ineffectual — and that nonviolent ways work better and more constructively.

Worcester also suggested that the peoples of the world "form a confederacy of nations and organize a high court of equity to decide national controversies," on the model of civil society within nations. William Ladd, founder of the American Peace Society, proposed in 1840 that "a regular system of arbitration" be established under principles "promulgated by a congress of nations," so that all international disputes would be adjudicated by a recognized "court of nations." Worcester and Ladd began a tradition of thought on international confederations and world courts that continued into the 1960s.

Implementation of these precepts was provided by U.S. participation in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, established at The Hague in 1899; by efforts to establish a full-fledged World Court at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, and by Woodrow Wilson's leadership in setting up the League of Nations and a Permanent

Court of International Justice after World War I. Domestic opposition kept America from joining the League and, despite the advocacy of various Presidents, from Harding to Franklin Roosevelt, membership in the world court was also blocked up to World War II.

In 1928 the United States joined fourteen other nations in signing the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which condemned war and renounced it "as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another," and promised the settlement of all disputes whatsoever among themselves by "pacific means" alone. The document placed no moral or legal obligation on the United States and the other signatories, and the only sanction for its enforcement was the moral opinion of the world. Senator James A. Reed of Missouri labeled this innocuous attempt at the "outlawry of war" as "an international kiss."

After World War II the United States, with remarkably little domestic opposition, for the first time entered into a full-scale world association, the United Nations, the main purpose of which was the "pacific settlement of disputes" and the control of "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." The United States also finally became a member of the International Court of Justice, one of the "principal organs" of the United Nations.

Protagonists of world government, such as Robert M. Hutchins, were disappointed in the new organization, both in principle and practice. "The United Nations," declared Hutchins in 1947, "is composed of independent, sovereign states. Their competition must be anarchical. Therefore, in the long run it cannot be peaceful." Peace among the nations, he insisted, can only be brought about through world government and world law; through a world state, not through the "debating society" of an "association of independent, sovereign states,"

such as the United Nations. (It is true enough that the United States, like the other members of the United Nations, has shown little or no desire to give up the essentials of its sovereignty.)

However, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles contended in 1959 that the United Nations was excellently designed to preserve peace on the principles of international law and justice. Unlike Hutchins, he believed that the United Nations would have been able to accomplish this if it had not been for the destructive opposition and duplicity of the Communist countries. If only they would "accept the principles of justice and law and peaceful change," Dulles maintained, there would be no need to fight defensive actions against them, and peace would be obtained.

A new alternative to military force, besides the traditional devices of international arbitration and association, emerged in the twentieth century: nonviolent resistance. War was to be opposed by disobedience to a nation's law, not by obedience to an ideal of international law and order. Originating in Thoreau's doctrine of civil disobedience, the theory of nonviolent action was applied by Gandhi — who called it "soul-force" — to conditions in South Africa in the 1890s and in India in the 1920s and 1930s. Richard Gregg, a U.S. lawyer and labor arbitrator, was influenced by Gandhi and his own experience to propound a reasoned theory of "the power of nonviolence," not only against the ruling powers within one's own nation but also against foreign foes as "an effective substitute for war."

It was the contention of Gregg and similar thinkers that an effective national defense could be pursued through nonviolent means, with much less physical destruction and without the emotional and moral wounds left in the wake of military action. They held that a nonviolent national defense could be effective even against a pow-

er like Nazi Germany. This had been demonstrated, they claimed, in the nonviolent phase of the Norwegian resistance to the German occupation and native Quisling regime during 1940-1943.

But what about the military virtues of obedience and self-sacrifice, and the natural psychological satisfactions of risk and adventure and the sheer glory and excitement involved in war? Aside from the practical questions of security and defense, how would nonviolent action compensate for the attractions of war?

Actually a good deal of thought had been given to the moral and psychological equivalents for war. Worcester, while decrying the alleged virtues of the soldier, had pointed to the heroic virtues, self-sacrifice, and bravery required in the pacifists' war against war. "In this cause," he declared in 1815, "ardent zeal, genuine patriotism, undaunted fortitude, the spirit of enterprise, and every quality of mind worthy of a hero may be gloriously displayed." "A peace-testimony," remarked Rufus Jones exactly a century after Worcester, "is . . . a heavy undertaking and calls for all the courage and all the sacrifice of a battlefield, though the 'weapons' are of a vastly different sort from Krupp guns and Mauser rifles."

William James contended in 1910 that some organized peacetime substitute must be found for "war's disciplinary function," a "moral equivalent of war" that would allow the demand for risk, daring, endurance, and sacrifice to be fulfilled in a cooperative endeavor with one's fellows. "Intrepidity, contempt of softness, surrender of private interest, obedience to command, must still remain the rock upon which states are built." He suggested that this be accomplished through "a conscription of the whole youthful population to form . . . a part of the army enlisted against *Nature*." Work on ships, in mines, and on roads would be the new way of doing service for one's country.

The pacifist Randolph Bourne picked up this suggestion in 1917, calling for universal nonmilitary service for the nation's youth, so that they would find in "drudgery and toil and danger the values that war and preparation for war have given."

The call of James and Bourne for a youth army to do the work of peace was ultimately answered, though in a different way, when in 1961 John F. Kennedy secured the "establishment of a permanent Peace Corps — a pool of trained American men and women sent overseas by the U.S. government . . . to help foreign countries meet their urgent needs for skilled manpower." The Peace Corps helped the undeveloped countries to meet their educational, medical, economic, and other peacetime needs. The recruits underwent training programs to develop and test their ruggedness, resourcefulness, and other qualities that would be called for in unexpected and sometimes primitive and dangerous conditions abroad. There were arguments pro and con on the Peace Corps' actual effectiveness and on the kind of qualities and character it developed among its members; but, by and large, it was accepted and became one of the main channels for serious, idealistic young Americans to do what they considered useful service in the world.

A domestic version of the Peace Corps soon followed, in 1964, when Volunteers in

Service to America (VISTA) was established to help underprivileged persons at home. The "volunteers" were given only a nominal salary, no glory (not even that of the Peace Corps), and only the satisfaction of helping out. Neither VISTA nor the Peace Corps was limited to youth; each was designed to meet the need to serve of older Americans, too. The age range in VISTA in 1966 was from eighteen to eighty-three.

As America approached the 1970s, the effective use of nonviolence as a technique in international disputes seemed remote. The power, ultimately resting on armed force, that was pointed to by "realists" like Dean Acheson and Hans Morgenthau seemed likely to predominate over the "soul-force" of unarmed prophets as it had in the past, despite the desires of "idealists." However, the final chapter has not yet been written. Remarkable achievements of nonviolence, when used by a subjugated people against a "master race" in India and in America's South, have occurred in the twentieth century. And, in any case, there is still the possibility that the combination of force and nonviolence — of law and order along with police — that characterizes the civil state may be duplicated someday on a world scale. [For further discussion of some of the matters treated here, see Ch. 1: NATIONAL CHARACTER.]