90

State

INTRODUCTION

Is man gregarious in the same sense as other animals are? Is he, unlike other social animals, the only political animal? Does man pattern the state after his own nature, or does he, in imitation of the angels, try to live up to a "city in the skies"—a model of rationality or a utopian illusion? According to the way such questions are answered, different theories of the state develop in the tradition of western thought.

But it is not only the view man takes of his social nature which affects his view of society or the state. His conception of the state is also colored by his understanding of man's place in nature and by his understanding of man's relation to God. On one view the state is ordered to the service of man; on another, man is thought to be a creature of the state, and the state is made God; on still another, man—like Antigone in Sophocles' play—seems to be torn between serving the state and serving God.

If man admits anything to be his superior, he acknowledges his inferiority only to God or to the state. That the idea of God and the idea of the state compete for maximum attention in the tradition of western thought is a significant and readily intelligible fact. That the word "sovereign," which connotes *absolute supremacy,* has both political and religious significance throws further light on this rivalry. It immediately suggests all the issues of church and state, of the spiritual and the temporal power, of the city of God and the city of man.

Even without the aura of divinity, the state, in the conception of many writers, assumes by comparison with the individual man the proportions of the greatest living thing on earth. For Plato it is the counterpart of the human soul, many times magnified. For Aristotle it is like an organic whole to which the individual belongs, just as his own arm or leg belongs to him as an organic part. For Hobbes it is the body politic—that Leviathan which dwarfs its members. For Rousseau it is the corporate person, having a general will more perfect than the individual will—infallible, or almost infallible. When to these images of the state is added the highest transfiguration—that by which the state becomes, according to Hegel, the image of God on earth or the embodiment of Absolute Spirit—the greatness of the state cannot be magnified further.

Huizinga refers to this when he notes that "medieval political speculation is imbued to the marrow with the idea of a structure of society based upon distinct orders" and that each of these orders "represents a divine institution, an element of the organism of Creation emanating from the will of God, constituting an actual entity, and being, at bottom, as venerable as the angelic hierarchy."

The passages in which these conceptions first appear are among the most famous in the literature of the theory of the state. In *The Republic,* Socrates proposes that "we inquire into the nature of justice and injustice, first as they appear in the State and secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser and comparing them." After the structure of the state has been examined in terms of its constituent classes and their functions or relations to one another, Socrates returns to the individual. We may assume, he says, that "he has the same three principles in his own soul which are found in the state"; and in another place he adds that "there appear to be

as many forms of the soul as there are distinct forms of the State."

Whereas Plato analogizes the social classes in the state with the parts of the soul, Aristotle compares the state in relation to the individual with the body in relation to its members. "The state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual," Aristotle writes, "since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense ... The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole."

The analogical conception of the state takes a different turn with Hobbes. The state is a work of art, not a creation of nature. "Nature (the art whereby God hath made and governs the world)," says Hobbes, "is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal." The machines men make—"engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch"—seem to Hobbes to "have an artificial life." But "art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of Nature, *man*. For by art is created that great Leviathan called a Commonwealth, or State (in Latin, *Civitas*), which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body."

Hobbes also speaks of the multitude being "united in one person" as the "generation of that great Leviathan, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defence." It is both divine and human, for "that which is compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent in one person, natural or civil" is, according to Hobbes, "the greatest of human powers."

Rousseau has a number of different names for the "moral and collective body" formed by the association of individuals. "This public person," he says, "formerly took the name *city*, and now takes that of *Republic* or *body politic;* it is called by its members *State* when passive, *Sovereign* when active, and *Power* when compared with others like itself." But Rousseau's primary emphasis seems to be upon the personality of the State; it is a corporate person, with moral qualities and intellectual faculties. He refers repeatedly to the State "as a *persona ficta*" and as "a moral person whose life is in the union of its members."

Many of these comparisons or analogies recur in Hegel's theory of the state. But for Hegel they are no longer metaphors, they are the elements of a literal definition. "The state is an organism," says Hegel. It is the organic whole no part of which can have a separate life. As "occurs with life in the physical organism," he writes, "life is present in every cell" and "separated from that life, every cell dies. This is the same as the ideality of every single class, power, and Corporation as soon as they have the impulse to subsist and be independent. It is with them as with the belly in the organism. It, too, asserts its independence, but at the same time its independence is set aside and it is sacrificed and absorbed into the whole."

But the state is not merely a living organism. "To the mature state," says Hegel, "thought and consciousness essentially belong ... As high as mind stands above nature, so high does the state stand above physical life. Man must therefore venerate the state as the divine on earth, and observe that if it is difficult to comprehend nature, it is infinitely harder to understand the state." In saying this Hegel seems to go beyond analogy to the assertion of a definition. "The march of God in the world, that is what the state is," he declares. "The basis of the state is the power of the reason actualizing itself as will. In considering the Idea of the state, we must not have our eyes on particular states or on particular institutions. Instead we must consider the Idea, this actual God, by itself."

To those who object that the state is finite, Hegel replies that "to hold that mind on earth, *i.e.,* the state, is only a finite mind, is a one-sided view, since there is nothing irrational about actuality. Of course, a bad state

is worldly and finite and nothing else. But the rational state is inherently infinite." As simply stated by Hegel in the Introduction to his *The Philosophy of History,* "the State is the Divine idea as it exists on Earth."

THE DIVERSE CONCEPTIONS of the state raise major issues in political theory concerning the origin of the state and the ends it serves, in both of which is involved the problem of the individual's relation to the state. That problem is touched on in the chapter on CITIZEN, and wherever the problem of the common good or the general welfare is discussed. Here the question whether the state is made for man or man for the state, whether the state subordinates the individual in every phase of his life or only in those matters wherein the public welfare takes precedence over private interests, serves critically to test the practical significance of different theories of the state. Here also questions concerning the relation of the family to the state—discussed from the point of view of the domestic community in the chapter on FAMILY—throw light on the nature and origin of the political community.

The word "community" and its synonym "society" seem to be more inclusive in meaning than "state." The family and the state are both communities—associations of individuals for a common purpose and sharing in a common life. The word "state" is customarily used only for the developed political society—whether a city-state, a feudal state, or a nation-state; the word "society" usually covers the tribal community, the village, or any community which is politically primitive and has some of the characteristics of a large family. In addition there are within the state, at least in its modern formation, many organized groups which deserve the name "society"—economic corporations and other associations, religious, educational, professional, recreational; and more comprehensive than any particular political community are the cities of God and man which, in Augustine's conception of them, are not to be identified with either the Church or the State.

With the rise of the science of sociology in our time, the idea of society has come to be regarded as more general than that of state. But in the tradition of the great books, particularly those of political theory, the state seems to be considered the epitome of human society. All other forms of association are, for the most part, discussed only in their relation to the state, either as the antecedents from which the state develops, or as the subordinate organizations which it includes, or sometimes, as in the case of the church, a distinct but coordinate community.

The nature of society in general and the problem of different types of social organization and development are not treated in the great books except in their bearing on the family, the church, or the state—the three communities which seem to be taken as representative or basic. Hence there is no chapter on society or community as such. What for modern sociology is a unified subject matter here divides into a number of related yet distinct ideas—the domestic community being treated in the chapter on FAMILY, the religious community in the chapter on RELIGION, the various forms of economic organization in the chapters on LABOR and WEALTH. In this chapter, therefore, we shall confine our attention to the specifically political community, both in itself and in relation to these other communities or social groups.

CONCEIVED IN POLITICAL terms, the problems of the state would seem to be inseparable from the problems of government. Yet the ideas of state and government may be separated to the extent that one signifies the political community as a whole and the other the organization of its members according to relationships of ruler and ruled. Furthermore, the state may in one sense remain the same while in another it changes with changes in its form of government.

Some writers, like Aristotle and Hegel, tend to identify state and government. Aristotle, for example, says that "the sameness of the state consists chiefly in the sameness of its constitution." Others, like Locke and Rousseau, seem to regard government as part of the state, the chief institution of a civil society or political community, but definitely a means for secur-

ing the ends for which the state is formed. For Locke government is primarily the legislative power, for Rousseau it is "the supreme administration, the legitimate exercise of the executive power," but for both it is a representative body—an organ of the whole body politic.

Insofar as the great political theorists distinguish problems of the external relation of states with one another from those which concern the internal organization of the state, and the relation of the state to its own members, they also tend to distinguish state from government. Hegel's distinction between external and internal sovereignty, for example, conceives the whole community as a sovereign state in relation to other communities and the state as a sovereign government in relation to its own members.

Such questions of sovereignty, or more generally of the relation of states to one another, belong to this chapter as well as to the chapter on WAR AND PEACE; but the theory of government is for the most part treated elsewhere—in the chapters on GOVERNMENT and CONSTITUTION, and in all the chapters dealing with the special forms of government. Still other problems of government, which have a bearing on the nature of the state, its powers, and its limits, are dealt with in the chapters on JUSTICE and LAW.

THAT IT IS SOMEHOW natural for men to associate politically is generally affirmed, even by those who also think the state is artificial or conventional. No one takes either of the possible extreme positions: that the state as a purely voluntary association is without any basis at all in man's nature and needs; or that the state, like the beehive and the ant mound, is purely a production of instinct.

Saying that "man is by nature a political animal," Aristotle goes on to remark that "man is more of a political animal than bees or other gregarious animals." But the difference Aristotle points out between man and other social animals may make man the *only* political animal. It consists in the fact that man, being "the only animal . . . endowed with the gift of speech," can communicate with his fellows concerning "the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust." What characterizes human associations, according to Aristotle, is that they are built upon a shared sense of the expedient and the just. "Justice," he writes, "is the bond of men in states."

Hobbes also distinguishes between human and animal societies, but seems to interpret the distinction differently "Bees and ants live sociably one with another," he says, "and yet have no other direction than their particular judgements and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signify to another what he thinks expedient for the common benefit." Inquiring "why mankind cannot do the same"—that is, live sociably without government and law—Hobbes offers a number of explanations, of which the last is that "the agreement of these creatures is natural; that of men is by covenant only, which is artificial: and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required, besides covenant, to make their agreement constant and lasting; which is common power to keep them in awe and to direct their actions to the common benefit."

But though Hobbes calls the state artificial because he holds it to be the product of a contract, he does not deny the natural necessity which drives men to the creation of a commonwealth. Man quits the state of nature, which is a "war of every man against every man," to achieve self-preservation, or at least to enjoy the security of civil peace and the freedom from fear of violence.

As natural as it may be for men to be "in that condition which is called war" when "they live without a common power to keep them all in awe," it is equally natural, according to Hobbes, for men to seek peace. "The passions that incline men to peace are: fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace upon which men may be drawn to agreement." The commonwealth is therefore natural, to the extent that man's needs and passions require it and man's reason recognizes certain natural laws for constructing it.

The state is naturally necessary, not as the

effect of instinctive determinations, but as the rationally determined means to an end. If the end the state serves were not naturally sought, or if there were any other means which reason could devise for accomplishing that end, the state would be purely conventional—and dispensable. "The final cause, end, or design of men in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves (in which we see them live in commonwealths) is," according to Hobbes, "the sight of their own preservation and of a more contented life thereby."

In this main particular Aristotle's account of the origin of the state seems to be the same. Though he does not attribute its formation to a contract, and does not make fear the predominant motive, he does regard the state as natural *only because* of its indispensability as a means for achieving the ends men naturally seek. The family is natural, Aristotle suggests, because it is necessary for the perpetuation of the race and "for the supply of men's everyday wants." When men aim "at something more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is the village"—normally, an association of families. And "when several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. Therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state."

The implication seems to be that if men were not naturally impelled to seek a better life than the family or the tribal community can provide—in other words, if the family or village satisfied all of man's natural needs for society—the larger community, the state, would be neither natural nor necessary. That man is by nature a political animal does not, therefore, mean that men have always and everywhere lived in states.

Aristotle refers to the man who lives apart from society, describing the natural outcast—"the 'tribeless, lawless, heartless one' whom Homer denounces"—as "a lover of war." He conceives the state as coming into being subsequent to more primitive forms of social life, each type of community being successively "established with a view to some good, for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good." Since he thinks that the state "aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good," he praises the man "who first founded the state" as "the greatest of benefactors."

For Aristotle, then, there seems to be no inconsistency in saying that the state is as natural as the family and also that it is the result of a convention, *i.e.*, a voluntary association of men. Nor does there seem to be any inconsistency between Hobbes's view that the state is produced by a "covenant of every man with every man" and his understanding of the naturalness of the state in terms of the impulses which lead men to enter into this contract. The same double note appears in the account of the state's origin which Locke, Rousseau, and Kant give. The issue raised by the contract theory thus seems to turn on the interpretation of the original convention—whether or not it has legal significance and what obligations or limitations it imposes.

Where Hobbes, for example, interprets the contract as creating, along with the commonwealth, a sovereign person having absolute power, Locke seems to make majority rule the legal consequence of the original compact. God "designed man for a sociable creature," according to Locke, "with an inclination and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind." Yet even what he calls "the first society ... between man and wife," Locke says, "is made by a voluntary compact." It makes no difference to Locke's theory whether political societies develop by expansion from the family (which he takes to be the normal course of events) or result from a voluntary association of independent men.

In either case, political as distinguished from domestic society does not begin until "every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society, to submit to the determination of the majority ... This is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be, between

the individuals that enter into or make up a commonwealth. And thus that which begins and actually constitutes any political society is nothing but the consent of any number of free men capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society."

If it is "that, and that only, which did or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world," it seems to be equally evident to Locke that "absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil government at all."

Though Rousseau says that the most ancient of all societies, the family, is "the only one that is natural," he qualifies this by adding that it remains natural only so long as the children need the family for their preservation. If the members of the family remain united thereafter, "they continue so no longer naturally, but voluntarily; and the family itself is then maintained only by convention." By the same criterion, civil society would seem to be natural, at least on Rousseau's own supposition that "the obstacles in the way of their preservation in the state of nature" are greater than the power of isolated individuals or families to maintain themselves, and so "the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence."

Rousseau, furthermore, explicitly denies that the transition from a state of nature to a state of civil society can be treated as a historical fact. It is a hypothesis "calculated to explain the nature of things, [rather] than to ascertain their actual origin." The social contract, which Rousseau sometimes calls the "first convention," is, therefore, the legal, not the historical, origin of the state. As he formulates the compact, "each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole."

Though "all the qualities of the general will" may "reside in the majority," so that the general will can be discovered by a majority vote, unanimity is required to create the sovereign body politic, with the right as well as the power to compel "whoever refuses to obey the general will." Rousseau points out that "the law of majority voting is itself something established by convention, and presupposes unanimity, on one occasion at least." To this extent Rousseau agrees with Locke about the juridical significance of the original convention or the universal consent which establishes a civil society; and just as Locke calls absolute monarchy inconsistent with the very nature of the state, so Rousseau uses the words "republic" and "body politic" interchangeably. "To be legitimate," he writes, "the government must be, not one with the sovereign, but its minister."

But Rousseau identifies government with the executive, rather than primarily with the legislative as Locke does. He therefore denies that the original convention institutes government as well as the body politic itself—"the Sovereign having no force other than the legislative power." In consequence, Rousseau and Locke differ somewhat in their discussion of the dissolution of government as distinguished from the dissolution of society, or the death of the body politic. Rousseau regards no law as irrevocable, "not excluding the social compact itself; for if all the citizens assembled of one accord to break the compact, it is impossible to doubt that it would be very legitimately broken."

According to Kant, "a state is the union of a number of men under juridical laws"—the opposite of the state of nature, "in which there is no distributive justice." It is incumbent on men, says Kant, "to accept the principle that it is necessary to leave the state of nature, in which every one follows his own inclinations, and to form a union of all those who cannot avoid coming into reciprocal communication, and thus subject themselves in common to the external restraint of public compulsory laws."

Kant refers to this principle as the "postulate of public right" which obliges "all men to enter into the relations of a civil state of society." The state thus seems to be both necessary and voluntary; for though he says that "the act by which a people is represented as constituting itself into a state is termed *the original contract,*" yet he also adds that "this is

properly only an outward mode of representing the idea by which the rightfulness of the process of organizing the constitution may be made conceivable."

AGAINST ALL THESE notions of the original contract, Hegel, criticizing Kant's treatment of marriage under the concept of contract, says that "it is equally far from the truth to ground the nature of the state on the contractual relation, whether the state is supposed to be a contract of all with all, or of all with the monarch and the government." Contract, according to Hegel, belongs to the sphere of "relationships concerning private property generally." Hence "the intrusion of this contractual relation... into the relation between the individual and the state has been productive of the greatest confusion in both constitutional law and public life."

A contract, Hegel explains, "springs from a person's arbitrary will, an origin which marriage too has in common with contract. But the case is quite different with the state; it does not lie with an individual's arbitrary will to separate himself from the state, because we are already citizens of the state by birth. The rational end of man is life in the state, and if there is no state there, reason at once demands that one be founded. Permission to enter a state or leave it must be given by the state; this then is not a matter which depends on an individual's arbitrary will and therefore the state does not rest on contract, for contract presupposes arbitrariness. It is false to maintain that the foundation of the state is something at the option of all its members. It is nearer the truth to say that it is absolutely necessary for every individual to be a citizen."

Hegel dismisses all questions concerning historical origins in general or particular as "no concern of the Idea of the state." In the Idea itself, its antecedents are to be found. The family and civil society are the earlier—logical—moments in the development of the Idea of the State. "Civil society," Hegel writes, "is the [state of] difference which intervenes between the family and the state, even if its formation follows later in time than that of the state." The social contract theory applies only to what he calls "civil society," by which he means the modern conception of the state "as a unity which is only a partnership... Many modern constitutional lawyers," Hegel goes on, "have been able to bring within their purview no theory of the state but this. In civil society each member is his own end" and, "except by contract with others, he cannot attain the whole compass of his ends, and therefore these others are means to the end of the particular members."

In another place, Hegel describes civil society as a system of complete interdependence for the attainment of selfish ends, "wherein the livelihood, happiness, and legal status of one man is interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, and rights of all." In still another, he observes that only when the state is confused with civil society, only when "its specific end is laid down as the security and protection of property and personal freedom," does "the interest of the individuals as such become the ultimate end of their association." Whence "it follows that membership in the state is something optional. But the state's relation to the individual is quite different from this. Since the state is mind objectified, it is only as one of its members that the individual himself has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical life."

The unity of the state, unlike that of civil society, is, according to Hegel, "an absolute unmoved end in itself, in which freedom comes into its supreme right... This final end has supreme right against the individual, whose supreme duty is to be a member of the state."

IT DOES NOT SEEM to be an inevitable corollary of the social contract theory that the state be conceived as serving the private interests of individuals. "The welfare of the state," Kant declares, "is its own highest good." It is not to be understood merely as "the individual *well-being* and *happiness* of the citizens of the state; for—as Rousseau asserts—this end may perhaps be more agreeably and more desirably attained in the state of nature." Kant and Locke both affirm a social contract, but where Kant makes the safety of the republic itself the highest law (*salus reipublicae suprema lex*),

Locke makes it the security of the people (*salus populi*).

"The reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their property," writes Locke. The property of the individual is insecure in a state of nature; to avoid this insecurity "men unite into societies that they may have the united strength of the whole society to secure and defend their properties." When Locke says that the chief end of civil society is "the preservation of property," he does not refer solely to economic goods, but to all the goods to which he thinks man has a natural right—"his life, liberty, and estate." Men would not quit the state of nature, he writes, "were it not to preserve their lives, liberties and fortunes, and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and quiet."

In the light of Locke's conception of "property," his position resembles Hobbes's statement of the end which men seek in forming a commonwealth: "to live peaceably amongst themselves and be protected against other men" and to get "themselves out from that miserable condition of war" in which life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."

It seems to be in a different sense of property that Rousseau holds that "the foundation of the social compact is property; and its first condition, that everyone should be maintained in the peaceful possession of what belongs to him." Restricting "property" to economic possessions, Rousseau asks, "Are not all the advantages of society for the rich and powerful?" Society, he observes, "provides a powerful protection for the immense possessions of the rich, and hardly leaves the poor man in quiet possession of the cottage he builds with his own hands." Tawney agrees, pointing out, with reference to the 18th century, that "No one has forgotten the opposition offered in the name of the rights of property to factory legislation, to housing reform, to interference with the adulteration of goods, even to the compulsory sanitation of private houses."

This and Adam Smith's statement that "civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all," seem to anticipate the Marxist view of the state as the bulwark of property rights and an instrument of class oppression. If the protection of property and the maintenance of economic inequalities is the sole purpose of the state, then the ultimate resolution of the class war in favor of a classless society will, in the opinion of Marx and Engels, be accompanied by what they call "the withering away of the state"—an atrophy from loss of function.

But even in a classless society, the state would not cease to function if its end were to secure not merely the individual's wealth, but his whole well-being. Then, however, we must face another question—whether the happiness of the individual is the end of the state. Plato, for example, seems to answer this question in opposite ways.

In the *Protagoras*, it is said that "the desire for self-preservation gathered men into cities." This is part of the Promethean legend of the origin of civilization. As told by Aeschylus—and in a similar account of early history by Lucretius—the story intimates that men contract to live together for protection against violence and to enjoy a better life—the fruits of civil society or civilization.

But in *The Republic*, Socrates says that, in constructing the ideal state, the aim is "not the disproportionate happiness of any one class, but the greatest happiness of the whole." To the objection of Adeimantus that the citizens may be miserable in such a state, Socrates replies that we must consider whether "we would look to their greatest happiness individually, or whether this principle of happiness does not rather reside in the State as a whole." Later Socrates reminds Glaucon, who wonders whether the members of the guardian (or ruling) class will not be unhappy, that we are "fashioning the State with a view to the greatest happiness, not of any particular class, but of the whole."

Aristotle criticizes Socrates for depriving even the guardians of happiness and for saying that "the legislator ought to make the whole state happy." In his own view, "the whole cannot be happy unless most, or all, or some of its parts enjoy happiness. In this respect, happi-

ness is not like the even principle in numbers, which may exist only in the whole, but in neither of the parts." When Aristotle asserts that "the state exists for the sake of a good life," he seems to have the happiness of individuals in mind, for he excludes slaves and brute animals from membership in the state on the ground that they can have "no share in happiness or in a life of free choice."

But Aristotle also seems to give the state preeminence over the individual. "Even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state," he writes, "that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete, whether to attain or to preserve." This does not seem to him inconsistent with thinking that that "form of government is best in which every man, whoever he is, can act best and live happily."

Nor is Hegel reluctant to embrace both horns of the dilemma. Civil society rather than the state in its perfect realization seems to be devoted to the "attainment of selfish ends," such as individual happiness. But Hegel also says it is "perfectly true" that "the end of the state is the happiness of the citizens . . . If all is not well with them, if their subjective aims are not satisfied, if they do not find that the state as such is the means to their satisfaction, then the footing of the state is itself insecure."

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS of the nature, origin, and end of political society enter into the various conceptions of the ideal state which appear in the tradition of western thought. They also have a bearing on the division of social classes in the state, on the duties of the statesman or prince, and the principles of statecraft—the art or science of the ruler. Finally, they have implications for the relation of states to one another and for the different historic formations of the state.

All the modern writers who make some distinction between the state of nature and the state of civil society seem to agree that independent or sovereign states in their relation to one another are in a state of nature. Identifying the state of nature with the state of war, Hobbes remarks that "though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another, yet in all times kings and persons of sovereign authority" are "in the state and posture of gladiators . . . which is a posture of war."

Similarly, to the question, "Where are or ever were there any men in a state of nature?" Locke replies, "all princes and rulers of independent governments all through the world are in a state of nature." Because "bodies politic" remain "in a state of nature among themselves," they experience, according to Rousseau, "all the inconveniences which had obliged individuals to forsake it." With the same intent, Montesquieu observes that "princes who live not among themselves under civil law are not free; they are governed by force; they may continually force or be forced."

In Kant's opinion, "states, viewed as nations in their external relations to one another—like lawless savages—are naturally in a non-juridical condition," and he adds that "this natural condition is a state of war." Similarly, Hegel writes that "since the sovereignty of a state is the principle of its relations to others, states are to that extent in a state of nature in relation to each other."

On any of the theories concerning the origin of the state, it may be asked why political society cannot be enlarged to include all mankind. If, for example, in Aristotle's view, the state is a union of villages, as the village is a union of families, why may not a further expansion of political society be brought about by a union of states?

The question is not simply one of geographic limits or extent of population. The modern national state, though normally larger than the ancient city-state, remains an individual state and in the same external relationship to other states. Even the expansion of a city-state like Rome, at the greatest extent of its imperial domain, does not exemplify the principle of the world state unless it is proposed that the political unification of mankind be brought about by conquest and maintained by despotism.

Though Aristotle describes the state as formed by a combination of villages, he does not propose a combination of states to form a larger community. His reason may be that the

essence of the state lies in its self-sufficiency. Consequently, "the best limit of the population of a state is the largest number which suffices for the purposes of life, and can be taken in at a single view"; and the territory need be no larger than one which enables the population to be "most entirely self-sufficing."

The moderns, in contrast, propose the expansion of the political community by the amalgamation of separate political units. Montesquieu, for example, suggests that by entering into a "confederate republic," a number of small states can obtain the security which none of them has by itself. "If a republic be small," he writes, "it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it be large, it is ruined by an internal imperfection." A confederate republic, he thinks, "has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical, government . . . This form of government," Montesquieu continues, "is a convention by which several petty states agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to establish. It is a kind of assemblage of societies, that constitute a new one, capable of increasing by means of further associations, till they arrive at such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the whole body."

It is not security against external aggression, but internal peace, which leads Rousseau to propose an association more extensive than anything Montesquieu seems to have in mind—a confederation of *all* the states of Europe. But he does not see beyond Europe to all the states of the world. He regards "the great city of the world" as something less than a political society with civil laws, for he speaks of it as "the body politic whose general will is always the law of nature."

Nor are the American Federalists, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, able, at the end of the 18th century, to envisage the unlimited extension of the principle of federal union. They content themselves with arguing for the possibility of so extensive a union as the projected United States of America, against those who quoted "the observations of Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a Republican Government."

Before our own day Kant alone seems to contemplate the possibility of a world state *through federal union*. The "cosmopolitical ideal," he says, is "a universal union of states analogous to that by which a nation becomes a state." The postulate of reason which obliges men to quit the state of nature and form a civil union applies to states as well. "The natural state of nations, as well as of individual men," Kant writes, "is a state which it is a duty to pass out of, in order to enter into a legal state." But the ideal is impracticable in Kant's opinion—again because of the supposed limits of government with respect to extended territories and populations.

"With the too great extension of such a union of states over vast regions, any government of it, and consequently the protection of its individual members, must at last become impossible." Kant therefore proposes as an alternative a "permanent congress of nations," but one which, being "a voluntary combination of states . . . would be dissolvable at any time"—a mere league or confederacy, and not such a federal union "as is embodied in the United States of America, founded upon a political constitution, and therefore indissoluble."

The further implications of Kant's proposal, the alternative it replaces, and Hegel's objections to either, are discussed in the chapter on WAR AND PEACE. Here it seems appropriate to conclude with that vision of the world state which appears early in the tradition of the great books. It is conceived not as a worldwide federal union, but as a universal or unlimited community in which all men are citizens together even as they belong to one human brotherhood.

"If our intellectual part is common," argues the philosophical Roman emperor, Marcus Aurelius, "the reason also, in respect of which we are rational beings, is common; if this is so, common also is the reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this is so, there is a common law also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens; if this is so, we are members of some political community; if this is so, the world is in a manner a state."

Centuries later Dante, in the first book of

his *De Monarchia,* recaptures this ancient vision of the world state. Because "a plurality of authorities is disorder," authority must be single; and therefore, Dante argues, "world government is necessary . . . for the well-being of the world." It must be conceived as governing "mankind on the basis of what all have in common." By that "common law, it leads all toward peace."

THE PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINE of anarchy holds up the vision of human beings living together in peace and harmony without government and coercive force. They can get along in peace without states that impose order by the use of coercive force as well as by the laws to which coercive force must be attached to make the laws effective. Weber quotes with approval Leon Trotsky's statement that "every state is founded on force." Without the use of force, Weber declares, states would not exist, and "a condition would emerge that could be designated as 'anarchy,' in the specific sense of this word." This leads Weber to define the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory." All other use of force, being illegitimate and unauthorized, is therefore violence.

Weber adds the note "that 'territory' is one of the characteristics of the state." Its significance in the definition of state is that, in a given tract of territory, the state is the most inclusive organized community. In that territory, families, corporations, and other organizations and associations are members of the state, but the state is not a member of any other organized community, unless it be something like the United Nations, which is not a state because it does not have a monopoly of authorized force.

If a federal world government ever comes into existence, it will be a world state because it will have a monopoly of legitimate force; and thus, in the global territory which it thereby governs, the several national states will become members of it, having internal but not external sovereignty, as is the case with the several states that constitute the federal union of the United States of America.